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Migration, Trade, and Development: An Overview
James.F..Hollifield,.Pia.M..Orrenius,.and.Thomas.Osang
Migration, Trade, and  
Development: An Overview
James.F..Hollifield,.Pia.M..Orrenius,.and.Thomas.Osang
Migration and trade are more prevalent today than ever before in the history of the world. The United States is the recipient of about one-third of the world’s migrants and accounted for a quarter of the 
world’s output and 13 percent of the world’s trade in 2005. But the global 
significance of the U.S. economy is slowly declining, and while the effects of 
migration and trade on the U.S. economy have been examined time and again, 
questions concerning the impact of migration and trade on development in low-
income countries are of growing importance.
Simple, neoclassical economic models predict that prices should drive factors 
such as labor and capital across regions and countries toward their most valuable 
use. As this happens, developing countries, which are typically labor-rich and 
capital-scarce, should experience more rapid growth, higher income, and eventu-
ally convergence to industrial world levels of well-being. This process is happen-
ing slowly in some cases, but in other cases not at all.
Do migration and trade speed this convergence? If so, how? If not, why? 
These questions are addressed from different perspectives in the following papers 
presented at the conference “Migration, Trade, and Development,” held in Dallas 
in October 2006.
The Migration, Trade and Development Nexus
While international migration and trade are often looked at in isolation in 
terms of their impact on development, this session looked at their individual as 
well as their joint roles for growth and development. 
The paper by Philip L. Martin of the University of California, Davis, opened 
the conference. First, Martin analyzed three major channels through which mi-
gration can affect development in the workers’ countries of origin: recruitment, 
	 3
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remittances, and returns. The greatest benefits to migrants and their countries of 
origin arise from the emigration of unskilled workers, since they are most easily 
replaced at home and less likely to settle abroad. Remittances surpassed Official 
Development Assistance in the mid-1990s as a source of foreign exchange in 
developing countries and continue to grow. Conflicting views exist on the role 
played by return migrants. The optimistic scenario sees returning migrants as 
change agents, investing remittances and using skills acquired abroad to acceler-
ate development at home. The pessimistic scenario states that migrants who work 
abroad often return to rest and retire, limiting their impacts on economic develop-
ment. In the second part of his paper, Martin looked at the link between trade and 
migration. Since free trade agreements speed up economic and job growth in all 
participating countries, they tend to reduce unwanted migration into high-wage 
countries in the long run. However, trade agreements may trigger more migration 
in the short term, because freer trade can immediately speed up labor-displacing 
change, while time is required to generate new jobs. 
Southern Methodist University economics professor Thomas Osang present-
ed an empirical paper that examined the joint role of external (trade and migra-
tion) and internal (institutions and geography) development factors. He found 
that both internal and external determinants matter for development. The internal 
measures exhibited the expected signs: Good institutions have a positive impact, 
while proximity to the tropics hurts development. Among the external determi-
nants, trade is typically significant, with the expected positive impact on develop-
ment. The two migration measures used yielded conflicting results. The first, the 
foreign-born population share, matters positively for development. The second, 
remittances, appears to contribute little to development unless the sample is re-
stricted to countries with a relatively large remittance share in GDP.
Raymond Robertson of Macalester College surveyed the recent literature 
on the impact of North American integration on the Mexican labor market. Glo-
balization integrates labor markets through trade, capital flows, and migration. 
Focusing mainly on several of his own studies of Mexico’s manufacturing sector, 
Robertson showed that Mexico’s integration with the U.S. since NAFTA has po-
tentially positive implications for Mexican workers. In particular, rising trade has 
coincided with rising Mexican wages (relative to U.S. wages) and falling wage 
inequality within Mexico. The studies also indicate that Mexican and U.S. workers 
are complements rather than substitutes and that North America probably should 
be thought of as a unified market in terms of production. 
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The Politics of Migration and Trade
Throughout history, migration has been controversial. In the past, newcomers 
were often viewed as competing for scarce resources, typically land, and accused 
by natives of forcing up land prices and pushing down wages. With the expan-
sion of international trade in the past few decades, it too has been the topic of 
controversy. Critics have cast trade as a force that displaces workers and under-
cuts domestic production by bringing in cheaper goods. As a result, the politics 
of migration and trade are complex.
Marc Rosenblum of the University of New Orleans focused on the obstacles 
to cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico on the issue of immigration. He 
described the U.S.–Mexican migration relationship as one of complex interde-
pendence. Policymaking in this area is multidimensional, involving complicated 
rules and regulations governing entry and settlement in the U.S. and multiple 
actors and institutions. In this sense, the migration relationship is far more dif-
ficult politically than the trading relationship. Rosenblum laid out the history of 
Mexican migration to the U.S. from its beginnings in the nineteenth century to the 
present, sorting through the shifting interests of each state. The U.S., he argued, 
has traditionally viewed Mexican migration through an economic lens, whereas 
Mexico’s concern has been for emigration’s effects on sovereignty and indepen-
dence and for the rights of Mexican nationals in the U.S. The change in the stra-
tegic relationship that occurred under Salinas de Gortari ushered in a period of 
greater cooperation and less hostility between the two countries, especially with 
the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in the 1990s. But just 
when it appeared that there was an opening for greater cooperation on migration, 
the 9/11 attacks again altered the relationship, pushing security issues to the fore. 
Rosenblum delved into the domestic politics of migration in Mexico to explain 
why cooperation with the U.S. remains elusive. 
SMU professor Valerie Hunt explored the role public opinion plays in shap-
ing U.S. immigration policy. She pointed to the profound ambivalence Americans 
have had historically toward immigration—as a nation of immigrants, wanting 
to have a welcoming attitude toward foreigners, but at the same time fearful of 
the social, economic, and political consequences of high levels of immigration. 
She looked specifically at the impact of the 9/11 attacks on U.S. perceptions of 
the threat posed by immigration. The attacks heightened the awareness of im-
migration among Americans and further complicated the prospects for reforming 
immigration policy, introducing a new security dynamic into a debate that had 
been dominated by economic concerns. Hunt used the Pew and Tarrance Group 
surveys to document the rise of immigration in the public consciousness and 
as an electoral issue pre- and post-9/11. She outlined various immigration bills, 
documenting how public opinion is driving the reform process in Congress and 
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the White House. The result, she argued, is that immigration has moved higher on 
the political agenda than at any time in recent American history. 
The Circulation Migration of the Skilled and Economic  
Development
Mark Rosenzweig, Yale University professor and conference keynote speak-
er, discussed one of the most pressing issues in migration and development: the 
effect of the brain drain. Within the framework of his skill-price model, Rosen-
zweig showed that the big puzzle in development economics is not so much the 
difference in skill levels between countries as variation in skill prices (wages). 
Higher skill prices slow out-migration, but higher schooling levels can speed it 
up. To retain skilled workers, developing countries must raise their skill prices by, 
among other things, acquiring new technology, raising investment, and improving 
institutional quality.
Migration and Development: The Role of Remittances
In his contribution, Dilip Ratha of the World Bank discussed how migrant 
remittances have become a major source of external development finance and 
play an effective role in reducing poverty. In a message to policymakers in home 
and host countries, Ratha wrote that because remittances are personal flows from 
migrants to their friends and families, they should not be taxed or directed to 
specific development uses. Instead, the focus should be on making remittance 
services cheaper and leveraging these flows to improve financial access of mi-
grants and their families in origin countries.
San Diego State University professor Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes provided 
an overview of her work on the effect of remittances on recipient households in 
Mexico, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. She discussed the char-
acteristics of remitters, the motives for remitting, and remittances’ effects on re-
cipient households. Remittances appear to increase well-being by increasing con-
sumption and reducing labor supply, at least among women, and also by raising 
spending on health. Amuedo-Dorantes also showed that some of the disruptive 
effects of migration, such as on children’s schooling, are offset by remittances.
J. Edward Taylor, professor at the University of California, Davis, presented 
a series of paradoxes and puzzles in the migration-trade-development nexus. He 
pointed out, for example, that brain drain can be good for the home country be-
cause it raises the incentives to go to school. He also made the point that the least 
skilled don’t migrate because they are poor and migration costs are prohibitive. 
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Consequently, in the short to medium term, development and income growth in 
less-developed countries are often positively—not negatively—correlated with 
migration. This result throws into question a common policy prescription for 
solving the immigration “problem,” namely, to invest in and develop the home 
country. 
The Historical Relationship Between Migration, Trade, 
and Development
Jeffrey Williamson, Harvard University professor, presented evidence show-
ing that in the first global century, up until 1914, trade and especially migration 
had profound effects on both low-wage, labor-abundant Europe and the high-
wage, labor-scarce New World. As labor migrated to the United States, working 
conditions improved in Europe and inequality declined. The opposite took place 
in America. Williamson argued that these developments eventually led to the 
U.S. high school revolution—intense investment in public schooling of American 
youth and a commensurate reduction in wage inequality. 
SMU professor James Hollifield asked why states risk migration in the ab-
sence of an international regime for migration, comparable to regimes for finance 
(International Monetary Fund), trade (World Trade Organization), and develop-
ment (World Bank). He explored the differences in the political economy of 
trade and migration and explained why it is so difficult for states to create an 
international migration regime. He looked at coordination problems from the 
perspective of three schools of thought: realism, globalization or transnationalism, 
and liberal institutionalism. He argued that an international regime for governing 
migration must deal with the issue of rights (status of foreign nationals) and can-
not be based purely on an economic logic. But he was not sanguine about the 
creation of such a regime in the near term. Receiving states are likely to remain 
trapped in what Hollifield called a liberal paradox for decades to come—the 
economic logic for migration is one of openness, while the political and legal 
logic is one of closure. As for many of the sending states, they have incentives to 
push for greater openness to reap the benefits of remittances and possible return 
migration. The nexus between trade, migration, and development remains tight; 
but the international politics surrounding each issue makes it unlikely that states 
will be able to overcome coordination problems. 
Gustav Ranis, professor at Yale, examined the costs and benefits for both or-
igin and destination countries, while differentiating between skilled and unskilled 
immigrants. The migration of unskilled workers represents the largest potential 
benefit to global welfare, even though the distribution of gains between ori-
gin and destination countries remains controversial. The origin country benefits 
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from unskilled migration because the country receives remittances without losing 
much productive capacity. For the destination country, the costs and benefits are 
more complex. While consumers and social security systems benefit, domestic 
unskilled workers experience a wage decline. The impact of skilled worker mi-
gration on the origin country is equally complex. Although the country benefits 
from remittances and return migration, the loss of human capital is costly in the 
short run. In contrast, the destination country appears to benefit from skilled 
worker immigration due to a reduction in specific labor shortages and more en-
trepreneurial energy and technological change.
Conclusion
In the long run, economic forces should act to iron out, not exacerbate, inter-
national income differences and improve national incomes in all countries. Cross-
country interaction, be it through migration or trade, should help this process 
along and improve global well-being. Presenters at this conference examined the 
various dimensions in which trade and migration affect economic development, 
whether individually or jointly, through economic or political forces. Despite the 
public controversy over the free flow of goods and people, the message of the 
papers collected in this volume is simple and clear: The net benefits from open-
ing borders to foreign goods, services, and people are positive and substantial in 
most cases. However, not all benefits will materialize immediately as economies 
transition toward more open borders. Nevertheless, policymakers interested in 
advancing the national well-being ought to pursue those policies most likely to 
promote long-term economic growth and prosperity. Policies aimed at helping 
goods, services, and people overcome national borders are clearly among them. 
Session I:
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The Trade, Migration, and  
Development Nexus
Philip.L..Martin.
The world is divided into about 200 nation states. Their per capita incomes ranged in 2004 from less than $250 per year to more than $50,000 (World Bank 2006), providing significant incentive to migrate from one 
country to another for higher wages. The thirty high-income countries had 1 bil-
lion residents in 2004, a sixth of the world’s population, and their gross national 
income was $32 trillion, 80 percent of the global $40 trillion.1 The resulting aver-
age per capita income of $32,000 was twenty-one times the average $1,500 for 
the five-sixths of the world’s people in low- and middle-income countries.
About 3 percent of the world’s 6.4 billion people were international migrants 
in 2005. These 191 million migrants included 62 million who moved from south 
to north (from a developing to a developed country), 61 million who moved from 
south to south, 53 million who moved from north to north, and 14 million who 
moved from north to south. In each of these flows, about half of the migrants 
were in the labor force of the destination area (International Labor Office 2004), 
prompting the question: What role can migrant workers who move from a devel-
oping to a high-income country play in fostering trade and accelerating develop-
ment in their countries of origin? For most of human history, the assumption was 
that migrants contributed primarily to their new homes, not to their countries of 
origin. Historians debate the emigration mistakes of governments, as when the 
French expelled the Huguenots in the sixteenth century, helping to spark the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain. 
Until recently, there were relatively few stories of migrants abroad transform-
ing the country they left behind. One exception is Taiwan, which invested so little 
in higher education in the 1970s that many of those who wanted graduate degrees 
went abroad. Many graduates stayed abroad despite rapid economic growth in 
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Taiwan, but during the 1980s (even before the end of martial law), some began 
to return.2 To encourage returns, the government established the Hinschu Science 
Industrial Park in 1980 as a rival to Silicon Valley in California. Financial incentives 
such as subsidized Western-style housing were provided to encourage high-tech 
businesses to locate in Hinschu (Luo and Wang 2002). By 2000, Hinschu was a 
major success, employing over 100,000 workers in 300 companies with total sales 
of $28 billion. Over 40 percent of Hinschu-based firms were headed by returned 
overseas migrants, and 10 percent of the 4,100 returned migrants employed in the 
park had Ph.D. degrees.
Is Taiwan’s Hinschu experience with diaspora-stimulated development the 
exception or the rule? Can migrants abroad foster the trade and investment links 
associated with faster economic growth in poorer countries, even if their coun-
tries are not undergoing rapid economic growth, as in Taiwan? Are migrants, as 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan asserted, “the motors of human 
progress” for both sending as well as receiving countries? 3
This paper deals with migrants’ role in stimulating development in their 
countries of origin, outlining the three major channels through which migra-
tion can affect development: recruitment, remittances, and returns. It next turns 
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), assessing the relevance 
of the Mexico–United States migration hump for migration, trade, and develop-
ment elsewhere. The paper concludes that migrants can accelerate development 
in their countries of origin but finds nothing mechanical or automatic about the 
migration and development linkage. Countries growing and ready to grow can 
benefit from migration’s three R’s: recruitment, remittances, and returns. But in 
other cases, migration’s three R’s can prevent an economic takeoff. Thus, the an-
swer to the question of whether migration accelerates development is simple: It 
depends.
Migration’s Three R’s
Migration that moves workers from lower- to higher-wage countries can be 
a win-win-win situation, with migrants benefiting from higher wages, receiving 
countries benefiting from more employment and larger gross national product, 
and sending countries benefiting from jobs, remittances, and returns. The first two 
wins are well established. Migrants demonstrate their strong desire to go abroad 
by taking enormous risks to move to higher-wage countries, and most studies 
conclude that migrants in industrial countries slightly expand economic output 
by slightly depressing wages.  
The third win—the effect of emigration on migrant countries of origin—has 
been in the spotlight recently, largely because migrant numbers and remittances 
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have been rising and some sending-country governments have demanded com-
pensation for their loss of human capital. Two extreme scenarios have emerged 
involving highly skilled migrants and their countries of origin: Indian information 
technology emigration and African health care migration. The virtuous circle that 
began with the emigration of Indian information technology specialists resulted 
in the development of a new software and outsourcing industry in India, while 
the vicious circle that began with the exodus of African health care professionals 
has been associated with deteriorating health care systems, lower worker produc-
tivity, and slower socioeconomic development.4
The Indian IT success story began in the mid-1980s, when some of the 
7,000 Indian IT specialists were sent by multinationals to their subsidiaries 
outside India, where they performed well. The late-1990s IT boom and Y2K is-
sue encouraged industrial countries to open doors to IT professionals from India 
and elsewhere. Independent brokers soon emerged to recruit and deploy In-
dians to firms that did not have operations in India. Two decades later, India 
has annual revenues of over US$10 billion from exports of computer-related 
services.
By contrast, the recruitment of African doctors and nurses by hospitals in 
ex-colonial masters such as the U.K. may have set in motion vicious circles that 
retarded economic development. African doctors and nurses are often trained 
to colonial-power standards, expediting the recognition of their licenses abroad. 
Many government-funded health care systems in Africa find it hard to lure doc-
tors and nurses to poorer rural areas, so they often assign graduates to rural areas 
and enforce these assignments by withholding licenses until the term of duty is 
completed. The result is often emigration fever, so that 40 percent of the 1,300 
doctors and 2,500 nurses who graduate each year in South Africa emigrate as 
soon as they can (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or 
OECD, 2004). The resulting loss of human capital can be significant. The South 
African government estimated it spent $1 billion educating health workers who 
emigrated during the 1990s, equivalent to a third of the development aid received 
from the end of apartheid in 1994 to 2000.
There are obvious differences between IT and health care, including gov-
ernment’s role in shaping labor supply and demand. IT is largely a private-sector 
industry in which much training occurs on the job and many standards are set 
privately. By contrast, the supply of health care services is heavily influenced 
by governments that support doctor and nurse training and control licensure, 
and the demand is influenced by the ease of access to and charges for services. 
Migration’s effects on countries of origin usually lie between these virtuous and 
vicious extremes, justifying a closer look at the three R’s that shape emigration’s 
effects on development. 
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Recruitment
Migration is not random. Young people are most likely to move over borders 
because they have the least invested in jobs and careers at home and the most 
time to recoup their “investment in migration” abroad. Who migrates depends sig-
nificantly on an individual’s human capital and network connections, but demand 
conditions in receiving areas are the dominant factor shaping labor flows. For 
example, if employers in destination countries want IT professionals and nurses, 
networks and recruiters will evolve to help them move abroad; if the demand is 
for maids and farmworkers, networks and agents will evolve to move them over 
borders. 
Migrants moving from developing to developed countries are different from 
the workers they left behind as well as the workers in the countries to which 
they move. About 40 percent of the world’s workers are employed in agriculture, 
20 percent in industry and construction, and 40 percent in services; the world’s 
developing country migrants are drawn from societies that have this 40–20–40 
distribution (World Bank 2006). The industrial countries to which migrants move 
have about 3 percent of their workers employed in agriculture, 25 percent in in-
dustry, and 72 percent in services. 
However, the 31 million migrant workers from developing countries who 
were in industrial countries in 2005 had a labor force distribution unlike that in 
sending or receiving countries. About 10 percent were employed in agriculture, 
40 percent in industry and construction, and 50 percent in services. This distribu-
tion of developing-country migrants reflects a tendency of three types of indus-
trial-country employers to request migrants: those in sunset industries such as 
agriculture and some manufacturing (sewing); those in industries that are difficult 
to trade, such as construction; and those in many growing service-sector indus-
tries, from janitorial to health care.
Developing-country migrants in industrial countries also have personal char-
acteristics that set them apart from other adults in receiving countries. Migrants 
differ in the best single determinant of individual earnings in industrial countries: 
years of education.
In most developing countries, the distribution of adults by years of education 
has a pyramid shape reflecting a few well-educated persons on top and a mass 
of workers with less than a secondary-school certificate or high school diploma 
at the bottom.  
Native-born adults in high-income countries, by contrast, have a diamond 
shape when arrayed by years of education. About 25 percent have a college 
degree, 60 percent a secondary-school certificate, and 15 percent less than a sec-
ondary-school certificate or high school diploma. 
Developing-country migrants in industrial countries have more of an hour-
glass or barbell shape. About 40 percent have a college degree, 25 percent a sec-
The Trade, Migration, and Development Nexus 1
ondary-school certificate, and 35 percent less than a secondary-school certificate 
or high school diploma. International migration from developing to industrial 
countries takes people from the top and bottom of a pyramid distribution and 
adds them to the top and bottom of a diamond-shaped distribution.
Professionals and Students. The migrants drawn from the top of the edu-
cation pyramid of developing countries are often professionals, students, or legal 
residents of industrial countries. Foreigners arrive in industrial countries via front, 
side, and back doors. The front door represents presumed settler immigration; the 
side door allows the entry of tourists, guest workers, and students for a specific 
time and purpose; and the back door represents illegal entries as well as legally 
arrived foreigners who violate the terms of their entry, such as tourists who go to 
work or overstay. 
Over the past two decades, almost all industrial countries have made it easier 
for foreign professionals to enter as settlers or guest workers. There are two broad 
approaches to selecting immigrants who are professionals: so-called supply and 
demand systems. The supply-oriented systems of Australia, Canada, and the U.K. 
give points to applicants for immigrant visas based on their language ability, 
years of education, age, and other factors presumed to affect earnings and grant 
immigrant visas to those with sufficient points. The demand-oriented system of 
the U.S., by contrast, makes the major criterion having a job offer from a U.S. em-
ployer. There has been some convergence between supply- and demand-oriented 
selection systems. In particular, Canada has raised the number of points awarded 
for having a local job offer to avoid brain waste—the presumed lack of earnings 
due to immigrants’ employment in jobs that do not require their credentials, such 
as when a doctor drives a taxi. Meanwhile, the U.S. makes it easiest for employers 
to obtain immigrant visas for degreed foreigners who fill a U.S. job that requires 
at least a college degree.
Side-door “nonimmigrant” professionals and students often wind up obtain-
ing immigrant visas. Nonimmigrants are admitted for a specific time and purpose, 
but most industrial countries have probationary immigrant guest worker programs 
similar to the U.S. H-1B program, which makes entry and settlement relatively 
easy (Martin 2006). U.S. employers open the border gate to degreed foreigners 
by attesting that these workers are needed to fill U.S. jobs that usually require a 
college degree. During the six years that an H-1B visa is normally valid, foreign-
ers may become immigrants by finding a U.S. employer to sponsor them under 
a different certification process that involves proving that qualified U.S. workers 
are not available. With the foreign worker usually employed in the job while the 
employer engages in the required recruitment of U.S. workers, it is no surprise that 
U.S. workers are rarely hired in these situations (U.S. Department of Labor 1996).
Professionals complete their education before they cross borders and are pro-
bationary until they find an employer to sponsor them for visas (U.S.) or satisfy 
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requirements (Europe) that provide permanent residence status. Foreign-student 
programs are another type of probationary immigrant system. Most graduates of 
host-country institutions learn the host-country language and become familiar 
with host-country ways of study and work before graduation. If they find employ-
ers to hire them, most countries permit foreign student graduates to remain at 
least several years or settle.
In 2000, two million foreign students were in OECD countries—half from 
outside the OECD, including 34 percent in the U.S., 16 percent in the U.K., 13 
percent in Germany, 11 percent in France, and 8 percent in Australia (OECD 
2002). Foreign students usually study subjects that impart skills transferable inter-
nationally, such as science and engineering rather than law. Some institutions of 
higher education have become dependent on the revenues from foreign students, 
and some graduate programs appreciate the willingness of foreign students to be 
relatively low-wage research assistants and postdoctoral researchers. 
The rising number of foreign students, especially in science and engineering 
graduate programs, raises the question of whether they are needed. Teitelbaum 
(2003) argues that the high percentage of foreign students in U.S. science and en-
gineering doctoral programs reflects labor market deficiencies and student desires 
for immigrant visas, not a “national need” for more Ph.D.s in science and engi-
neering. He points out that in many basic sciences, six or more years of graduate 
study is followed by five to ten years of low-paid postdoctoral research, so that 
graduates do not get “real jobs” until age 35 or 40.5
Unskilled Migrants. Most of the world’s workers and most of the world’s 
migrant workers are unskilled. Many need help to cross national borders, and 
there has been rapid growth in the number of for-profit recruiters that move the 
workers (Kuptsch 2006). The wage gap between countries motivates migration, 
and the recruiter’s share of this wage gap depends on a number of factors, includ-
ing the difficulty of migrating illegally (or migrating without the help of recruiters) 
and prospects for settlement and upward mobility abroad. In most labor flows, 
recruiting fees are highest at the beginning of a flow. But after workers are es-
tablished abroad, more potential migrants have access to information via social 
networks and may find alternative routes to employment that include traveling as 
tourists to visit relatives and staying to work.
In countries such as the Philippines, where most migrants leave legally, re-
cruiters match half or more with jobs. The government tries to limit recruiting fees 
to the equivalent of one month’s wages for the typical two-year contract, about 
4.2 percent, but Abella (2004) concludes that limits on fees that recruiters can 
charge workers have been “widely disregarded” because there is an excess sup-
ply of migrants. A migrant may leave the country with a contract stipulating that 
the recruitment fee is a month’s wage but, upon arrival, is asked to sign another 
contract that raises the fee to four to six months’ wages. Migrants can refuse to 
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sign the second contract but may be forced to return without the means to repay 
recruitment debts.
A December 1995 survey of male migrants in Kuwait found that 75 percent 
of Sri Lankan migrants used private recruiters to get their jobs, paying an aver-
age $800, or four months’ wages, for the typical $200-a-month worker (some of 
these recruitment fees wind up in the hands of the foreign sponsor-employers). 
Fewer Indian and Pakistani men used recruiters because they had more access to 
social networks; the Indians and Pakistanis who used recruiters paid two to three 
months’ wages in fees (Shah 1996). Half of the Bangladeshis used recruiters, and 
they paid the highest fees despite having the lowest monthly earnings: an average 
$1,800 for jobs paying $150 a month. The recruitment fees paid by Bangladeshis 
rose in the 1980s,6 perhaps because the shift from construction to services jobs 
allowed migrants to remain abroad longer (Azad 1989).
It is important to emphasize that conditions in receiving-country labor mar-
kets, such as employer perceptions of the relative virtues of migrants and local 
workers, affect what type of worker is preferred and how migrants find jobs. Most 
economists believe that employers prefer workers with the most human capital, 
but sociologists Roger Waldinger and Michael Lichter (2003) find that many Los 
Angeles-area employers preferred newly arrived migrant workers because they 
had the “right” attitude toward the often low-wage and difficult jobs offered.7 Mi-
grants lacking English, schooling, and familiarity with American culture may be 
preferred by some employers because of their “personal qualifications—friendli-
ness, enthusiasm, smiling, subservience.”
Waldinger and Lichter look at the requirements of jobs held by migrants and 
find that in manufacturing, workers needed to be able to engage in the physical 
exertion associated with the job, but their next-most-important trait was an ability 
to get along with coworkers. In most workplaces, current employees were ex-
pected to teach new workers the tricks of particular tasks and machines. Migrant 
networks are ideal for such on-the-job training because current workers often 
recruit friends and relatives. Networks save employers recruitment and training 
costs and enable workers from particular foreign places to “capture” particular 
workplaces, so that unemployed local workers with more human capital but no 
“social capital” may not even learn about the vacant jobs.8
Most migrants move over national borders under the terms of unilateral guest 
worker programs, meaning that employers who satisfy national government cri-
teria for employing foreign workers can recruit them where and how they wish. 
Most countries do not sign bilateral agreements or memorandums of understand-
ing (MOUs) with migrant countries of origin to regulate recruitment, even though 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) favors recruitment under bilateral 
agreements and included a model agreement in Recommendation 86 (1949).9
More MOUs regulate migration today than in the past, but they often deal 
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with the return of apprehended migrants, not the recruitment and protection of 
migrant workers. Thailand has MOUs with the three neighbors that send migrant 
workers—Burma, Cambodia, and Laos—and they call for migrant workers in 
Thailand to receive equal wages and benefits. However, the emphasis on return 
is reflected in the 15 percent of wages earned in Thailand that are withheld to en-
courage returns and provide funds for development in migrant areas of origin.
In exchange for opening legal channels for migrants, Burma, Cambodia, and 
Laos are to issue identification documents to their nationals at home and abroad 
and accept the return of apprehended unauthorized foreigners. In December 
2005, the Thai cabinet approved the admission of 200,000 migrants under these 
MOUs while there were 300,000 nationals of these countries in detention for ir-
regular status.10 Since these apprehended foreigners had to be dealt with before 
new legal guest workers were admitted, the net effect of the announcement may 
have been to promote illegal migration. Some migrants expecting to go legally 
may have been encouraged to go illegally rather than wait.
Remittances
Remittances are international financial transfers from individuals to individ-
uals. Most are derived from the earnings of citizens of one country who are 
employed in another, meaning that remittances replace what would have been 
earned at home if the individual had not migrated.  
Three steps are involved in a typical remittance transfer: The migrant pays 
the remittance to a money transfer firm such as Western Union in one country, 
the money transfer firm instructs its agent in another country to deliver the re-
mittance, and the agent pays the recipient. Agents in the two countries periodi-
cally settle their credit and debit accounts, often via a commercial bank. Under 
the hundi, hawala, padala, fei-chien, and other informal remittance systems, 
no money need cross national borders immediately to have remittances paid to 
beneficiaries.
Volume and Formalization. Remittances are the sum of workers’ remit-
tances and “compensation of employees” payments recorded in balance of pay-
ments data. Workers’ remittances are monies received from nationals or residents 
of countries abroad more than twelve months (regardless of their legal status), 
while compensation of employees payments are funds from those abroad less 
than twelve months, including border commuters and seasonal workers.11 Not all 
countries report remittance data. Forty-five report both workers’ remittances and 
compensation of employees data, fourteen only workers’ remittances, and nine-
teen only compensation of employees data (World Bank 2005).12
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) compiles reports of remittances from 
national central banks in its Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. Conceptually, 
workers’ remittances are a transfer without a quid pro quo, while compensation 
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of employees is labor income, but “it may be difficult to separately identify the 
two items” (United Nations Technical Subgroup on Movement of Natural Persons 
2005). Some countries, such as Indonesia, report personal transfers from abroad 
as workers’ remittances; others, such as Thailand, report them as compensation 
of employees; and some, including the Philippines, report under both categories. 
Most analyses sum workers’ remittances and compensation of employees to ob-
tain a measure of formal transfers, and this sum is generally called remittances.13 
Major payers of remittances include the U.S. ($39 billion in 2004), Saudi 
Arabia, and Germany. Flows of money out of countries in which migrants work 
should match inflows of funds to migrant countries of origin (unless migrants 
send remittances to third countries). This does not necessarily occur, in part be-
cause some countries do not (fully) report remittances, and some remittances are 
transferred via informal channels, such as when migrants return with cash, send 
cash with friends or via couriers or informal systems, or return with goods. 
The Global Economic Prospects 2006 report (World Bank 2005) estimates to-
tal remittances of $232 billion in 2005, including $167 billion received by develop-
ing countries. There are several reasons for rapidly rising remittances, including 
the increased scrutiny of remittance flows after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks;14 lower costs and expanding networks to move small sums over borders 
via regulated financial institutions; better recording of fund transfers; more mi-
grants; and the depreciation of the dollar, which raises the dollar value of remit-
tances transferred in other currencies.15 Unrecorded remittance flows via informal 
channels “may conservatively add 50 percent (or more) of recorded flows” (World 
Bank 2005), or $84 billion to developing countries in 2005, bringing the total to 
at least $251 billion.
In 2004, 34 developing countries each received over $1 billion in remittances. 
India received the most, $21.7 billion, followed by China, $21.3 billion; Mexico, 
$18.1 billion; and the Philippines, $11.6 billion.16 About two-thirds of remittances 
to developing countries came from migrants in developed countries and a third 
from developing-country migrants in other developing countries (for example, 
when Indonesians in Malaysia send remittances to Indonesia). Remittances to 
developing countries doubled between 2000 and 2004, with half the increase 
accounted for by China, India, and Mexico. Countries in which remittances are 
the highest share of gross domestic product include islands such as Tonga, 31 
percent; countries making transitions from communism, including Moldova, 27 
percent; and traditional labor exporters such as Lesotho, 26 percent. 
The major determinants of remittance volume include the number of mi-
grants, their income abroad, and their propensity to remit to their countries of ori-
gin. International organizations such as the World Bank and IMF aim to increase 
and formalize remittances to accelerate poverty reduction and improve the access 
of poor people in developing countries to financial services. Formal transfers 
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may have favorable macroeconomic effects on recipient countries, such as when 
banks lend against remittance deposits or sell bonds based on anticipated remit-
tances, increasing their multiplier effect. Formal remittances may also deepen 
recipient-country financial systems and strengthen country credit ratings. In many 
cases, if recipients pick up remittances at banks, they open accounts, which can 
have favorable impacts on bank profits as well as development.
Formalizing remittance flows can be encouraged by reducing the cost of 
formal transfers, increasing migrant access to banks and other formal transfer 
mechanisms, and providing migrants with the IDs needed to deal with regulated 
financial institutions. The World Bank 2005 report concludes that it is generally 
easier to formalize remittance flows by reducing costs and improving migrant 
access to regulated financial institutions than by trying to impose regulation on 
informal transfer mechanisms. 
Reducing formal remittance costs and easing access can be accomplished 
with regulatory changes such as:
• Allowing and encouraging domestic banks to operate in countries where 
migrants are employed to overcome migrant distrust of unfamiliar banks17 
and to ensure that banking services are provided in the migrants’ lan-
guage (in some cases, capital requirements may need to be reduced to 
allow more foreign banks to operate in countries hosting migrants). 
• Discouraging or banning exclusive arrangements between transfer agents, 
such as Western Union or MoneyGram, and entities with dispersed facili-
ties in migrant areas of origin, such as postal agencies, thereby promoting 
competition in the so-called last mile of a remittance corridor linking two 
countries.
• Encouraging the spread of cellular telephone-based remittance systems, 
which promise the lowest-cost means of sending remittances while 
improving communications in migrant-sending areas.
All research agrees that the best way to increase and formalize remittances 
is to ensure that migrant-sending countries have sound economic policies, in-
cluding an appropriate exchange rate and a banking system that is cost-efficient 
and friendly to remitters and recipients. Most remittances are spent on consump-
tion, reflecting the fact that the breadwinner is abroad and remittances substitute 
for local earnings. However, the portion of remittances saved and invested in 
the home country can be increased if the savings and investment climate favors 
these activities; that is, if there is little risk of devaluation or taxation or expro-
priation of local savings and there are opportunities to launch profitable small 
businesses.
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Remittances and Development. Increasing the development impact of re-
mittances is the second policy priority of national governments and international 
institutions. With remittances rising faster than Official Development Assistance 
and flowing through private channels to often poor areas that send migrants 
abroad, increasing the portion of remittances invested in job-creating businesses 
could reduce future emigration pressures.
Little evidence exists that programs targeted at migrants have significant devel-
opment-enhancing effects, suggesting that growth- and business-friendly macro 
and micro environments hold more promise to encourage migrant investments. 
However, targeted programs to increase the development impact of remittances 
are spreading. These include Mexico’s three-to-one program, which provides fed-
eral, state, and local government matches for remittance contributions invested in 
infrastructure improvement in migrant areas of origin. 
In 2004, Mexican migrants in the U.S. raised $20 million for such infrastruc-
ture investments. Federal, state, and local governments added $60 million to fund, 
for example, infrastructure improvements in migrant villages. However, $80 mil-
lion is less than half of 1 percent of the $18 billion in remittances received by 
Mexico, and World Bank (2005) reports that most of the Mexican hometown as-
sociations that raised funds for matching in 2004 invested less than $10,000 in 
their communities of origin. 
The World Bank 2005 report concludes that the development effects of match-
ing program investments are “poorly documented.”18 Other complaints were that 
the money to match migrant funds usually comes from overall development 
funds. If migrant and local development priorities differ—for example, when mi-
grants want to restore the local church while local residents want a paved road or 
sewer system—migrant funds can lead to conflict over how scarce development 
funds should be allocated.
A more promising development-accelerating impact of remittances may be to 
lower the cost of borrowing money. Banks in Brazil, the Philippines, and other 
countries have floated bonds at lower-than-average interest costs because inves-
tors assume remittances will provide a continuing inflow of foreign exchange to 
repay them. Remittance securitization typically involves a borrowing bank estab-
lishing an offshore entity and pledging the remittances it anticipates to this entity. 
Correspondent banks channel remittances to the offshore entity, which pays off 
the bonds and funnels the surplus to the bank. Investors are willing to accept a 
lower interest rate from the offshore entity because there is less danger that the 
country will make it hard to convert local currency to foreign. Bonds based on the 
expected flow of remittances to El Salvador, for example, carry interest rates 1 to 
2 percent less than the debt issued by the El Salvador government (World Bank 
2005). Between 1994 and 2004, about 90 percent of the remittance-based debt 
issued involved three countries—Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico.
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Matching migrants’ investment contributions and lowering the cost of bor-
rowing with remittance-backed bonds are examples of incremental development-
enhancing steps. The U.N.’s high-level dialogue in September 2006 aimed to find 
larger development-enhancing benefits from migration. Some believe that the 
combination of remittances and diasporas is a key to more rapid development, 
with funds flowing from migrant-receiving to migrant-sending countries, accom-
panied by more trade in both directions.
Returns
The third R in the migration and development equation is returns. Ideally, 
migrants who have been abroad return and provide the energy and ideas needed 
to start or expand businesses, or return with the skills and discipline needed to 
raise productivity as employees. Migrants are generally drawn from the ranks of 
the risk takers at home, and if their savings from work abroad are combined with 
risk-taking behavior on their return, the result can be a new impetus for economic 
development. 
On the other hand, if migrants settle abroad and cut ties to their countries of 
origin, or if they return only to rest and retire, migration may have limited devel-
opment impact. In the extreme, returning to rest and retire can slow development 
if workers acquire a work-abroad and rest-at-home mentality, and this mentality 
spreads to children. There may also be back-and-forth circulation, which can un-
der some conditions contribute to economic growth in both countries. 
Countries such as China sometimes refer to their diasporas as “stored brain-
power” abroad, to be welcomed home when needed, as in the Taiwanese case. 
It is much harder to persuade established migrants to return to the poorest coun-
tries. The International Organization for Migration operates a return-of-talent 
program for professional Africans abroad, providing them with travel and wage 
subsidies if they sign two-year contracts pledging to work in the public sector of 
their country of origin. The U.N. Development Program has a similar Transfer of 
Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals program that subsidizes the return of 
teachers and researchers. Sussex University’s Richard Black calls such programs 
“expensive failures” because they bring temporary returns but not the “investment 
that [long-term return] should bring.”19
Even if migrants do not return immediately, they can contribute to develop-
ment at home by maintaining links with their countries of origin, increasing the 
probability of an eventual return and perhaps forging trade and investment ties. 
One way for sending countries to maintain links with their nationals abroad is 
to permit dual nationality or dual citizenship, which Bhagwati (2003) argues can 
lead to a diaspora model of development, “which integrates past and present 
citizens into a web of rights and obligations in the extended community defined 
with the home country as the center.” Bhagwati notes that migrants abroad can 
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generate “political remittances,” including ideas that help to speed up change in 
often-traditional sending countries. 
There are two caveats to the current enthusiasm for diaspora-led develop-
ment. First, it is often asserted that instead of promoting returns with subsidies, 
dual nationality, and other devices, sending countries should do more to retain 
migrants by reducing discrimination and other factors that prompt people to 
leave. An example is when only those from the tribe or political party in power 
are given access to universities and good jobs. It is generally cheaper to keep 
potential migrants at home than to induce migrants abroad to return. Second, 
the diaspora can be a force for conflict and economic stagnation rather than de-
velopment at home. This is the case when migrants abroad provide the funds to 
prolong civil wars or conflicts.20 
NAFTA, Migration, and Development
Europe and the U.S. have distinctly different policies concerning economic 
integration with poorer neighbors that are sources of migrants. The European 
Union, built on the four freedoms—free movement of goods, services, capi-
tal, and labor—aims to foster the political and economic changes necessary to 
minimize emigration before granting workers freedom-of-movement rights. As a 
result, when there is freedom of movement, usually after seven years, few Italians 
or Spaniards migrate. The U.S. has followed a different path with NAFTA, hoping 
that freer trade and investment lead to faster economic and job growth in Mexico 
and reduced migration over time.
Migration was the central feature of Mexico–U.S. relations for most of the 
twentieth century, but the volume of cross-border flows rose remarkably in the 
1990s. A third of all legal Mexican immigrants admitted in the twentieth century 
and a third of twentieth-century apprehensions were in the 1990s (Table 1). High 
levels of legal and unauthorized migration have continued in the twenty-first 
century despite rising levels of Mexico–U.S. trade and stepped-up border enforce-
ment efforts.
The roots of this Mexico–U.S. labor migration lie in the U.S. government-
approved recruitment of about five million Mexican workers between 1917 and 
1921 and again between 1942 and 1964. Distortion and dependence resulted from 
these guest worker programs. Some U.S. farmers made investment decisions that 
assumed there would be a continued influx of Mexican workers, and some Mexi-
cans became dependent on U.S. jobs and earnings. These developments allowed 
the labor migration that began with U.S. recruitment to take on a life of its own.
A combination of increased demand-pull pressures in the U.S., especially 
during the job booms of the late 1980s and late 1990s, and increased supply-push 
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pressure in Mexico, especially after economic crises in the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s, helped diffuse the origins and destinations of Mexican migrants. Today, 
more Mexicans come from southern and urban Mexico, and more are taking non-
farm as well as farm jobs throughout the U.S. The U.S. labor force of 148 million 
in 2004 included 19 million Hispanics (13 percent), with perhaps 40 percent born 
in Mexico. The Hispanic share of net U.S. labor force growth over the 1994–2004 
decade, 44 percent, is three times the Hispanic share of the labor force.21  
Mexico–U.S. trade has increased as a result of NAFTA, but the rate of increase 
in Mexico–U.S. migration has been even faster. The Mexican government changed 
its economic policies in the mid-1980s from an inward-oriented import-substitu-
tion model to an outward-oriented model that assumed foreign investors would 
create jobs in factories to capitalize on low Mexican wages to produce goods for 
export. Mexican President Carlos Salinas sought to lock these free-trade policies 
into an international agreement through NAFTA.
NAFTA accelerated the lowering of trade and investment barriers among Can-
ada, Mexico, and the U.S. that was already under way. The result was expected 
Table 1
Mexican Immigration and Apprehensions: 1890–2003
 Immigrants,  Decade Apprehensions,   Decade 
 annual  Decade as percent of  annual Decade as percent of 
Decade  average  total 1890–2003 total average  total 1890–2003 total
1890–1900. 97. 971. 0. NA. NA. NA
1901–10. 4,964. 49,642. 1. NA. NA. NA
1911–20. 21,900. 219,004. 3. NA. NA. NA
1921–30.. 45,929. 459,287. 7. 25,697. 256,968. 1
1931–40. 2,232. 22,319. 0. 14,746. 147,457. 0
1941–50. 6,059. 60,589. 1. 137,721. 1,377,210. 3
1951–60. 22,981. 229,811. 3. 359,895. 3,598,949. 8
1961–70. 45,394. 453,937. 7. 160,836. 1,608,356. 4
1971–80. 64,029. 640,294. 10. 832,150. 8,321,498. 19
1981–90. 165,584. 1,655,843. 25. 1,188,333. 11,883,328. 26
1991–00. 224,942. 2,249,421. 34. 1,466,760. 14,667,599. 33
2001–03*. 180,557. .541,670. 8.. 1,008,017. 3,024,052.. 7
.....Total. . 6,582,788. 100. . 44,885,417. 100
NOTES: Apprehensions record events, so one person caught three times is three apprehensions. Mexicans are 
95 to 98 percent of those apprehended. Apprehensions for 1925–30 were 128,484; Border Patrol was created in 
1924. *2001–03 values are not comparable to other decade totals because the period only covers three years.
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the Yearbook of Immigration 
Statistics), various years. 
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to be more trade and employment as well as higher wages in all three countries. 
Some of the political leaders promoting NAFTA assumed that if trade and migra-
tion are substitutes in the long run, they are also substitutes in the short run. 
Then-President Salinas, for example, asserted in a Bush letter to Congress (May 
1, 1991) that freer trade means “more jobs…[and] higher wages in Mexico, and 
this in turn will mean fewer migrants to the United States and Canada. We want 
to export goods, not people.”
However, Mexico–U.S. migration increased along with Mexico–U.S. trade. 
The estimated number of unauthorized Mexicans in the U.S. rose from 2.5 mil-
lion in 1995 to 4.5 million in 2000 and to 6.6 million in 2005, when 60 percent 
of the 11 million unauthorized foreigners in the U.S. were Mexican (Passel 2006). 
Over 80 percent of migrants from Mexico in recent years have been unauthor-
ized—most between the ages of 18 and 40.
 The upsurge in Mexico–U.S. migration between 1990 and 2005 has been 
called a migration hump—an assumed temporary increase in migration. A mi-
gration hump in response to closer economic integration means that the same 
economic policies that can reduce migration in the long run can increase it in 
the short run, generating “a very real short-term versus long-term dilemma” that 
can make it hard to persuade a skeptical public that freer trade is the best way to 
reduce unwanted migration (Martin 1993). 
The steadily rising line in Figure 1 represents the status quo migration flow, 
with slightly rising migration reflecting demographic and economic differences. 
The hump line depicts the additional migration associated with freer trade and 
economic integration. The temporary increase in migration is represented by A, 
which occurs if freer trade displaces Mexicans but foreign investors need time to 
create additional factory jobs (or the jobs they create do not go to the workers 
displaced). Freer trade speeds up economic and job growth, and the downside of 
the hump is the movement toward the status quo, or B. As economic integration 
accelerates convergence in wages between migrant-sending and migrant-receiv-
ing areas, C represents the migration avoided by economic integration, and D 
represents the migration transition, which occurs when a net migrant-sending 
country becomes a net receiving country. 
The critical policy parameters are A, B, and C—how much does migration 
increase as a result of economic integration (A), how soon does the migration 
hump disappear (B), and how much migration is “avoided” by the faster growth 
associated with economic integration (C)? Three factors are generally required to 
create a migration hump: a continued demand-pull for migrants in the destination 
country, an increased supply-push in the origin country, and migration networks 
that can move workers across borders. 
The usual comparative static economic analysis focuses on equilibrium points, 
not the process of adjustment to reach them. The migration hump is precisely 
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this adjustment process. However, it is important to emphasize that once wage 
differences narrow to four-to-one or less and job growth offers more opportuni-
ties at home, the “hope factor” can deter especially irregular migration since most 
people prefer to stay near family and friends.22
NAFTA got off to a promising start in Mexico, with employment rising in 
1994. However, just before President Ernesto Zedillo was inaugurated in Decem-
ber 1994, an economic crisis led to a sharp devaluation of the peso. The U.S. 
provided emergency funds to stabilize Mexican government finances, but the 
number of formal-sector jobs shrank by over 10 percent. Job growth resumed in 
1996, and formal Mexican employment peaked in 2000 as employment in maqui-
ladoras reached 1.3 million, 10 percent of formal-sector jobs. 
When the U.S. went into recession in 2000–01, maquiladora employment fell 
and many of the border assembly factories, especially those producing textiles 
and apparel, closed and moved to China and other countries with lower wages. 
Of the 700,000 new maquiladora jobs generated in NAFTA’s first seven years, 
300,000 were eliminated between 2000 and 2003, and most are unlikely to reap-
pear. The consensus is that Mexico must upgrade the skills of its workers and 
their productivity or risk losing even more jobs to lower-wage countries.  
NAFTA gave industrial employment a boost in Mexico while accelerating 
rural-to-urban migration. About 25 percent of Mexicans live in rural areas, and 
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ral Mexico is increased imports of low-cost and subsidized U.S. farm commodi-
ties such as corn. Corn is planted on 50 percent of Mexican cropland, much of 
which is not irrigated, and some three million Mexican households depend at 
least partially on corn production. The availability of cheaper U.S. corn sends a 
clear signal that there is no future in small-scale and rain-fed corn production in 
Mexico.23
Many evaluations of NAFTA’s first decade conclude that trade-led growth was 
not sufficient to bring stay-at-home prosperity to Mexico. Real wages in Mexico 
were lower in 2001 than in 1994 despite higher productivity, and income inequal-
ity increased. Mexico’s per capita economic growth was 1 percent a year between 
1994 and 2003, compared with 7 percent a year in China. Poverty remains wide-
spread. Half of the 104 million Mexicans in 2003 were considered poor, including 
42 million who make less than $2 a day (the daily minimum wage is about $4). 
U.S. Responses: Immigration Reform
In March 2005, the U.S. had 37 million foreign-born residents, 30 percent of 
whom were unauthorized (Table 2). The increase in unauthorized workers has 
been especially fast in recent years. The number rose by an estimated 4.4 million 
between 2000 and 2005, an average 880,000 a year. By comparison, 706,000 legal 
immigrants were admitted in 2003.24
Opinion polls find that most Americans want additional steps taken to pre-
vent illegal migration. A December 2005 Washington Post–ABC News poll report-
ed that 80 percent of Americans think the federal government should do more 
to reduce illegal immigration, and 56 percent agree that unauthorized migrants 
hurt the U.S. more than they help it.25 An April 2006 Los Angeles Times poll found 
that 63 percent of Americans favored stepped-up enforcement as well as a guest 
worker program to deal with illegal migration, while 30 percent favored stepped-
up enforcement only.26
Table 2
Status of Foreign-Born U.S. Population
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The House and Senate have taken distinctly different approaches to the issue. 
The House in December 2005 approved the enforcement-only Border Protec-
tion, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (HR 4437) on a 239–182 
vote. It includes a requirement for mandatory screening of employees to ensure 
that they are legally authorized to work in the U.S. Within two years of its enact-
ment, all U.S. employers would have to submit Social Security and immigration 
data on newly hired workers to government agencies by telephone or computer, 
receiving a credit-card-type confirmation of each worker’s right to work in the 
U.S. Within six years, employers would have to verify the status of their current 
employees.
The House bill contains several controversial items that include making “il-
legal presence” in the U.S. a felony and adding 700 miles of fencing along the 
Mexico–U.S. border. The House bill does not include a guest worker or legaliza-
tion program, under the theory that enforcement must be proven effective before 
additional migrant workers arrive legally and the government deals with the un-
authorized foreigners now in the U.S.
The Senate approved the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 
(S 2611) in May 2006 on a 62–36 vote. Like the House bill, it contains measures 
that would increase border enforcement by adding agents and fences and require 
employers to submit data on newly hired employees to a government database. 
However, the Senate bill also includes a new type of guest worker program and 
an “earned path” from illegal to legal immigrant status.
The Senate-approved guest worker program would add H-2C worker visas to 
a list that already includes H-1A, H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B. Employers in any U.S. 
industry would have to attest that the employment of H-2C migrants “will not ad-
versely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States 
similarly employed” and not lead to the termination of U.S. workers 90 days be-
fore and after the H-2C migrants go to work. Foreigners in their countries of ori-
gin who receive job offers from U.S. employers filing such attestations would pay 
$500 and pass medical exams to obtain three-year renewable work permits. After 
three years of U.S. work, H-2C guest workers would have to spend at least one 
year in the country of origin unless the foreigner has become a U.S. immigrant.
H-2C guest workers could change U.S. employers but only to work for other 
employers filing the same attestations regarding their need for migrants; migrants 
unemployed more than 45 days would be subject to removal. The H-2C guest 
workers could become immigrants while working in the U.S. in two ways: Their 
employers could apply for immigrant visas on their behalf after one year of work 
in the U.S., and the workers could apply for immigrant visas on their own after 
four years in the U.S. and if they are proficient in English and civics. In both cases, 
this path to immigrant status may be complicated by the requirement that the U.S. 
Department of Labor certify that no U.S. workers are available to fill the jobs for 
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which H-2C visas are sought, a process that today takes several years. 
The H-2C program aims to be sensitive to U.S. labor market conditions by 
adjusting the number of visas to employer requests. The number of H-2C visas 
was initially set at 325,000 a year, to be immediately raised by 20 percent (to 
390,000) if all H-2C visas were allocated within the first quarter of the fiscal year. 
That would make the ceiling for the next fiscal year 468,000. If H-2C visas were 
exhausted in the second quarter, an additional 15 percent of the fiscal year’s visa 
ceiling would be made available immediately, and the annual ceiling would be 
raised by 15 percent for the next year. If the visas were exhausted in the third 
quarter, the factor would be 10 percent. If H-2C visas were not used up, the ceil-
ing for the next year would be reduced by 10 percent. 
During Senate deliberations, the starting number of H-2Cs was reduced to 
200,000, but the adjustment formula remains, so that 600,000 H-2C guest workers 
could be admitted in the seventh year if all visas were used up each year in the 
first quarter.
Unauthorized foreigners already in the U.S. are divided into three groups by 
the Senate bill:
• Those in the U.S. at least five years could become “probationary immi-
grants” by proving they worked in the U.S., paid back taxes owed and a 
$1,000 fee, and passed English and background tests. At the end of six 
years of continued U.S. work and tax payments and after an additional 
$1,000 fee, they could apply for green cards or immigrant visas, although 
they would have to go to the back of the queue. (Total fees were raised 
to $3,250 during Senate deliberations.) 
• Those in the U.S. two to five years would have to satisfy the same 
requirements but would also have to return to their countries of origin 
and reenter the U.S. legally. 
• Those in the U.S. less than two years would be expected to depart, 
although they could return with H-2C visas.
Unauthorized farmworkers would be treated differently. The Agricultural Job 
Opportunity, Benefits, and Security Act (AgJOBS) of the Senate bill would allow 
up to 1.5 million unauthorized foreigners who did at least 150 days of farmwork 
during the 24-month period ending December 31, 2005, to pay $500 and obtain 
blue-card temporary-resident status. Blue-card holders who performed at least 
100 days of farmwork each year during the next five years could become legal im-
migrants. While in blue-card status, foreigners could also do nonfarm work, travel 
legally in and out of the U.S., and get work authorization for their spouses, who 
would not have to work in agriculture, and legal status for their minor children in 
the U.S. When the qualifying farmwork is completed, blue-card holders could get 
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immigrant visas outside the global ceiling of 675,000 a year and country ceilings 
of 20,000 a year.
The House bill makes reducing illegal immigration and employment its top 
priority and does not deal with unauthorized foreigners in the U.S. or employer 
requests for new guest worker programs. Some House leaders have suggested 
that, as new enforcement measures make life more difficult for unauthorized 
foreigners, some will depart on their own, and the smaller number who remain 
could eventually be legalized.  
The Senate bill involves a three-legged stool of enforcement, guest workers, 
and legalization—the comprehensive approach endorsed by President Bush. No 
one knows how its components might interact to affect workers and labor mar-
kets. For example, would legalization lead to a new industry creating work histo-
ries of at least two years or 150 days of farmwork, or would immigration adjudica-
tors tap into administrative data to determine work done? Would workers without 
documentation leave the United States, or would they go further underground in 
the U.S. economy, complicating the enforcement of labor laws?
Conclusions
Is sending workers abroad a way to speed up development? Does opening 
front and side doors for migrants reduce backdoor illegal migration and generate 
win-win-win outcomes that speed up economic growth in migrant-sending and 
migrant-receiving countries?
Migrant and remittance numbers are rising faster than generally accepted 
answers to questions about how migration affects development. Sending workers 
abroad has been considered a means of reducing the number of surplus workers, 
and economic theory has suggested that the major contributions of migrants are 
in destination areas. New literature suggests that recruitment, remittances, and 
returns can accelerate development in migrant countries of origin. This reason-
ing suggests that developing countries should welcome the opportunity to send 
workers abroad to get more remittances and to benefit from the return of entre-
preneurs or contributions from the diaspora.
The number of migrants has doubled in the past two decades, as have remit-
tances to developing countries. Only time will tell if migration is a win-win-win 
proposition for migrants and receiving and sending countries. While there are 
clear benefits to migrants and the employers that hire them, the benefits to send-
ing countries are less clear. It may be useful for states to be cautious of the theory 
that sending their best and brightest workers abroad will accelerate economic 
development at home, particularly when private market-led development has 
replaced state-induced development that protected infant industries.
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Notes
1	 At	purchasing	power	parity,	which	takes	into	account	national	differences	in	the	cost	of	living,	







4	 For	 additional	 detail	 on	 Indian	 IT	 and	African	 health	 care	migration,	 see	Martin,	 Abella,	 and	
Kuptsch	(2005),	70–74.
5	 According	to	one	study	cited	by	Teitelbaum	(2003),	bioscientists	can	expect	to	earn	$1	million	





7	 Training	 times	were	 typically	 short:	Restaurants	 said	 that	 new	workers	needed	eight	days	 to	
master	their	jobs;	hotels	said	11	days.	
8	 Migrants	are	selected	to	fill	some	jobs	precisely	because	they	are	“here	to	work”	and	do	not	have	
“negative	attitudes.”	This	 “dual	 frame	of	 reference	and	 less-entitled	status”	helps	newcomers	
to	find	so-called	3-D	jobs	(dirty,	dangerous,	and	difficult)	acceptable.	However,	many	migrant	
workers	and	most	of	their	children	educated	in	the	receiving	country	eventually	want	and	expect	




























origin	 to	migrant	destinations,	where	 they	offer	services	 in	 the	migrants’	 language	as	well	as	
ancillary	services	to	migrant	relatives	at	home.























ejido	 land	 could	 not	 be	 sold,	 which	 limited	 productivity-increasing	 investments.	 The	 29,162	
ejidos	became	synonymous	with	rural	poverty;	however,	in	1992,	the	Mexican	constitution	was	
amended	to	allow	the	sale	or	rental	of	ejido	land.
24	The	 estimate	 of	 unauthorized	 immigrants	 is	 from	 Passel	 (2006).	 The	 Congressional	 Budget	




26	Mark	Z.	Barabak,	 “Guest-Worker	Proposal	Has	Wide	Support,”	Los Angeles Times,	April	 30,	
2006.
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External and Internal  
Determinants of Development
Thomas.Osang
As Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) point out, factors that affect economic development can be classified using a two-tier approach. Based on a standard production function, inputs such as labor and physi-
cal and human capital directly affect per capita income. Much of the empirical 
cross-country growth literature has focused on these covariates. But the factors 
themselves are the product of deeper and more fundamental determinants and, 
thus, are at best proximate factors of economic development. The deeper deter-
minants fall into two broad categories: internal and external. Among the former, 
institutions and geography have received the most attention, while international 
trade has been the focus of the latter.1 The main purpose of this paper is to add 
an external factor, namely measures of migration, to the existing geography-
institutions-trade setup and to evaluate its contribution to the observed differ-
ences in per capita income across countries.
Geography refers to the physical location of a nation and the various physical 
characteristics it is endowed with (for instance, distance from the equator, access 
to sea, agro-climatic zone, disease environment, soil type, and natural resources). 
A country’s size, access to sea, and general topography can crucially affect trans-
port costs and the extent of its integration with the world. Climate and soil affect 
the types of crops planted. Interestingly, geography may even contribute to the 
nature of a country’s early institutions (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998; Sachs 
2003). Thus, geography is an obvious choice as an essential factor that shapes the 
course of a nation’s development.
 The role of institutions for development can be directly linked to the work 
of Douglass North (1993; 1994a, b, c). North’s motivation was the inability of 
neoclassical theory to explain widespread differences in economic performance 
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across countries. If only factor accumulation led to progress, all countries would 
advance, provided the payoffs are high enough. Since progress is absent in many 
countries, the payoffs must be different for different countries—and institutions 
may be the reason for the differences (North 1994a). Institutions define the rules 
of the game that determine the incentives people face and the choices they make. 
An alternative way of looking at institutions is through the transaction-cost ap-
proach. Well-defined rules and their smooth enforcement—for example, better 
institutional quality—greatly reduce transaction costs faced by economic agents 
and, thus, lead to more efficient economic outcomes (North 1993; 1994b). One 
of the first studies to carefully examine the impact of institutions on productivity 
levels across countries was Hall and Jones (1999). Unlike geography, however, 
there is a potential endogeneity problem with institutions that needs to be ad-
dressed in the empirical investigation. 
International trade may affect economic development in several ways. In 
addition to gains from specialization in production based on comparative cost 
advantages, trade can make available new technologies and ideas, which, in turn, 
enhance total factor productivity. Moreover, operating in a larger market allows 
firms to take advantage of economies of scale and consumers to take advantage 
of a larger variety of goods. The empirical literature on the international trade-
development nexus is extensive, but a few papers stand out. Sachs and Warner 
(1995) construct an openness index and find that greater openness leads to higher 
growth. Similarly, Frankel and Romer (1999) find that international trade plays an 
important role in explaining cross-country differences in economic performance. 
Since trade measures, too, are likely to be endogenous, the authors construct an 
instrument for trade using a gravity-type model that explains the volume of trade 
between countries through their joint economic size and the distance between 
them. 
Migration can affect development in numerous ways, such as changes in the 
cost of labor, the loss or gain of human capital, knowledge spillovers, or work-
ers’ remittances. While empirical literature on the impact of remittances is fairly 
extensive,2 fewer studies examine the role of emigration of skilled workers (brain 
drain) or the potential brain gain due to migration (Beine, Docquier, and Rapo-
port 2001). 
This study indicates that both internal and external determinants matter for 
development. The internal measures—institutions and geography—exhibit the 
expected signs and are typically statistically significant, but they differ in their 
economic impact. Institutional measures appear to have large elasticity estimates, 
while geography measures are rather small. Among the external determinants, 
trade measures and the foreign-born population share (destination-country mea-
sure) exhibit the expected signs and are significant in most specifications. Inter-
estingly, remittances (source-country measure) appear to contribute little to the 
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observed variation in per capita income across countries unless the sample is 
restricted to the top half of all countries receiving remittances. In that case, remit-
tances have a positive impact on economic development.
In the next section, we provide an overview of the literature on trade, mi-
gration, and development. In the sections that follow, we describe the empiri-
cal models used, discuss the data set, and present and interpret the empirical 
results.
Review of the Literature 
In this section, we review the literature on the trade, migration, and develop-
ment nexus. We begin with the welfare and labor market implications of migra-
tion as well as a brief discussion of political economy issues related to migra-
tion. We then investigate the special relationship between trade and migration in 
the context of their joint effect on economic development. Finally, we review a 
number of papers that examine the impact of both migration and trade within a 
regional context. 
Migration and Development
Welfare Effects of Immigration. From an empirical standpoint, there is no 
agreement on the gains or losses from immigration at the aggregate (national) 
level for either destination or source country. Martin (2003) maintains that eco-
nomic gain from the current level of immigration in the United States is small, 
and even doubling the number of entering migrants would not make a great deal 
of difference. Head and Ries (1998) suggest in passing that immigration lowers 
transaction costs and generates trade gains that would not have been realized 
otherwise. In a welfare analysis, Razin and Sadka (1997) determine that those left 
behind in the source country lose, landlords in the destination country gain, and 
wage earners in the destination country lose, though their loss is less than the 
gain of the landlords. 
While the Razin and Sadka findings—like the majority of studies in the mi-
gration literature3—suggest a net gain in the destination country, an empirical 
study by Davis and Weinstein (2002) finds that U.S. natives collectively suffer a 
$72 billion loss per year due to migration, roughly equal to 0.8 percent of gross 
domestic product. Davis and Weinstein argue that immigration increases the out-
put of the destination country while decreasing the output of the source country. 
The net effect in the U.S. is deterioration of trade as prices for U.S. goods go 
down while those of foreign goods go up. Furthermore, gains that accrue to the 
immigrants’ source country may be greater than the loss sustained by the destina-
tion country.
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Labor Market Effects of Migration. A key result of the Heckscher–Ohlin 
model is the Rybczynski theorem, which states that a difference in a country’s 
endowment of labor will be reflected in its output of goods. Gandal, Hanson, and 
Slaughter (2000) cast some doubt on the empirical validity of the theorem in a 
case study of Israeli immigration. In the early 1990s, Israel experienced a massive 
influx of highly skilled Russian immigrants (relative to the Israeli population). Cu-
riously, this did not significantly depress the wages of Israeli workers. The authors 
show that the mix of output in Israel did not change during this period to reflect 
the change in labor composition. The most skill-intensive industries were not 
always the fastest growing. Instead, a global wave of skill-biased technological 
change helped Israel adjust to such a shock in factor supply. In fact, the change in 
production technology was such that the effective supply of skilled labor in Israel 
decreased even as its raw supply increased. The technological advances could 
have come to Israel from the United States through bilateral trade, capital flows, 
and government activities. 
Interestingly, in a related study using U.S. state-level data, Hanson and Slaugh-
ter (2002) find evidence in support of the Rybczynski effects.
Political Economy of Immigration. Rising differentials in global per capita 
income and advances in technology and transportation have contributed to an 
upsurge in international migration flows. Russell and Teitelbaum (1992) find this 
increase is most dramatic among illegal migrants. Futhermore, migration move-
ments have become not only greater but also more volatile and unpredictable 
and are accompanied by significant remittance flows. They also play a role in the 
trade of many services previously considered “nontradable.”
This trend raises concerns in wealthy countries, where the native populace is 
often resistant to immigration because of its potential to depress wages, displace 
native workers, or benefit from wealth redistribution tax schemes. Dolmas and 
Huffman (2004) model the behavior of a voting population when it decides on 
the level of immigration. A critical determinant is the native’s initial wealth level. 
Those endowed with relatively more capital will allow maximum immigration 
because the influx of migrants raises the marginal product of capital. Natives 
endowed with relatively less capital have to rely comparatively more on labor for 
their income, and since immigration erodes the marginal product of labor, poorer 
natives’ optimal decision is to allow zero migration. Interestingly, the natives’ 
collective decision is associated with the population’s level of wealth inequality: 
Greater inequality is likely to lead to a no-immigration policy, while inequality 
that approaches zero can bring a maximum-immigration policy. In the survey 
article by Razin and Sadka (1997), the potential loss suffered by the native popu-
lation in a welfare state through wealth redistribution tax policies is given as a 
possible reason for native resistance to immigration. The Dolmas and Huffman 
model also addresses this scenario and shows that the tax rate approaches zero as 
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the number of voting immigrants approaches 100 percent of the original popula-
tion. However, the tax rate rises significantly once immigrants outnumber natives. 
Razin and Sadka also mention that the reallocation of investment from physical to 
human capital further erodes native welfare. 
The Relationship Between Trade and Migration
Migration and Trade as Substitutes. If the fear is tenacious that immigra-
tion may result in losses for the host country, the Heckscher–Ohlin model sug-
gests one approach for reducing the flow: The unimpeded movement of goods 
will lead to the equalization of factor prices, and that will remove an incentive 
for labor to move from one country to another. Horiba (2000) finds empirical 
evidence of the Heckscher–Ohlin theory. He shows that the convergence toward 
a more similar relative labor supply (which would equalize wages) is limited 
in magnitude, perhaps due to the costs associated with migration. Instead, the 
trade in goods, which can be considered trade in the factors that produced these 
goods, follows the same path as one would expect the factors to move according 
to Heckscher–Ohlin. 
Migration and Trade as Complements. Razin and Sadka (1997) point out 
that trade and immigration are substitutes only under the somewhat restrictive 
conditions of the Heckscher–Ohlin framework, allowing for country differences 
in the relative factor endowments only. For countries that differ in other as-
pects—technology, for example—free trade cannot equalize factor prices and 
may even widen factor price differentials. Immigration will allow each country to 
further specialize in the goods in which it has a technological advantage, leading 
to complementarity between trade and migration. 
Helliwell (1997) and Head and Ries (1998) both offer empirical evidence 
that trade and migration are complementary insofar as migration is capable of 
facilitating trade. Specifically, Head and Ries find that a 10 percent increase in 
immigration in Canada is associated with a 3 percent increase in imports and a 1 
percent increase in exports to the immigrant’s source country. They attribute this 
finding to two factors: Immigrants may have a preference for goods produced at 
home, and immigrants’ knowledge about their home economies can lower the 
cost of foreign trade. However, the authors note that the tendency for immigration 
to increase imports more than exports creates a decrease in net exports, which 
can translate into currency depreciation and a loss of welfare for the destination 
country, though such a loss can be offset by social and economic gains that ac-
crue from increased diversity.
Migration and Trade as Complements in the Short Run and Substi-
tutes in the Long Run. Two recent papers, both theoretical in nature, conjecture 
that the relationship between trade and migration depends on the time horizon of 
the analysis.4 Ludema and Wooton (1997) find that trade liberalization is initially 
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agglomerative, creating a manufacturing core that attracts labor from the country 
of origin (an argument earlier posited by Krugman 1991), but as trade liberaliza-
tion continues, the cost of trade becomes sufficiently low that a manufacturing 
core loses its advantages and some labor shifts back to the periphery. Ludema 
and Wooton emphasize the importance of timing revealed by this diversifica-
tion–agglomeration–diversification pattern and suggest that countries in the midst 
of liberalizing trade ought to restrict labor mobility until agglomerative forces 
weaken.
Lopez and Schiff (1998) deconstruct migration patterns by skill composition 
in a small, labor-abundant developing economy after unilateral trade liberaliza-
tion. Initial liberalization does not have much effect on the movement of skilled 
labor, but it does increase the number of unskilled workers leaving the country. 
The total labor force decreases, though the average skill level of the remaining 
population rises. Once trade has become substantially liberalized, the number of 
unskilled emigrants decreases and the total labor force stabilizes. This result is 
consistent with the pattern described above: a temporary spike in migration fol-
lowed by a stabilization of migration flow. 
Immigration and Trade: Regional Analysis
Taylor (1995) looks at the Asia–Pacific region and, in particular, the determi-
nants of the region’s relatively high economic growth rates. His empirical findings 
point to the high investment rate, primarily imported capital, as the biggest fac-
tor. Secondary causes include human capital accumulation and low population 
growth. Migration plays a very limited role, partly because the movement of 
people has become relatively restricted, unlike the massive immigrant flows that 
characterized the pre-World War I days. Taylor does suggest, however, that the 
movement of goods may have substituted, to some extent, for the movement of 
labor.
Examining the effects of immigration and trade on a host country’s wage 
structure, Borjas et al. (1997) perform an empirical study on the U.S. labor pool 
and find that neither immigration nor trade can be counted as a sufficient explana-
tion for the widening differential between unskilled and skilled wages. However, 
in the case of native workers with less than a high school education, immigration 
has a decidedly large effect on the relative wages, more so than trade. The magni-
tude of this impact can be attributed to the flow of less-educated immigrants into 
the country, which raised the relative supply of unskilled workers (those without 
a high school education) 15 to 20 percent between 1980 and 1995. The authors 
do concede, however, that isolating the effects of immigration on the native la-
bor market is difficult, in part because immigration does not have large regional 
effects. The movement of native migrants tends to balance that of immigrants 
so that relative skill endowments stay the same. As a result, comparing regions 
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especially receptive of immigrants to other regions does not provide meaningful 
results. In addition, other factors that influence the U.S. labor market are not ad-
equately controlled, and a realistic counterfactual is difficult to establish.
Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) base their paper upon recent findings that 
immigrants have a pro-trade effect between source and host country (Head and 
Ries 1998). Data on U.S. trade and immigration between 1870 and 1910 provide 
empirical evidence for this pro-trade effect, particularly on finished foodstuffs and 
manufactures. For these two categories of goods, a 10 percent increase in migrant 
stock increased imports from the source country by 4 percent. The authors also 
find that the pro-trade effect diminished or was nonexistent for New European 
countries (eastern and southern Europe) as well as for the period between 1900 
and 1910. They hypothesize that immigrants from New Europe were unable to 
form the kind of links or relationships that would facilitate trade. They also sug-
gest that from 1900 to 1910, a significant shift in source countries occurred, which 
also weakened the pro-trade effect. In general, this study supports the Head and 
Ries paper, which focuses exclusively on U.S.–Canada trade.
Martin (2003) also focuses on post-NAFTA Mexico, though his paper is more 
descriptive than empirical. He argues that when the assumptions involved in Heck-
scher–Ohlin are relaxed, trade and migration are more likely to be complements. 
He calculates that migration to the United States will increase by 10 to 30 percent 
in the five to fifteen years following the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
creating what he terms a migration hump. He does predict, however, that migra-
tion will decrease soon after due to social and economic trends in Mexico.
Robertson (2005) takes an empirical approach to the Mexican labor mar-
ket following NAFTA. He uses wage convergence as a measure of labor market 
integration and finds that the rate of wage convergence in post-NAFTA Mexico 
did not significantly increase. Integration was not uniform, as one would expect 
if trade were the main force behind wage convergence, nor was it higher in 
manufacturing industries that received large amounts of foreign direct investment. 
Instead, integration was highest in the two border cities—Tijuana and Ciudad 
Juárez—that experienced large immigrant flows. Robertson thus concludes that 
migration plays the most significant role in labor market integration. Liberaliza-
tion in trade and capital flows alone is insufficient to induce wage equalization. 
This, of course, contradicts the Heckscher–Ohlin premise of factor price equaliza-
tion following free trade. 
Empirical Models
The starting point of our empirical investigation into the internal and external 
determinants of economic development is the following linear empirical model:
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(1)       Incomei=θ1+θ2Insti+θ3Geogi+θ4Tradei+θ5Migi+ei
where Incomei is income per capita in country i and Insti, Geogi, Tradei, 
and Migi  are measures of country i’s institutions, geography, internation-
al trade volume or policy, and migration, respectively. As mentioned before, 
institutions and geography represent the internal determinants of development, 
while trade and migration are the external measures. Simple least square (OLS) 
estimates of equation (1) will serve as the benchmark for subsequent specifica-
tions.
Our second empirical specification addresses the issue of endogeneity of 
regressors. Institution, trade, and migration measures are likely to be endogenous 
due to measurement error, survey bias, and/or reverse causality.5 Consequently, 
appropriate instruments are needed for all measures. Of the various external 
instruments found in the literature, two stand out due to their widespread use: 
settler mortality as an instrument for institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son 2001),6 and predicted trade shares as an instrument for a country’s actual trade 
share (Frankel and Romer 1999) (Table 1). Since the exogeneity of the geography 
measure is indisputable (and assuming for now that migration is exogenous), 
our second specification is the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator version of 
equation (1), with the following first-stage regressions for the two endogenous 
regressors (institutions and trade):
(2a)     Insti =a1+a2SMi+a3PTradei +a4Geogi +θ5Migi +ηi
(2b)    Tradei =b1+b2SMi+b3PTradei +b4Geogi +b5Migi +νi
where SMi measures settler mortality and PTradei is the predicted trade share in 
country i.
One problem with specifications (2a) and (2b) is that the two instruments 
used are highly correlated. As a result, they may not be able to identify the im-
pact of the endogenous regressors they are instrumenting for (Dollar and Kraay 
2003). As an alternative to the external instruments, our third specification uses 
internal instruments instead (Lewbel 1997). In particular, we use second- and 
third-order-central moments of the endogenous variables as instruments.7 In this 
specification, we not only account for the potential endogeneity of the trade and 
institution measures but of the migration measures as well.  
Finally, a shortcoming of all the above models is that they assume that all 
covariates have the same impact for all countries. In other words, the model 
ignores unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across countries. Using a panel-
data approach enables us to exploit the time dimension of the data to account 
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Table 1
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Institutions 





























Instrumental variables (external) for 2SLS regressions.








for this unobserved country-specific heterogeneity. The following panel model is 
estimated:
(3) Incomeit=γ1+µiλt+γ2Instit+γ3Geogit+γ4Tradeit+γ5Migit+δit
where µi and λt are country- and time-specific fixed effects, respectively. A panel-
data specification such as (3), however, is problematic if some of the right-hand-
side variables are time invariant. Thus, when using mean- or first-differencing 
to remove the unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects—the standard 
procedure in fixed effect (FE) estimation—all time-invariant covariates such as 
most geography measures are removed from the estimation equation as well. 
However, the “lost” parameter estimates can be recovered through an auxiliary 
regression of the estimated fixed effects on the time-invariant covariates. As an 
alternative to the above FE model, we also estimate a random effects (RE) model. 
Hausman specification tests guide us in the model-selection procedure. 
Data
In general, the data set covers the four decades from 1961 to 2000, though 
fewer time periods may be available for certain variables. For the cross-section 
estimates, all time-varying variables are averaged, except for the dependent vari-
able that is measured in 2000. The number of countries varies among the different 
specifications of the baseline regression model, ranging from N = 65 to N = 125.
 For the panel-data estimates, the time-varying variables are averaged over 10 
years to smooth out temporary shocks and business cycle fluctuations common 
across countries. As a result, the time dimension of the panel-data regressions 
includes four years of observations. The number of countries in the panel regres-
sions is N = 68.
Dependent Variable. Our measure of economic development (the depen-
dent variable in all regressions) is the log of per capita GDP in 2000, expressed in 
purchasing power parity-adjusted dollars (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002).
Explanatory Variables. Our main measure of institution is contract inten-
sive money (CIM), which was proposed by Clague et al. (1999). It is defined as 
the ratio of noncurrency money to total money. The basic argument for such a 
measure stems from the fact that in societies where the rules of the game and 
property and contract rights are well defined, even transactions that heavily rely 
on outside enforcement can be advantageous. Currency in this setting is used 
only in small transactions. Agents are increasingly able to invest their money in 
financial intermediaries and exploit several economic gains. Clague et al. discuss 
the various gains from increased use of CIM and augment their use of CIM with 
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case studies. They also show that CIM is a measure of contracting environment 
and not of financial development, as one might suspect. This measure is thus in 
line with the definition of institutions as noted above. Moreover, CIM is a rather 
objective measure without the many biases and measurement errors that are typi-
cal of the survey-based measures of institutions. 
While CIM is our preferred measure of institutions, we also use the rule of 
law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003) as an alternative measure. This vari-
able captures the extent to which agents abide by the rules of society. 
To control for the effect of geographic location and climate, we use a coun-
try’s distance from the equator (distance equator). 
We measure the extent of a country’s openness to international commerce 
in two ways: by its trade share, as defined by the ratio of exports and imports to 
GDP, and by the average import tariff, constructed as the ratio of import duties to 
imports (tariff rate).
A country’s exposure to international migration is also captured in two ways. 
First, we use the share of remittances in gross national product (remittances share) 
as an indicator of the potential benefits from emigration for the source country. Sec-
ond, we employ the ratio of foreign born to total population (foreign-born share). 
The foreign-born share can be interpreted as measure of the potentially beneficial 
impact of immigration for the destination country, either as a proxy for the size of 
the immigration surplus or the positive externalities associated with immigration. 
A third migration measure, the ratio of emigrants to total native population, can be 
interpreted as an indicator of the negative brain-drain effect of emigration for the 
source country. However, reliable emigration data are either difficult to obtain or 
not available. For this reason, we do not consider the measure in this study.8
Empirical Results
Cross-Section Estimates
To contrast our empirical results with the literature, we first estimate the cross-
section specification used by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004); see Table 
2A, col. 1. The measure of economic development is the log of per capita GDP, 
expressed in international prices.9 Openness to international trade is measured 
as the average trade share from 1961 to 2000. Rule of law is used to measure the 
quality of public institutions, while the measure of geography is distance from 
the equator, distance equator. While the magnitude of the coefficient estimates 
in col. 1 are not exactly identical to the ones reported in Rodrik, Subramanian, 
and Trebbi, all signs are the same and both geography and institutions are sta-
tistically significant (at the 1 percent level), while trade share is not statistically 
significant. 
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Adding remittances as a covariate (col. 2) does not lead to substantive changes 
in the results. This is not surprising given that the (negative) coefficient on remit-
tances is insignificant by itself. However, the potential endogeneity of institutions, 
trade, and remittances has not been taken into consideration so far and, thus, all 
results may be biased. In column 3, we use the 2SLS estimator with settler mortal-
ity and predicted trade share as instruments while continuing to assume that the 
remittances share is exogenous. As in Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, using 
instruments for institutions and trade makes the geography measure insignificant 
without changing the lack of significance of the trade measure and the remittances 
share. When we use instrumental variables to account for the potential endogene-
ity of the remittances share (col. 4), both institutions and remittances are significant 
at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively, while geography and trade measures 
remain insignificant. Given the negative sign on the remittances share, remittances 
appear to have a negative impact on a country’s macroeconomic performance. At 
this point, our results appear to support Rodrik et al.’s conclusion that “institutions 
rule,” with the added twist of the negative impact of remittances. Note that the 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test easily rejects the simple OLS models (col. 2) in 
favor of the two 2SLS estimators (cols. 3 and 4).
(Dependent.variable.natural.log.GDP.per.capita.in.2000,.in.purchasing.power.parity.dollars)
	 (1) (2) (3) (4)
   2SLS 2SLS 
Model OLS  OLS  IV Set A IV Set B
.
Rule of law. .812. 1.024. 2.849. 2.735
. (11.7)**. (7.14)**. (3.32)**. (3.43)**
Trade share. .0277. .0475. –.434. –.300
. (.33). (.43). (–1.00). (–.74)
Distance equator.. 1.348. .736. –1.940. –1.342
. (4.05)**. (1.68)†. (–.93). (–.69)
Remittances share. . –.0226. –.131. –.190
. . (–.96). (–1.51). (–1.93)†
.
Observations. .....131. 80. 42. 42
R-squared. .70. .48. –.55. –.41
DWH.test:.OLS.(null).vs...
...2SLS.(P-value). . . [.0008]. [.0023]
NOTES: t statistics in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; IV Set A: Settler 
mortality for rule of law; predicted trade share for trade share; IV Set B: Same as Set A plus higher-centered 
moments of remittances share.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 2A
Cross-Section Regressions I: Remittances, Rule of Law, and Trade Share
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Next, we reestimate Table 2A with different and, we believe, better measures 
of institution and trade. Instead of rule of law, we use CIM for institutions, while 
trade share is replaced with a trade policy measure, the average import tariff. In 
addition, we use internal instruments for trade and institutions rather than the 
external instrumental variables in Table 2A. The results are shown in Table 2B. 
The immediate consequence of the substitutions is a reduction in the sample size 
for the OLS estimates (cols. 5 and 6), while the 2SLS sample sizes are slightly 
larger (cols. 7 and 8). In terms of the estimates, the main differences pertain to 
the impact of geography and trade. In every specification of Table 2B, trade and 
geography measures have the expected signs and are significant at least at the 
10 percent level. The remittances share, however, is negative and insignificant 
throughout. Note that at the 10 percent level, the DWH test indicates that OLS 
(col. 6) is preferred over the 2SLS estimates. 
 So far, the skewed nature of the remittances variable has not been taken into 
consideration. As Table 3 reveals, more than half the countries listed have remit-
tance shares that are less than 1 percent of GNP. To account for this, we construct 
two remittance dummies, one for countries with shares between 1 percent and 
10 percent (medium remittances share), and one for countries with shares larger 
(Dependent.variable.natural.log.GDP.per.capita.in.2000,.in.purchasing.power.parity.dollars)
	 (5) (6) (7) (8)
   2SLS 2SLS 
Model OLS  OLS  IV Set A IV Set B
.
CIM. 2.529. 2.438. 2.029. 2.201
. (6.73)**. (5.03)**. (3.58)**. (3.80)**
Tariff rate. –.152. –.345. –.453. –.405
. (–2.56)*. (–1.73)†. (–2.23)*. (–1.94)†.
Distance equator.. 2.602. 1.473. 1.560. 1.671
. (5.45)**. (2.02)*. (2.23)*. (2.37)*
Remittances share. . –.0263. –.0160. –.0616
. . (–.57). (–.36). (–1.12)
Observations. .86. 47. 47. 47
R-squared. .73. .53. .52. .51
DWH.test:.OLS.(null)..
...vs..2SLS.(P-value). . . [.3173]. [.1492]
NOTES: t statistics in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; IV Set A: 
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than 10 percent (high remittances share). The results are shown in Table 2C.
Once again, we compare simple OLS (col. 9) with 2SLS (col. 10), in which 
we use high-order-central moments of CIM and tariff rate as instruments. The 
results indicate that discretization of the remittances variable does not change the 
outcome. The medium- and high-share dummies aren’t significant, and both are 
negative. 
In our final cross-section model, we drop from our sample all countries with 
a remittances share of less than 1 percent of GDP since remittances are likely to 
play no role in these countries. The results are given in Table 2D. In addition to 
the OLS estimates, we report 2SLS estimates using internal instruments for institu-
tions and trade (col. 13) and institutions, trade, and remittances (col. 14). We also 
use the trade share instead of the trade policy measure. Despite the reduction in 
power (N = 24 in cols. 12–14), the coefficient estimates for institutions, geogra-
phy, and trade are statistically significant (except for trade in col. 11) and have 
the expected sign, while the coefficient estimate on the remittances share is now 
positive throughout and even statistically significant at the 10 percent level in two 
specifications (cols. 12 and 13). The insignificance of the coefficient estimate on 
(Dependent.variable.natural.log.GDP.per.capita.in.2000,.in.purchasing.power.parity.dollars)
	 (9) (10)
  2SLS 




Tariff rate. –.306. –.391
. (–1.58). (–2.01)*.
Distance equator.. 2.417. 2.503
. (3.42)**. (3.67)**
Medium remittances share. –.238. –.228
. (–1.25). (–1.25)






NOTES: t statistics in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; IV Set A: Higher-
centered moments of CIM and tariff rate.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 2C
Cross-Section Regressions III: Remittances Group
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remittances in the last specification (col. 14) is mitigated by the fact that the DWH 
test cannot reject the OLS null hypothesis (col. 12). Thus, it appears that for the 
group of countries with substantial unilateral foreign transfers, remittances appear 
to matter for a source country’s economic development, in addition to the effects 
of trade, institutions, and geography. 
Panel Estimations
We use the panel-data approach to investigate the impact of the share of 
the foreign-born population on economic development. As previously discussed, 
the foreign-born share measures the impact of migration on destination coun-
tries, compared with the remittances share, which affects only source countries. 
Furthermore, while the remittances share is important for developing countries 
only, nontrivial foreign-born population shares can be found in both developing 
and developed countries (see Table 4 for a ranking of countries by the foreign-
born share).10 Our estimation results are given in Table 5. Column 1 contains the 
random-effects specification since the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test reveals that RE 
is strongly preferred over pooled OLS (the null hypothesis). While institutions, 
(Dependent.variable.natural.log.GDP.per.capita.in.2000,.in.purchasing.power.parity.dollars)
	 (11) (12) (13) (14)
   2SLS 2SLS 
Model OLS  OLS  IV Set A IV Set B
.
CIM. 3.85. 2.16. 2.351**. 2.296**
. (7.42)**. (3.89)**. (4.60). (4.56)
Trade share.. .0003. .356. .362*. .361*
. (.00). (2.08)*. (2.05). (2.05)
Distance equator.. 3.25. 3.21. 3.183**. 3.223**
. (6.86)**. (4.26)**. (4.58). (4.63)
Remittances share. . .17. .166. .143
. . (1.72)†. (1.86)†. (1.48)
Observations. .48. .25. .25. .25
R-squared. .83. .68. .73. .73
DWH.test:.OLS.(null).vs.
...2SLS.(P-value).. . [.2279]. [.4877]
NOTES: Sample is restricted to countries in which remittances share of GDP exceeds 1 percent; t statistics 
in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; IV Set A: Higher-centered moments 
of CIM and trade share; IV Set B: Higher-centered moments of CIM, trade share, and remittances share.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 2D
Cross-Section Regressions IV: High Remittances Sample
(Continued on page 3 )
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Ranking of Countries by Remittances-to-GNP Ratio
NOTE: Countries with no remittances were omitted.
SOURCE: World Bank (2000); author’s calculations.
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        Mean 
Rank        Country 1965 1975 1985 1990 1965–90
..1. United.Arab.Emirates. .842. .675. .663. .900. .770
..2. Kuwait. .529. .524. .594. .715. .590
..3. Qatar. .515. .588. .586. .633. .580
..4. Macau. .674. .601. .536. .446. .564
..5. Hong.Kong. .466. .430. .405. .400. .425
..6. Israel. .560. .416. .339. .309. .406
..7. Jordan. .362. .261. .261. .265. .287
..8. Bahrain. .202. .213. .329. .351. .274
..9. Luxembourg. .158. .192. .270. .316. .234
10. Oman. .080. .158. .319. .335. .223
11. Singapore. .282. .235. .186. .155. .215
12. Australia. .179. .195. .219. .234. .206
13. Cote.D’Ivoire. .024. .218. .261. .292. .199
14. Saudi.Arabia. .065. .115. .285. .257. .181
15. New.Zealand. .146. .158. .151. .155. .152
16. Switzerland. .129. .162. .140. .160. .148
17. Canada. .017. .152. .151. .155. .118
18. Taiwan. .171. .114. .085. .079. .112
19. Gambia. .118. .100. .094. .112. .106
20. France. .090. .105. .108. .104. .102
. Libya. .043. .098. .143. .123. .102
22. Lebanon. .080. .076. .104. .122. .096
23. Belgium. .055. .078. .090. .090. .078
24. Argentina. .110. .083. .060. .052. .076
25. Malawi. .075. .056. .040. .121. .073
26. Sweden. .050. .069. .078. .089. .071
. Pakistan. .106. .054. .065. .061. .071
28. Zimbabwe. .050. .060. .078. .079. .067
29. Somalia. .004. .096. .093. .072. .066
30. Ireland. .032. .053. .080. .093. .064
. Puerto.Rico. .023. .043. .099. .092. .064
. Iran. .091. .044. .059. .062. .064
. Syria. .061. .060. .068. .066. .064
34. United.States. .050. .054. .070. .079. .063
35. Malaysia. .088. .072. .047. .042. .062
. Gabon. .040. .040. .078. .088. .062
37. Zambia. .092. .063. .045. .041. .060
38. Togo. .087. .062. .047. .041. .059
39. Venezuela. .063. .057. .061. .053. .058
. Costa.Rica. .023. .014. .043. .153. .058
41. United.Kingdom. .045. .056. .062. .065. .057
42. Burundi. .048. .038. .070. .061. .055
. Uganda. .109. .077. .013. .019. .055
44. Congo. .044. .047. .052. .059. .050
. Poland. .070. .053. .040. .036. .050
................................................................................................................(Continued on page 2 )
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Ranking of Countries by Share of Foreign-Born Population
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        Mean 
Rank        Country 1965 1975 1985 1990 1965–90
46. Netherlands. .029. .025. .054. .078. .047
47. Zaire. .052. .062. .031. .028. .043
48. Nigeria. .002. .161. .003. .003. .042
. Liberia. .031. .039. .046. .050. .042
50. Paraguay. .028. .037. .048. .043. .039
51. Sierra.Leone. .024. .032. .044. .050. .037
. South.Africa. .048. .038. .029. .030. .037
53. Austria. .017. .028. .036. .059. .035
54. Tanzania. .041. .040. .025. .023. .032
. Norway. .020. .027. .037. .044. .032
. Senegal. .047. .037. .017. .025. .032
57. Denmark. .021. .026. .035. .041. .031
58. Sudan. .019. .019. .049. .033. .030
59. Honduras. .022. .014. .020. .056. .028
. Cameroon. .034. .029. .024. .024. .028
61. Ghana. .058. .029. .014. .009. .027
62. Burkina.Faso. .008. .017. .034. .047. .026
63. Nepal. .033. .023. .017. .021. .024
64. Turkey. .029. .022. .019. .020. .023
65. Italy. .016. .018. .023. .027. .021
. Greece. .008. .013. .030. .032. .021
67. Iraq. .003. .009. .033. .028. .018
. Mali. .023. .024. .014. .012. .018
69. Guatemala. .011. .006. .014. .029. .015
. Portugal. .007. .017. .021. .014. .015
71. India. .019. .015. .012. .010. .014
72. Algeria. .016. .014. .009. .015. .013
. Yugoslavia. .008. .010. .017. .017. .013
. Korea. .005. .008. .017. .021. .013
75. Spain. .009. .009. .010. .018. .011
. Kenya. .017. .012. .008. .007. .011
. Romania. .018. .011. .007. .006. .011
78. Chile. .012. .011. .007. .008. .009
. Niger. .004. .003. .015. .015. .009
. Brazil. .009. .011. .009. .008. .009
. Thailand. .014. .010. .007. .006. .009
. Bangladesh. .009. .010. .008. .007. .009
83. Japan. .006. .006. .006. .007. .006
. Mexico. .005. .004. .006. .008. .006
85. Ethiopia. .001. .002. .003. .016. .005
. Czechoslovakia. .004. .004. .005. .006. .005
. Egypt. .007. .005. .004. .003. .005
88. Colombia. .004. .004. .003. .003. .004
89. Myanmar. .002. .001. .002. .002. .002
Table 4 (continued)
Ranking of Countries by Share of Foreign-Born Population
NOTE: List shows countries reporting these data to the U.N.
SOURCE: United Nations (1994).
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trade, and geography coefficients are significant and have the expected sign, the 
most important finding pertains to the foreign-born share, which is positive and 
significant. 
Interestingly, the RE result on the foreign-born share is not robust when we 
estimate an FE model instead of the RE model (col. 2). While institutions and trade 
continue to be significant (and have the expected signs), the foreign-born coef-
ficient estimate is now much smaller in size and insignificant.11 However, given 
the small time-series dimension (T = 4), the FE model suffers from overfitting and 
the corresponding decline in degrees of freedom.12 In the next two columns, we 
thus revert to the FE specification but use different sets of instruments to account 
for the potential endogeneity of the institutions, trade, and foreign-born share. 
Initially (col. 3), we use internal instruments only for the institution and trade vari-
ables, while in the final specification (col. 4), we add internal instruments for the 
foreign-born share. The random effects/instrumental variables (RE-IV) estimates 
(Dependent.variable.natural.log.GDP.per.capita.in.2000,.in.purchasing.power.parity.dollars)
	 (1) (2) (3) (4)
   RE-IV RE-IV 
Estimation method RE  FE  Set A Set B
.
CIM. 1.377. .982. .755. .814
. (6.43)**. (4.50)**. (2.17)*. (2.36)*
Tariff rate. –.0706. –.0684. –.0653. –.0624
. (–3.60)**. (–3.52)**. (–2.85)**. (–2.73)**
Distance equator. 3.127. . 3.419. 3.404
. (7.40)**. . (7.62)**. (7.61)**
Foreign-born share. .100. .0257. .111. .117
. (2.09)*. (.48). (2.23)*. (1.87)†
Observations. 175. 175. 175. 175
Number.of.countries. 68. 68. 68. 68
R-squared. . .33
BP.test:.pooled.(null).vs...
...RE.(P-value). [.0000]. . .
Hausman.test:.RE.(null).vs..
...FE.(P-value). . [.0000]. .
Hausman.test:.RE.(null).vs..
...IV.RE.(P-value). . . [.1613]. [.1783]
NOTES: z statistics in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; RE-IV Set A: 
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 Thomas Osang
confirm the finding from the simple RE model (col. 1), namely that the foreign-
born share has a positive impact on macroeconomic performance. Overall, the 
differences in the estimated coefficients between the RE and RE-IV models are 
small, with a small preference for the RE model (according to the Hausman test, 
we cannot reject the RE model at the 10 percent level). 
Conclusions
To our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to integrate mea-
sures of migration into a framework that analyzes the economic impact of the 
so-called deep determinants of development: institution, geography, and inter-
national trade. Using both cross-section and panel-data estimation methods, we 
find that both measures of migration used in this study—remittances as a share of 
GNP (top half of receiving countries) and foreign-born relative to the total popu-
lation—have a positive impact on economic development even after controlling 
for institutions, geography, and trade. The findings go beyond establishing corre-
lations. Using instrumental variable methods to counter the estimation bias of the 
three potentially endogenous covariates (institutions, trade, and migration), the 
findings provide evidence for a causal link between external measures (migration 
and trade) and per capita income. 
In terms of their economic impact, institutions appear to matter the most. 
This is especially true if we measure the quality of institutions by the extent of 
contract-intensive money in the economy, which has a high elasticity with respect 
to per capita income. Openness to trade (when measured as the average import 
tariff) and migration (when measured as the foreign-born share) exhibit point 
elasticities that are more than ten times smaller than the one for institutions. The 
(positive) economic impact of geography appears to be rather small. 
This study can be extended in several directions. First, better measures of 
migration for both source and destination countries are desirable. As mentioned 
before, the migration measures used here cannot account for the negative brain 
drain or the potentially positive brain gain of migration in countries with liberal 
emigration rules. Similarly, the destination-country measure (foreign-born share) 
cannot differentiate between the positive and negative externalities associated 
with immigration. In addition to the “average” effect captured in this study, iden-
tifying the size of both positive and negative migration effects for the destination 
country would be desirable from a policymaking perspective. Second, method-
ologies could be improved. In addition to the extremes of random- and fixed-ef-
fects estimations, a middle-ground panel-data estimator such as Hausman–Taylor 
(1981) could prove to be a superior specification and, thus, may produce less-
biased estimates. 
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Globalization and Mexican  
Labor Markets
Raymond.Robertson
More than nearly any other phenomenon, globalization has had a pro-found effect on the Mexican economy. Mexican labor markets have been particularly affected. Globalization integrates labor markets through 
trade, capital flows, and migration. Recent studies that mainly focus on Mexico’s 
manufacturing sector suggest that North American economic integration (particu-
larly Mexico’s integration with the United States since the North American Free 
Trade Agreement) has had potentially positive implications for Mexican workers. 
Rising trade has coincided with rising Mexican wages (relative to U.S. wages) and 
falling wage inequality within Mexico.
In terms of North American integration, the perceived competition between 
Mexican and U.S. workers may not be as accurate as popularly believed. Recent 
research suggests that Mexican and U.S. workers are complements rather than 
substitutes. Growing economic integration suggests that North America could and 
probably should be thought of as a unified market in terms of production.
As is increasingly understood, however, the net gains from integration may 
overshadow important losses for many workers. These losses explain persistent 
popular opposition to NAFTA and economic integration. The gains have been 
slow to arrive in many of Mexico’s rural areas, affecting political support for 
candidates (López Córdoba 2006). Rising U.S. border enforcement also may hide 
NAFTA’s benefits because the wages of Mexican workers decline when enforce-
ment increases. Further, while integration may bring technology, increased de-
mand, and trade, it also increases Mexican susceptibility to U.S. economic fluc-
tuations. Mexican manufacturing employment closely followed the drop in U.S. 
manufacturing employment during the 2001 U.S. recession.
Three main policy recommendations emerge from these studies. First, Mexico 
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would continue to benefit, on net, from increased economic integration. Second, 
to the extent possible, Mexico should work to reduce migration restrictions into 
the United States. Third, the Mexican government should continue to direct ad-
justment assistance to rural and less economically active areas. Recent research 
has shown that workers in these areas are especially susceptible to shocks and 
that workers in more economically dynamic regions suffer much less from adjust-
ment and job loss. 
North American Economic Integration
Despite their differences in development status, the U.S. and Mexican econo-
mies are closely integrated. Robertson, Kumar, and Dutkowsky (2006) analyze 
matched product-level prices and find strong cointegrating relationships in these 
narrowly defined goods markets. Factor markets are also closely integrated. Rob-
ertson (2000) demonstrated that Mexican and U.S. labor markets are closely inte-
grated because wage shocks in the United States affect Mexican wages. Consis-
tent with economic integration, these effects are strongest along Mexico’s border 
region.
One goal of NAFTA was to deepen existing integration by fostering trade and 
capital flows. How successful it has been at these goals has been the subject of 
much debate. NAFTA studies are complicated by the December 1994 peso crisis. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a distinct change in both the level and trend of 
imports, exports, and capital flows after NAFTA went into force on January 1, 
1994. 
Figures 1A and 1B are from Robertson (2005a). Figure 1A shows that Mexico’s 
share of U.S. goods exports (the fraction of all U.S. goods exports that go to Mexi-
co) rises relatively steadily until the peso crisis. The sharp devaluation of the peso 
increased the Mexican price of U.S. exports, and, as a result, U.S. goods exports 
to Mexico fell sharply. The fall did not last long, however. During the recovery, 
the U.S. share of Mexican exports resumed its rise. The estimated rate of growth, 
however, was statistically higher in the post-NAFTA period than before NAFTA.
Figure 1B presents the results for Mexico’s share of U.S. imports (the fraction 
of all U.S. imports that come from Mexico). Like exports in Figure 1A, the Mexican 
share of U.S. imports rises prior to NAFTA. The peso crisis significantly affected 
this trend. The December 1994 crisis made Mexican exports cheaper for U.S. con-
sumers, and imports rose. During the recovery period, however, there was a clear 
increase in the level of Mexico’s share of U.S. imports. Furthermore, the rate of 
increase of this share was higher after NAFTA than before NAFTA.
Another goal of NAFTA was to increase capital flows. Figure 2 illustrates the 
total change in capital flows into Mexico during the 1980–2005 period. The level 
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Figure 1A
Mexico’s Share of U.S. Goods Exports
SOURCE: Robertson (2005a).
 Mexico share of U.S. exports    Fitted values 






Mexico’s Share of U.S. Goods Imports
SOURCE: Robertson (2005a).
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and trend of flows into Mexico are higher after January 1, 1994. Several other 
reforms, such as capital account liberalization starting in 1989, facilitated these 
flows. The point is not that NAFTA per se explains this increase, only that flows 
into Mexico are higher in the NAFTA period.
Another measure of capital flows is maquiladora investment. The key feature 
of maquiladoras in this paper is their close relationship with U.S. manufacturing. 
By definition, maquilas are designed to be closely related to U.S. manufacturing. 
Figure 3 illustrates this relationship. The growth in maquiladora value added and 
U.S. manufacturing output follow very closely together. 
Labor Market Implications of Integration in Mexico
Absolute Wage Convergence
Revenga and Montenegro (1998) match industry-level data between Mexico 
and the United States and find that trade liberalization in Mexico lowered Mexi-
can wages relative to their industrial U.S. counterparts between 1984 and 1990. 
Hanson (2004) analyzes the Mexican population census in 1990 and 2000 and 
finds little, if any, evidence of wage convergence between the United States and 
Mexico. These results are not consistent with rising trade and foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) contributing to rising wages in Mexico. Although the labor mar-
Figure 2
Total Foreign Direct Investment Flows into Mexico















SOURCE: Banco de México, Series SE37 (“pasivos Inversión extranjera Directa”).
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kets can be considered integrated, a substantial wage gap between Mexican and 
U.S. wages persists. To formally illustrate the gap and convergence, Robertson 
(2005b) matches the Mexican National Survey of Urban Employment (Encuesta 
Nacional de Empleo Urbano, or ENEU) and the similar U.S. Current Population 
Surveys (CPS). These data allow Robertson to control for individual-specific char-
acteristics and to track the time path of relative wages. 
Following Robertson (2000), the Mexican wages are converted to dollars us-
ing the nominal peso–dollar exchange rate. Then, to approximate a panel effect, 
Robertson (2005b) implements Deaton’s (1985) pseudo panel approach. This ap-
proach generates wage averages for different groups in the population and tracks 
the wages of these groups over time. Workers in each city fall into one of forty 
groups defined by five education levels and eight age groupings.1 The quarterly 
data run from 1987 to 2002.  Average wages of each cell in Mexico and the U.S. 
are matched to generate relative wage measures that control for changes in de-
mographic patterns. 
Figure 4, from Robertson (2005b), illustrates the evolution of the average 
wage gap for similarly defined age–education groups in the United States and 
Mexico (that is, comparing twenty-five- to thirty-year-old workers with twelve 
years of education). Contrary to the findings of Revenga and Montenegro (1998), 
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SOURCE: Hanson and Robertson (2005).
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evident, but as Mexican wages begin to recover, the trend continues toward clos-
ing the gap. Figure 4 also illustrates Hanson’s result of a lack of convergence. The 
1999 level is very close to, if not slightly below, the 1989 level.
One of Robertson’s (2005b) main findings is that the rate of convergence is 
not significantly (if at all) faster during the NAFTA period than before the NAFTA 
period. Given the rise in the trend and level of trade and foreign direct invest-
ment, this result is somewhat surprising. One possible explanation is that trade 
and FDI do not have a significant effect on the U.S.–Mexican wage gap. Another 
possible explanation is that there is a third factor affecting wages in ways that 
mitigate the otherwise positive effects of trade and FDI.
Robertson (2005b) presents evidence supporting the latter. Using border en-
forcement hours, he finds that U.S. border enforcement depresses Mexican wages. 
These results are consistent with Mishra (2006), which finds that emigration has 
large positive effects on Mexican wages. Furthermore, this effect is comparable to 
the estimated positive effect of trade. This result is illustrated in Figure 5, which 
graphs the U.S.–Mexican wage ratio and U.S. border enforcement in Tijuana. The 
two series exhibit a strong inverse relationship, suggesting that U.S. border en-
forcement depresses Mexican wages or raises U.S. wages. Since Hanson, Spilim-
Figure 4
Mexican Convergence to U.S. Wages
 Tijuana  Central
 Cd Juarez  Matamoros






NOTE: These series represent citywide averages of Mexican–U.S. wages for matched age-education groupings 
using the Mexican National Survey of Urban Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano) and the 
U.S. Current Population Surveys. The ratios are based on indexed real wages, converted to real values using 
domestic national consumer price indicators.
SOURCE: Robertson (2005b).
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bergo, and Robertson (2002) find that changes in U.S. border enforcement do not 
affect U.S. wages, the more plausible explanation seems to be that U.S. border 
enforcement depresses Mexican wages.
Relative Wages
The effect of globalization on relative wages in developing countries has 
been a topic of much debate. In particular, Mexico was one of the first countries 
to have a documented rise in wage inequality following trade liberalization. Since 
then, several other papers have shown that a similar phenomenon occurred in 
other developing countries (see Wood 1997 and the excellent survey by Goldberg 
and Pavcnik 2007). 
The literature contains several possible explanations for rising wage inequal-
ity, including, but not limited to, changes in industry-specific wage premiums 
(Revenga 1997; Cragg and Epelbaum 1996; Feliciano 2001), FDI (Feenstra and 
Hanson 1997), changes in tariffs that favored skilled workers (Hanson and Har-
rison 1999), changes in exchange rates that induced quality upgrading (Verhoo-
gen 2007), skill-biased technological change (Cañonero and Werner 2002), and 
changes in relative output prices (Robertson 2004). These explanations are not 
mutually exclusive, and all could have played a role in rising wage inequality after 
Figure 5
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NOTE: Enforcement is measured in line-watch hours. The wage ratio is the citywide average of the indexed 
wage ratio of matched age–education groups using Mexican Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano and U.S. 
Current Population Survey data.
SOURCE: Robertson (2005b).
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Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986.
After NAFTA, however, wage inequality falls (Airola and Juhn 2001; Robert-
son 2004; López-Acevedo 2006). The fall emerges in consumption surveys, house-
hold surveys, the Mexican Industrial Census, and the Monthly Industrial Survey 
(Encuesta Industrial Mensual, or EIM).
These papers illustrate that wage inequality falls through 2001, but the trend 
continues through 2005.  To illustrate the recent evolution in the wage inequality 
trend, we draw from EIM. For the 1994–2005 period, aggregated data for 205 in-
dustries are available on the Internet.2 The survey is designed to cover 80 percent 
of Mexican manufacturing production and is based on the Mexican Industrial 
Census, which is taken every five years. For the period in this paper, the survey 
covers about 6,000 establishments.3 The survey excludes firms in the maquiladora 
industry, basic petrochemicals, petroleum refining, and firms with fifteen or fewer 
employees (microindustria). Variables include employment, hours, and wages 
for production (obreros) and nonproduction (empleados) workers, as well as the 
value of production and sales. Figure 6 shows the change in the employment-
weighted, within-industry ratio of average nonproduction to production worker 
wages. The relative wage of skilled workers continued rising during the crisis, 
consistent with Verhoogen (2007). Once the recovery began, however, the rela-
tive wage of skilled workers (as a measure of inequality) started to fall.
While the extent of technological change in Mexico may be debatable, Caño-
nero and Werner (2002) argue that skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is 
relevant for Mexico in the GATT period. Haskel and Slaughter (1998) argue that 
it is the sector bias of SBTC, rather than simply SBTC itself, that explains changes 
in relative wages.4 To evaluate the degree of sector bias of SBTC, I use Mexican 
Industrial Census data and the methodological approach described by Haskel and 
Slaughter for industries indexed by k:
(1)       ∆Sk=a0+a1∆log(ws/wu)k+a2∆(K/Y )k+ek ,
in which ∆Sk is the change in the nonproduction employment share in the total 
wage bill, wi (i = s,u) represents the wage of each worker type, K is capital, Y 
is real value-added output, and the final term is the error. Haskel and Slaughter 
suggest that SBTC in sector k can be represented by positive values of a0+ek. The 
estimates are positive, suggesting that all industries in all periods experienced 
SBTC (consistent with Cañonero and Werner). To evaluate the sector bias, Haskel 
and Slaughter assume that technology does not affect prices and regress their 
estimates of SBTC on the initial value of the nonproduction–production employ-
ment ratio.
The results, shown in Figure 7, suggest that the relationship between skill 
intensity and SBTC is weakly positive between 1985 and 1989, negative between 
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1989 and 1994, and strongly positive from 1994 to 1999. The implication is that 
the sector bias of SBTC is in the opposite direction than would be expected if 
sector bias mattered and SBTC explained the changes in wage inequality.
Other explanations have similar difficulty accounting for the rise and fall of 
wage inequality. Trade, foreign investment, and exchange rates all follow either 
the same pattern before and after NAFTA, or move in ways following NAFTA that 
are inconsistent with the fall in relative wages.  
The only identified variable to move consistently with theory is relative pric-
es, suggesting that Stolper–Samuelson forces play a potentially significant role 
in explaining wage inequality in Mexico. The fall in the relative wages of skilled 
workers is consistent with neoclassical trade theory (Heckscher–Ohlin), which, 
under very restrictive assumptions, predicts that liberalization between a labor-
abundant and a skill-abundant country will induce an increase in the relative 
wages of less-skilled workers in the skill-scarce country. 
Even so, the literature has been slow to accept the Stolper–Samuelson expla-
nation for several reasons. First, price data are generally difficult to find. Very few 
papers use relative prices. Two notable exceptions are Beyer, Rojas, and Vergara 
(1999) and Gonzaga, Filho, and Terra (2006). Beyer et al. find a strong link be-
Figure 6
















NOTE: Series is the industry-employment-weighted average relative hourly wage of nonproduction workers 
(empleados) to production workers (obreros) in the Mexican Monthly Industrial Survey. The series represents 
the three-month moving average of the relative wage. The survey excludes maquiladora employment and 
otherwise represents all of Mexican manufacturing.
SOURCE: Encuesta Industrial Mensual.
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Figure 7
Skill-Biased Technological Change Using Census Data
NOTE: Shapes represent industries, with the size representing industry employment.
SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, Mexican Industrial Census 1985, 1989, 
1994.
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tween changes in relative prices and wage inequality in Chile, and Gonzaga et 
al. find a link between changes in relative wages and wage inequality in Brazil. 
Second, the literature tends to find few examples of significant between-industry 
shifts. The intuition behind the theorem suggests, although does not strictly re-
quire, that trade liberalization in a labor-abundant country will induce a shift to-
ward less-skill-intensive industries. As resources move toward less-skill-intensive 
industries, the demand for unskilled workers increases, raising the relative wage 
of skilled workers. 
Robertson (2004) shows that about 42 percent of the increase in demand for 
skill over the 1987–94 period is explained by between-industry shifts, and about 
32 percent of the fall in demand for skill over the 1994–98 period was due to 
between-industry shifts.5 One possible reason that the between-industry shifts 
are less than half of the total change (leaving more than half to be explained by 
within-industry shifts) is the shift toward the maquiladora sector. Figure 8 shows 
the rise in the ratio of maquila employment to the rest of Mexican manufacturing 
(using an index for both series). The data clearly show that maquiladora employ-
ment has been rising faster than employment in nonmaquila manufacturing.
This move would be consistent with an increasing demand for skill if maqui-
Figure 8





























NOTE: The maquiladora employment series represents total maquiladora employment as measured by 
Mexico’s national statistics institute, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). The 
nonmaquila employment series is total employment in the Mexican Monthly Industrial Survey (EIM). Both series 
are normalized to 1 in 1994. The line in this graph is the ratio of the two indexed series.
SOURCES: INEGI; EIM.
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ladoras were, on average, more skill intensive. Table 1, however, suggests that 
maquiladoras have a much lower nonproduction–production worker wage ratio 
than the same industries in the Mexican Industrial Census. The relative produc-
tion-worker intensity of the maquiladora sector seems to suggest that its rela-
tive rise is consistent with a within-industry shift toward less-skilled production, 
which would be consistent with the change in relative prices in the NAFTA era.
Are Mexican and U.S. Workers Substitutes or Complements?
Several studies have suggested that immigrants to the United States are sub-
stitutes for generally less-educated U.S. workers and complements with higher-
skilled U.S. natives (Grossman 1982; Orrenius and Zavodny 2003; Ottaviano and 
Peri 2005). The rise of trade and mobility of capital suggests that Mexicans may 
be either substitutes for or complements with U.S. workers while they are still in 
Mexico. 
The question of whether U.S. and Mexican workers are substitutes or comple-
ments has been, implicitly, at the core of a great deal of political debate. One 
of the major fears of Mexican integration with the United States was that firms 
would flock to Mexico in search of low wages. It is certainly true that over the 
past 25 years, U.S. manufacturing employment has been falling. Figure 9 shows 
the evolution of U.S. manufacturing employment from 1979 to 2005. The graph 
shows that employment falls steeply during recessions and tends not to recover, 
leading to the cumulative decline. The most recent decline (since 2000) has been 
especially dramatic, renewing concern over the loss of relatively well-paying 
manufacturing jobs.
If Mexican workers are substitutes, clearly there is cause for concern with 
past and future integration. Neoclassical trade theory, in particular, suggests that 
workers in the two countries would be substitutes in the sense that U.S. workers 
would be at risk of losing their jobs to Mexico. On the other hand, there are good 
reasons to believe that U.S. and Mexican workers would be complements. Feen-
stra and Hanson (1997), in particular, show how less-skilled workers in the U.S. 
would be substitutes for skilled workers in Mexico. Robertson (2006) formally 
tests this hypothesis.
Robertson matches Mexico’s EIM with U.S. Current Employment Statistics 
surveys. EIM was described earlier; the U.S. Current Employment Statistics pro-
gram covers about 300,000 employer units (over 35 percent of total payroll em-
ployment). The survey is conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics with 
cooperation from individual states. The data include average hourly wages and 
employment for production workers but do not include value of production or 
earnings of nonproduction workers. As a result, monthly production value is not 
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Table 1
Maquiladora Employment in 1998
                               N/P employment ratio
    Employment share
State      maquila/census        Census            Maquila
Aguascalientes. 0.286. 0.261. 0.041
Baja.California.Norte. 0.868. 0.153. 0.078
Baja.California.Sur. 0.226. 0.319. 0.031
Campeche. 0.000. 0.357. . –
Chiapas. 0.000. 0.311. . –
Chihuahua. 0.742. 0.152. 0.084
Coahuila. 0.485. 0.217. 0.056
Colima. 0.000. 0.423. . –
Distrito.Federal. 0.004. 0.506. 0.108
Durango. 0.340. 0.170. 0.052
Guanajuato. 0.048. 0.192. 0.051
Guerrero. 0.060. 0.282. 0.022
Hidalgo. 0.008. 0.186. 0.069
Jalisco. 0.087. 0.323. 0.126
México.State. 0.020. 0.352. 0.121
Michoacán. 0.000. 0.308. . –
Morelos. 0.023. 0.348. 0.092
Nayarit. 0.000. 0.316. . –
Nuevo.León. 0.142. 0.285. 0.090
Oaxaca. 0.000. 0.311. . –
Puebla. 0.101. 0.198. 0.047
Querétaro. 0.552. 0.422. 0.083
Quintana.Roo. 0.000. 0.299. . –
San.Luis.Potosí. 0.073. 0.308. 0.027
Sinaloa. 0.022. 0.401. 0.148
Sonora. 0.644. 0.212. 0.065
Tabasco. 0.000. 0.390. . –
Tamaulipas. 0.769. 0.239. 0.086
Tlaxcala. 0.103. 0.243. 0.068
Veracruz. 0.000. 0.310. . –
Yucatán. 0.227. 0.266. 0.055
Zacatecas. 0.154. 0.326. 0.070
Average. 0.242. 0.293. 0.073
NOTES: Maquilas include services as well as manufacturing. In 1998, and over the 1990–2003 period, services 
averaged 4 percent of total maquila employment. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática does 
not report data for all states. We presume this reflects an insignificant number of maquiladoras and, therefore, 
enter zero for these states. The employment ratio is the nonproduction/production worker ratio.
SOURCE: INEGI Industrial Census.
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available at the industry level.6 Hours and earnings data are available for about 
850 industries.
The Mexican and U.S. data are matched industry by industry at the most 
detailed level possible. Eighty industries were successfully matched. The level of 
aggregation ranges from three- to six-digit NAICS codes, with forty-one industries 
matched at the four-digit level and thirty-one matched at the five-digit level.
Robertson applies a labor-demand approach to estimate whether Mexican 
and U.S. production workers are complements or substitutes. This paper evalu-
ates the hypothesis before and after the NAFTA period. The main results indicate 
that during the NAFTA period, U.S. and Mexican production workers are comple-
ments, while U.S. production and Mexican nonproduction workers are substi-
tutes. This has significant implications for North American labor market integra-
tion. The United States and Mexico seem to act more like a single production unit 
rather than competing units. One may conclude from this result that while some 
job displacement is inevitable as economies adjust, North American economic 
interests are closely tied and policymakers would do well to think of Mexico as 
an economic partner rather than a competitor.
Figure 9














NOTE: The series represents total employment in manufacturing, seasonally adjusted.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Some Economic Concerns
U.S. Economic Outlook
The finding that U.S. and Mexican production workers are complements 
brings good and bad news (in the normative sense). First, the degree of inte-
gration with the U.S. ties Mexico’s fate to U.S. manufacturing. To some extent, 
this may help Mexico as competition from China increases. However, the recent 
decline in U.S. manufacturing employment can be closely linked to the decline 
in Mexican nonmaquila manufacturing employment. U.S. manufacturing employ-
ment has been falling for twenty-five years, and few economists predict the de-
cline to reverse over the medium run.
Furthermore, the United States is facing several potentially serious economic 
challenges. Since 1980, the U.S. trade deficit has been rising, and as Figure 10 
shows, the growth in U.S. federal debt is closely related to the U.S. trade deficit. 
The United States now has ratios of debt to gross domestic product greater than 
those of Turkey, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, all countries that have experi-
enced debt-related crises. 
Several prominent macroeconomists have suggested that a correction in the 
U.S. trade deficit, which they consider inevitable, could come in the next five to 
ten years. Several scenarios apply. The United States could experience a gradual 
Figure 10
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SOURCES: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division; U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
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depreciation of the dollar and, therefore, a gradual fall in consumer imports. To 
the extent that Mexico is integrated into the U.S. production chain, however, this 
depreciation could potentially help Mexico by increasing the demand for U.S. 
finished-good exports. If so, this could increase demand for Mexican exports to 
the United States, which would be helpful during a time of otherwise falling U.S. 
imports. The more integrated Mexico is in the U.S. production chain, the more 
positive (or less negative) will be the effects of a gradual or sudden depreciation 
of the dollar. 
The Chinese Threat
Hanson and Robertson (2006) apply a technique based on the gravity model 
of trade (as described in Hanson and Robertson 2005) to decompose Mexico’s 
export growth into components associated with export-supply capacity, import-
demand conditions, and other factors. Three main findings emerge. First, since 
the mid-1990s, Mexico’s export-supply capacities have improved relative to the 
rest of the world. Second, Mexico is relatively exposed to export-supply shocks 
from China. Industries in which Mexico has strong export capabilities are also 
those in which China’s capabilities are strong, and in most industries, China’s 
capabilities improve over time relative to Mexico’s. Had China’s export-supply 
capacities remained constant from 1994 onward, Mexico’s annual export growth 
rate would have been up to 1.5 percentage points higher during the late 1990s 
and up to 3 percentage points higher during the early 2000s. Third, while changes 
in Mexico’s export-supply capacities have contributed positively to the country’s 
export growth, changes in U.S. import demand in Mexico’s key export industries 
have not. Mexico’s exports are concentrated in sectors in which the United States 
has shown relatively weak growth in trade. Had U.S. GDP grown at the same rate 
from 2000 to 2004 as it did in the late 1990s, Mexico’s annual export growth rate 
would have been up to 1.4 percentage points higher.
Hanson and Robertson describe several important caveats to their results. The 
framework and analysis are confined to manufacturing industries. This approach 
may not capture the effects of U.S. and China business cycles on Mexico’s com-
modity trade. The counterfactual decompositions of export growth that we report 
do not account for general equilibrium effects. There could be feedback from a 
slowdown in China’s export growth or an increase in U.S. GDP growth that would 
cause us to overstate the growth consequences of such shocks for Mexico. Also, 
Hanson and Robertson do not explicitly account for zero trade between some 
countries.
The results hold important lessons for policymakers. Mexico’s ability to im-
prove its export-supply capacities (through modernization of its infrastructure, 
education system, energy sector, and so forth) compares favorably when one 
takes the rest of the world as a benchmark. Given the relatively high exposure 
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of Mexico to export competition from China, however, the country’s improving 
export-supply capacities may come as small consolation. Mexico is vulnerable to 
export-supply shocks in China and, given slowly changing patterns of industrial 
specialization, is likely to remain so for the medium run. During the early 2000s, 
China’s impact on Mexico was roughly twice that of the U.S. economic slowdown. 
If the U.S. economy continues to expand, there is scope for Mexico to recover 
some of the export growth it enjoyed in the 1990s.
The regression results suggest that for Mexico to continue to expand its 
export-supply capacity in the country’s key export industries, it would need to 
expand the supply of labor, increase electricity production, reduce borrowing 
costs, and/or expand telecommunications infrastructure. Among the sample of 
countries that also export goods in Mexico’s primary export industries, growth in 
these factors is positively correlated with increases in export-supply capacity.
Conclusion
The question of integration remains especially salient for Mexico. Engage-
ment with the global economy even has political implications. For Mexico, en-
gagement in the global economy means integration with the United States. The 
contraction of the U.S. economy has traditionally hurt the Mexican economy, and 
integration brings risks. These risks, however, must be weighted against alterna-
tive policies (less integration, in this case) that seem less promising than deepen-
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Commentary on Session I 
The Migration, Trade, and 
Development Nexus
Kent.H..Hughes
International trade has become a contentious topic in many industrial democracies, including the United States. In sharp contrast to earlier periods, President Bush was barely able to secure fast track or trade promotion 
authority in the Trade Act of 2002. In the end, the act survived three votes in 
the House of Representatives, twice by a one-vote margin and once by three 
votes. Trade has also become more complex. It is no longer possible to think 
in terms of a developing world with largely homogenous interests. As the New 
York Times once noted, the world is now made up of the haves, the have some, 
and the have nots. Even the Brazil-led Group of Twenty that includes key 
emerging-market economies has significantly varied interests.
Like trade, migration has also become a more controversial subject in the 
United States and much of Europe. The current debate in the United States re-
volves around the question of legal and illegal status and whether immigrants 
are highly educated or less well educated. Some observers are concerned about 
whether the traditional melting pot model will continue to work. In Europe, the 
debate includes the pace of internal, European Union immigration as well as the 
growing number of Muslim immigrants from Africa.
In the early twenty-first century, there has also been a renewed focus on the 
importance of fostering more rapid growth in the developing world. In November 
2001, the World Trade Organization launched the Doha Development Agenda as 
the latest round of multilateral trade negotiations. The emphasis on development 
was, in part, recognition that many of the least-developed countries felt that they 
had gained little from the last set of negotiations, the Uruguay Round.
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A growing ease of travel and improved communications have made global pov-
erty a reality that can be easily broadcast around the world. There is increasing aware-
ness that any country is only one plane ride away from any disease. In the case of the 
United States and many other countries, the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon linked poverty, stagnant economies, and repressive 
governments to the conditions that create pools of candidates for radical action. 
For the United States, trade, development, and migration have all become fac-
tors in an ongoing debate about the economic impact of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In part, NAFTA was described as fostering growth in and 
reducing immigration from Mexico. While added flows of trade, investment, and 
technology were expected, there was little, if any, discussion of the role of Mexican 
migrants in supporting development through remittances, returning with new ideas, 
or creating Mexican–U.S. networks.
There has also been recent scholarship on the impact of immigrants on the 
receiving country. In the U.S. context, the debate has been particularly sharp over 
whether low-wage immigration has had a negative effect on the wages and job 
opportunities of Americans, particularly low-wage Americans. There has also been 
a growing debate over the impact of temporary and permanent highly skilled im-
migrants on the wages of competing U.S. workers. Other scholarship has noted the 
contribution of foreign-born scientists and engineers to U.S. innovation.
In the early twenty-first century, the United States began to face global competi-
tion for scientific and engineering talent. Developed and emerging-market economies 
are both factors in the new competition. As opportunities grow in China, India, and 
elsewhere, foreign-born scientists and engineers who have studied and worked in 
the Unites States have begun to return to their countries of origin. In response, the 
United States has made some adjustments in its visa policy and has also begun put-
ting greater emphasis on math and science education in elementary, secondary, and 
university education. The best U.S. companies, laboratories, and universities also con-
tinue to recruit highly trained people from around the world. 
The world looks less ambiguous for immigrants who go from developing to de-
veloped countries—the move is almost always an economic plus for the immigrant. 
Where the immigrant is less educated and poor, there is also less of an economic loss 
for the sending country. In recent years, more attention has been paid to remittances 
and their potential for fostering growth. Returning immigrants can bring with them 
not only capital but expectations of better governance, an added appreciation for 
education, and a capacity for entrepreneurship. 
The highly educated immigrant from emerging-market countries is no longer 
always seen as a simple case of brain drain. As Philip Martin points out in his paper, 
emigration of African health professionals fits the classic definition. But similar emi-
gration of Indian information technology professionals has had more positive effects. 
Long-term, permanent Indian immigrants are forming pools of venture capital in 
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Silicon Valley to invest in India. Temporary immigrants are returning to the homeland 
with contacts and know-how about the American way of doing business that have 
helped bolster growth in India. 
The Tower Center for Political Studies, the Department of Economics at Southern 
Methodist University, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas are to be congratulated 
for convening a timely and important conference. 
These sponsoring organizations have assembled four panels of experts to look at 
the interrelationships among migration, trade, and development. Specific panels also 
put the relationships in historic perspective, explore the impact of remittances, and 
examine the increasingly contentious politics of migration and trade. 
Summary of the Papers 
On the first panel, Philip Martin, Thomas Osang, and Raymond Robertson pres-
ent three very fine papers. Each takes a quite different approach to exploring the 
links among migration, trade, and development. Each paper reaches useful conclu-
sions and directly or implicitly suggests a course for future policy. 
In “External and Internal Determinants of Development,” Osang uses cross-sec-
tion data, a panel-data approach, and several econometric tools to test migration as 
an external determinant of the factors of production that can define a country’s com-
parative advantage. Following the work of Dani Rodrick, his findings confirm institu-
tions as the dominant internal factor. Under specific measures, trade and migration 
also emerge as positive, but much less important, factors. Osang adds that remittances 
appear significant only for the larger recipient countries (as measured by remittances 
relative to gross national product). 
In “Globalization and Mexican Labor Markets,” Robertson explores the impact on 
Mexican wages and wage inequality of economic integration into North America. In 
general, he finds that integration has been positive both in terms of raising wages and 
reducing wage inequality. But he notes that wages did not rise more rapidly in the 
post-NAFTA period despite increased flows of trade and investment. He concludes 
that it was increased border enforcement by the United States that slowed the wage 
gains in Mexico. In addition, Robertson draws on Mexican and U.S. data to make 
wage comparisons and finds that low-wage production workers in Mexico are actu-
ally complements to rather than substitutes for production workers in the United 
States. 
Robertson makes three specific policy recommendations: First, Mexico should 
seek further integration into the U.S. economy; second, Mexico should push for 
easier migration to the United States; and third, Mexico should continue to focus 
adjustment assistance on rural areas where adjustment to increased trade will be 
most difficult. 
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In “The Trade, Migration, and Development Nexus,” Martin examines how 
migrants from developing to developed countries affect trade and development 
in their home countries. He assesses the impact of immigration through the lens 
of recruitment, remittances, and the return of migrants to their sending countries. 
He finds that immigration is positive for the migrant and provides a win for the 
receiving country by “slightly expanding economic output by slightly depressing 
wages.” The sending country may benefit through remittances and the impact of 
returning migrants but lose through classic brain drain. Martin distinguishes be-
tween the case of African health care workers, who are often permanently lost to 
the sending country, and India’s IT professionals, who create export opportunities 
for the home country. 
As part of his paper, Martin provides an overview of the differing approaches 
to immigration reform that passed the U.S. House and Senate. His paper, how-
ever, was completed before Congress adopted legislation to fund 700 miles of 
fence and other devices along the Mexican border. 
Paper-by-Paper Comments
Thomas Osang
Osang’s paper is very clear about its purpose—to assess the role of migra-
tion as an external determinant of a country’s factors of production. He takes the 
reader through the more common proxies for institutions and other recognized 
determinants of growth. In developing his conclusions, he tries other proxies and 
finds they add useful insights. 
Osang walks the reader through his reasoning in using a panel-data approach 
as well as cross-section data. He uses several different econometric techniques while 
also explaining the limitations of each. By making his assumptions clear, he allows 
interested readers to reach their own conclusions about a preferred approach. His 
fluency is dazzling—or at least dazzled this reader—but at times I found myself 
thinking back to President Harry Truman and his call for a “one-handed economist.” 
I would have found it more useful for Osang to explain why he preferred a specific 
technique in addition to presenting the results of different approaches. 
His use of contract-intensive money as a proxy for institutions was interesting 
and, I thought, useful. He went on to choose natural logs of lagged values, but I 
did not see an explanation of what the lags were or how they were determined. 
The paper left me with at least two other questions. 
First, he uses the foreign-born share in the population as a proxy for the 
impact of migration. That particular measure would not have much relevance for 
Mexico, which falls well down his list in terms of countries ranked by percentage 
of foreign-born population. 
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Second, he finds that remittances are important only for the top half of re-
mittance-receiving countries (as measured by remittances to GNP). Again, that 
would mean Mexico isn’t a significant beneficiary of remittances even though 
official figures show its remittances lag behind only oil revenues as a source of 
hard currency earnings. 
Osang’s finding that institutions far outpaced the contribution of other factors 
would be consistent with the emphasis of the United States’ Millennium Chal-
lenge Corporation and with World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz’s determination 
to fight corruption in the developing world. While Osang’s paper is written at a 
more abstract level, I would have welcomed his comments on these two policy 
initiatives. 
Raymond Robertson
Robertson beneficially reviews the literature on the degree of U.S.–Mexican 
integration, the impact of integration on wage rates, and whether or not wage in-
equality has been reduced. He finds that economic integration increased Mexican 
wages and, since adoption of NAFTA, reduced wage inequality. In addition, he 
finds that low-wage workers in Mexico are complements to and not substitutes 
for American production workers. In effect, his work validates the common jus-
tification for several decades of favorable U.S. tariff treatment for the importation 
of goods produced by the maquiladoras. 
Robertson finds rising wages in the NAFTA period but also notes that the 
1999 level of wages is still slightly below the 1989 level.    
In the midst of generally positive findings, Robertson notes that despite in-
creased trade and investment in the post-NAFTA period, there has not been ac-
celeration in the increase in wages. Robertson’s explanation is an increase in U.S. 
border enforcement and, by implication, a reduction in emigration from Mexico 
to the United States. It would be helpful to have some estimate on whether or not 
immigration to the United States actually slowed or simply became more difficult 
and more costly. 
Robertson could have disposed of three other possibilities. First, Mexico may 
still be at the point where past high birthrates are sending a still-rising flow of 
young adults into the labor force. Could that be holding wages in check? Second, 
Mexico is also a major conduit for undocumented workers from Central and 
South America. Have they stayed in Mexico for a sufficient time or in sufficient 
numbers to affect wage rates? Third, much of Robertson’s analysis must rely on 
urban or industrial data. Could the flow of labor from the rural areas be holding 
down measured wages in the maquiladora or industrial sectors? 
Robertson turns the reader’s attention to two other important questions—
China and the U.S. economy. Chinese competition has had a major impact on 
Mexican industry, with many maquiladoras closing as firms move their facilities 
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to China and many U.S. and other foreign investors now looking east rather than 
south. 
While favoring further Mexican–U.S. integration, Robertson asks whether 
“Mexico may be latching itself to a falling star.” He might have added a paragraph 
on the large, persistent trade and current account deficits that have affected the 
U.S. manufacturing sector. The United States is also the only major industrial 
country that developed a private-sector welfare system, which now puts several 
U.S. industries and, hence, their Mexican suppliers at a disadvantage in inter-
national competition. Finally, a U.S. policy of benign neglect with regard to the 
Asian practice of keeping their exchange rates competitive has also had negative 
effects on Mexico’s industrial prospects. 
Philip Martin
Martin looks at migration from the sending countries’ point of view, puts 
migration flows in a long-term context, and discusses the current U.S. response 
to rising legal and undocumented immigration. By taking a closer-to-the-ground 
approach, Martin complements the paths taken by Osang and Robertson. 
Martin looks at three different phases of emigration—recruitment, remittances 
sent home, and the eventual return of the emigrant. In discussing recruitment, 
he notes how formal recruiters and informal networks both play a role. There 
are also, of course, many intermediaries to facilitate undocumented immigration. 
Based on anecdotal reporting in the financial press, informal or illegal networks 
have become specialized enough that they can deliver specific skills to a specific 
firm in a relatively short period of time. Recruitment is an area that will require a 
mix of interviews and scenario modeling to analyze more fully.  
Martin contrasts the average emigrant from a developing to a developed 
country with the distribution of skills in the receiving country. He also provides 
some institutional detail on the current U.S. approach to temporary workers and 
notes that the temporary high-skilled immigrant often finds a path to permanent 
residency and citizenship. Noncitizen students finishing their doctorates can usu-
ally work for a year in the United States. They can then become recipients of 
H1-B visas, reserved for temporary immigrants with a college education or com-
parable skills and experience. The initial three-year H1-B visa can be renewed 
for another three years. At that point, the employer often can credibly claim that 
no available American can do the specific job currently filled by the H1-B visa 
holder. With permanent residency status, the former student may go on to secure 
citizenship. 
In discussing professional or high-skilled immigration, Martin contrasts the 
U.S. demand-driven approach with the supply-oriented approach. He notes that 
in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, points are awarded to potential 
immigrants based on various criteria, such as language ability.  
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In addition to distinguishing between the losses implied by the emigration of 
African health care professionals and the gains from the emigration of Indian IT 
professionals, Martin briefly discusses the efforts of the International Organiza-
tion for Migration to encourage the return of the African health diaspora to the 
continent. Martin does not explore the policy implications for Africa, but he made 
this reader wonder if African countries should focus more on the African equiva-
lent of the Mao-era Chinese barefoot doctors and reduce their investments in 
medical schools based on industrial country standards. Some grist for a future 
paper. 
In economic terms, Martin stressed the gains for both the low-skilled im-
migrant and the receiving country. As previously noted, he sees a win for the 
receiving country by “slightly expanding economic output by slightly depressing 
wages.” Beyond that phrase, however, neither he nor the other authors take on 
the debate over whether, or by how much, low-skill immigration depresses the 
wages or reduces the economic opportunities of U.S. workers. 
Martin provides useful detail on the growing volume of remittances, noting 
that they now exceed foreign assistance by a significant margin. He discusses de-
terminants of the volume of remittances and notes that policy and technology can 
reduce the cost of sending money to the home country. By implication, Martin is 
positive about the impact of remittances but left to the later panel the question of 
how or how effectively remittances are applied by the receiving family, village, 
or country. 
The potential return of emigrants to their home countries can bring the added 
benefits of capital, training, and ties to a developed economy. Martin notes that 
modern travel and communications can help keep emigrants in touch with their 
home countries. The adoption of dual citizenship by the sending country can also 
help keep home-country ties. Martin does not discuss if the dual-citizenship ap-
proach is a plus for the receiving country. 
In turning his attention to the specifics of U.S.–Mexican immigration, Martin 
provides some valuable history and contrasts the U.S. approach with the freedom 
of movement adopted in the European Union. He also provides an illustration 
of what he terms “The Migration Hump” (see his Figure 1). The figure traces in-
creased immigration after a period of displacement caused by economic integra-
tion and shows how it is eventually offset by faster economic growth and a return 
to the home country. He suggests that once the wage differential in the receiving 
to sending country falls to four-to-one, significant migration slows. He does not, 
however, estimate how soon the slowing might occur. At some point, given fall-
ing birthrates, Mexico may face the same kind of retirement-versus-working age 
challenge that is prominent in Europe, Japan, and, to a lesser degree, the United 
States. Might the burden of future Mexican taxes continue to drive younger Mexi-
cans north to help meet the needs of elderly parents? 
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Added Observations
China did appear in the papers, but without sufficient weight. Economic 
prospects for Mexico and many other countries are bound to be affected by the 
continued rise of China and other Asian countries. Conference organizers might 
even consider adding a paper putting Mexico in the context of global forces that 
include the rise of Asia. 
Martin contrasts the emigration of Indian IT professionals and their contribu-
tions to India’s growing computer-related services industry with the classic brain 
drain of African medical professionals to the industrialized West. It would be use-
ful to explore the degree to which Mexicans with technical and professional train-
ing seek opportunities outside their country and to have some sense of whether 
that pattern fits the Indian IT or African health care cases.  
The papers did not touch on how Indian success in providing business ser-
vices might affect future growth in Mexico. Yet, Mexico is increasingly caught 
between low-cost manufacturing in China and the difficulty of moving into traded 
services against stiff competition from India and others.  
Robertson, in particular, suggests thinking about North America as an eco-
nomic unit. In a future paper, Robertson could explore what such a North Ameri-
can economy might look like and what policies Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States could pursue to move the nations in that direction. 
For the most part, discussion of technology and innovation is absent from 
the three papers. Robertson does discuss the degree to which skill-biased tech-
nological change can explain wage inequality in Mexico but does not address the 
drivers of technological change. No one discussed the development of Mexican 
institutions that would improve the country’s ability to use or generate new tech-
nologies. Given the likelihood of decades of low-wage competition from Asia and 
elsewhere, Mexico should consider following the Korean example of becoming 
more and more of an innovative power. 
Finally, Mexican and other immigration to the United States cannot be dis-
cussed without looking at the potential impact of large-scale, low-wage, and 
relatively low-skilled immigration on the United States as an economy, a political 
entity, and a culture. That, of course, is the subject for a conference all its own.
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Cooperation: Obstacles and 
Opportunities
Marc.R..Rosenblum
On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox became Mexico’s first democratically elected opposition president. Within weeks, President-elect Fox scheduled a trip to the United States, and on August 17 he made good on his 
campaign promise to reexamine U.S.–Mexican migration relations by proposing 
that the countries of North America lay the groundwork to remove controls on 
regional labor flows. The idea of a common market fell on deaf ears within 
the United States, but President George W. Bush agreed with Fox that Mexican 
immigrants make essential contributions to the U.S. economy and that the core 
U.S. migration policy problem was the shortage of legal mechanisms to match 
willing Mexican workers with U.S. employers. Migration was one of two issues 
at the top of the agenda (along with energy cooperation) when Bush made 
Mexico his symbolically important first international destination, and many 
observers were optimistic that the former border-state governor would move 
quickly to adopt a radical new approach to bilateral immigration issues. 
The presidents met three more times in the next three months, and opti-
mism about an immigration deal was reinforced at the fifth Bush–Fox summit, in 
Washington, D.C., on September 5, 2001. Following the summit, which included 
a first-ever full joint cabinet meeting, Bush and Fox announced a framework for 
additional cabinet-level negotiations aimed at a bilateral immigration deal. At the 
heart of the framework agreement were a U.S.–Mexican guest-worker arrange-
ment and the theme of “shared responsibility” for migration enforcement to pre-
serve orderly migration flows (White House 2001). With the U.S. Senate passing 
legislation the following day to allow some undocumented Mexicans (and others) 
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to adjust to legal immigrant status, an immigration deal seemed imminent. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 derailed this progress. Immigration nego-
tiations were suspended while the United States turned its attention to homeland 
security and the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Then relations became 
strained when the United States expanded its “war on terrorism” to include Iraq, 
and Mexico refused to support the U.S. position in the United Nations Security 
Council. Mexicans grew impatient with President Bush’s failure to return to the 
negotiating table before the end of his first term. And after President Fox staked 
his personal prestige on an immigration deal, many analysts concluded that the 
countries’ failure to advance the bilateral migration agenda had undermined the 
Fox presidency (see Castañeda 2003; Sullivan and Jordan 2002).
Nonetheless, immigration remains at the top of the political agenda in both 
countries. The Mexican House and Senate—divided on many issues—unani-
mously approved a Concurrent Resolution in February 2006 endorsing a report 
by a top-level public–private working group, which reiterated the principles un-
derlying the earlier bilateral framework agreement (Hernández et al. 2005). In 
the United States, immigration dominated Washington’s attention through much 
of 2005 and 2006, but the House and Senate passed widely divergent bills during 
the 109th Congress, neither of which responded directly to Mexico’s concerns. 
Many analysts believe Republicans were punished at the polls in 2006 for their 
failure to pass meaningful migration reform, and Democrats returned to the issue 
during the 110th Congress, though reform efforts hit a road block in the Senate 
(see Wallsten and Gaouette 2006; Rosenblum 2008).
Thus, as 2007 draws to a close with a new Mexican president and the United 
States preparing for elections in 2008, familiar questions remain at the top of the 
regional relationship. Do the United States and Mexico share common interests 
in migration policy? Would the two countries benefit from a bilateral migration 
agreement? What shape might such an agreement take? It remains easy to identify 
potential areas of agreement: Both countries benefit from Mexican labor migra-
tion, both would benefit further if a higher proportion of cross-border flows 
occurred through legal channels, and both would benefit from bringing more 
order and security to the border. Yet substantial obstacles to a bilateral migration 
deal remain, including conflicting priorities about the details of a potential agree-
ment, political obstacles to bilateralism within each country, ambiguity about the 
broader strategic costs and benefits of a bilateral migration deal, and institutional 
design problems.
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing theoretical issues regarding oppor-
tunities for migration cooperation. Immigration is an inherently multidimensional 
issue and differs from trade and other aspects of the bilateral relationship because 
of Mexico’s unique ability to influence policy outcomes. Thus, simple asymmetric 
bargaining models are of limited utility for examining joint migration policy-
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making, and it is necessary instead to consider specific migration preferences in 
each country as well as the context in which migration negotiations occur. The 
remainder of the chapter therefore reviews the history of U.S. and Mexican pref-
erences over migration policy, changes in the broader bilateral relationship, and 
the evolution of bilateral conflict and cooperation on migration policy. A final 
section evaluates contemporary preferences and context to identify obstacles and 
opportunities for migration cooperation at this time. 
Immigration Cooperation: Theoretical Obstacles and  
Opportunities
In theory, U.S.–Mexican immigration regulation would appear to be a natural 
issue for bilateral cooperation. The traditional international relations literature 
on cooperation stresses the role of information asymmetries, weak institutions, 
and the costs of defection as barriers to cooperation. As in the classic prisoners’ 
dilemma game, international cooperation is limited by each country’s fear that the 
other will unilaterally defect, leaving the honest player with a high-cost “sucker 
payoff” (Axelrod 1985). Yet this analogy seems to apply poorly to immigration 
policymaking because the issue area is characterized by relative transparency: 
The United States can observe (at least roughly) whether Mexico is meeting com-
mitments to enforce its side of the border or assist in the recruitment of temporary 
workers, and Mexico can easily observe U.S. policies regulating visa issuance. 
Prisoners’ dilemma-like conditions are also ameliorated by the dense institutional 
structure surrounding bilateral issues between the United States and Mexico, by a 
broad set of shared norms, and by the long time horizons that neighbors sharing 
a 2,000-mile border are forced to adopt.
Migration policy also differs from other issues on the bilateral agenda be-
cause of the high degree of interdependence within the U.S.–Mexican migra-
tion system. U.S. efforts to regulate migration flows are inherently vulnerable 
to changing conditions within Mexico—for example, when changing Mexican 
economic conditions affect emigration pressures. And the migration relationship 
is structurally bound by a shared border and 500-year-old social and cultural net-
works, meaning that in contrast with other bilateral policy issues such as trade or 
investment, the United States has limited ability to opt out of bilateral migration 
relations by shifting its focus to other partners. As a result, migration relations are 
quintessentially characterized by complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 
1977; Manning 1977), rather than by the asymmetric bargaining dynamics charac-
terizing other dimensions of the bilateral relationship.
In addition to interdependence, migration relations are characterized by 
multidimensionality. On one hand, migration is multidimensional in its substan-
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tive implications, sitting at the nexus of security, economic, and cultural policy, 
and potentially responsible for large-scale demographic changes. On the other 
hand, migration is also multidimensional in its policy implementation. Whereas 
rules governing international investment are mainly defined by restrictions on 
entry and exit, for example, migration regimes must define selection criteria and 
procedures for admission, the terms of entry (length of stay, rights and respon-
sibilities within the United States), a wide range of enforcement issues, rules for 
return migration, and immigrant integration policies, among other questions.
A final area of complexity derives from the multiple nongovernmental actors 
within each country who perceive a direct stake in the debate, also in contrast 
with most other aspects of international relations. Immigration policy is contested 
not only by business and labor groups, but also by social conservatives and anti-
population-growth groups, which oppose flows, and by human rights, religious, 
civil liberties, and ethnic interest groups, which support more generous poli-
cies. Thus, far from resembling a simple one- or two-dimensional coordination 
problem with a unique equilibrium point, migration negotiations are an extreme 
version of Krasner’s (1991) multiple-equilibrium model in which the challenge is 
choosing among the many possible pareto-improving regimes that exist. 
Similarly, traditional assumptions about unified states engaging in game theo-
retic negotiations are of limited utility in the case of U.S.–Mexican migration pol-
icy, suggesting a need for a more nuanced negotiation-analytic approach (Sebe-
nius 1983). In this case, international relations theory directs attention to specific 
state preferences and the preferences of competing actors within each state, to 
the role of domestic and transnational interest groups and epistemic communi-
ties, and to the strategic environment in which migration policymaking occurs 
(Lake and Powell 1999; Moravcsik 1997; Sebenius 1992). The following section 
thus examines how Mexican and U.S. migration preferences have been mediated 
by the broader context to produce unilateral and collaborative migration policy 
responses during the twentieth century. 
U.S.–Mexican Migration Policy: A Historical Perspective
What do Mexican and U.S. policymakers hope to accomplish through their 
migration policies? In general, state interests in migration policy reflect the rela-
tionship between migration and security, economic prosperity, foreign policy, and 
national identity. These broad concerns have produced shifting short-term policy 
demands in both countries, with the Bracero Program (1942–64) and the end of 
the Cold War in 1990 marking important turning points. While the two states have 
often had conflicting migration agendas, their goals during the contemporary 
period reveal substantial areas of common ground.
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Mexican Preferences
In the Mexican case, the early part of the twentieth century was characterized 
by revolution and state consolidation, so migration preferences were necessarily 
laissez faire. Migration at this time followed traditional seasonal patterns—some 
of which predated the international border established in 1848—as industrial-
ization and infrastructure development in the U.S. Southwest outpaced Mexican 
development and as land ownership patterns in Mexico limited employment op-
tions at home. Mexicans benefited from these jobs, which already paid twelve 
times more than jobs in Mexico (Lessard 1984, 98–99). And the postrevolutionary 
Mexican state quickly came to depend on emigration as a development strategy 
and a political safety valve, a position enshrined in Article 11 of the 1917 Mexican 
constitution, which forbids exit restrictions (Craig 1971, 18; Cardoso 1979, 20). 
Nonetheless, this general economic preference for a free emigration regime 
was balanced by conflicting political and developmentalist ideas. First, Mexican 
thinkers had long expressed concern that the country was underpopulated and 
that both economic development and national security required investment in 
domestic manpower (Kirstein 1977). Labor-dependent state development goals 
were particularly embraced by the Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40) and Manuel Cama-
cho administrations (1940–46). At the same time, emigration to the United States 
in particular raised additional concerns, both on a security level in the wake of 
three U.S. incursions into Mexico during the previous century, and in light of 
the long record of discrimination against Mexican workers in the United States 
and the more recent record of harsh repatriation campaigns during the Great 
Depression (Lessard 1984). For all these reasons, “the majority of literate Mexi-
cans were totally opposed to emigration” (Cardoso 1979, 20) at the start of World 
War II.
Regularization of flows during the Bracero guest-worker program radically 
altered migration politics within Mexico. On one hand, concerns about the mis-
treatment of Mexican workers intensified, and Mexican business, labor, and po-
litical leaders all resented the failure of U.S. officials to prevent undocumented 
migrant employment or to enforce other pro-labor Bracero provisions, especially 
in the program’s later years. On the other hand, peasants strongly supported the 
program, voting with their feet by overwhelming Bracero recruitment stations 
(Craig 1971). And bureaucrats administering the program quickly became an in-
fluential pressure group supporting its continuation because they benefited from 
the $20–$50 worth of bribes that the typical Bracero worker paid to obtain his 
visa (Craig 1971; Pfeiffer 1979).
Mexican economic dependence on emigration intensified in the postwar pe-
riod as development programs systematically kept rural wages down to subsidize 
state-led industrialization. Thus, Mexico lobbied successfully in 1961–63 to delay 
the termination of the Bracero Program (Rosenblum 2003) and spent much of 
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the next decade pushing behind the scenes for a resumption of a formal bilateral 
visa program to ensure continued access to U.S. labor markets and to protect 
workers’ rights. By the mid-1970s, however, it became clear that the United States 
lacked the capacity or the will to enforce immigration restrictions, and Mexicans 
accepted the new informal regime, which offered the benefits of market-based 
emigration without the costs of a formal acknowledgment of Mexico’s failure to 
create jobs at home (Fitzgerald 2006; Rico 1992).
A final stage in the development of Mexican migration preferences began 
to take shape during the 1980s and ’90s as the threat of migration enforcement 
loomed larger. Unilateral U.S. enforcement efforts failed to substantially affect 
Mexican access to U.S. labor markets, but the criminalization of undocumented 
migration and harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric offended Mexican sensibilities. With 
80 percent of Mexicans having a personal connection to a current or former im-
migrant, the issue took on growing political importance in a newly democratic 
Mexico, and new emigrant rights groups (within Mexico and spanning Mexico 
and the United States) demanded government action (Fitzgerald 2006; Guarnizo, 
Portes, and Haller 2003). At the same time, the heavy U.S. focus on border en-
forcement had the perverse effect of increasing criminality and migrant deaths in 
the border region as migrants were more likely to rely on professional smugglers 
and as the U.S. “war on drugs” contributed to higher profits and more border 
violence. In this context, and learning from their successful effort to influence 
U.S. policy during the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Mexican officials and others close to the government began an explicit 
effort during the 1990s to reframe migration as a regional problem demanding 
regional solutions rather than a domestic issue on which Mexico should defer to 
U.S. sovereignty (Rosenblum 2004a).1
More than a decade later, the combination of sustained attention to the hu-
man rights crisis at the border and within the United States, the strengthening of 
U.S.–Mexican economic integration, growing violence on the Mexican side of the 
border, and new concerns about the Mexican “brain drain” problem has contrib-
uted to a growing consensus within Mexico to abandon its historic “policy of no 
policy.” As summarized by a high-level working group including legislators, cur-
rent and former executive branch officials, academics, and representatives of non-
governmental organizations, the consensus centers around six principles: (1) the 
status quo regime has failed Mexicans and demands an active policy response; 
(2) that response should include collaboration between the United States and 
Mexico (“shared responsibility”); (3) emigration pressures will continue as long 
as Mexicans lack economic opportunities at home; (4) migration policy should 
protect the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their legal status; (5) border 
security, including antismuggling efforts, must be a top priority; and (6) Mexico 
should be sensitive to the broader regional context, including systemic pressures 
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compelling Central American transmigration through Mexico (Hernández et al. 
2005). In a rare example of multipartisan consensus, these principles and related 
policy recommendations—development in sending communities, collaborative 
enforcement efforts, replacement of undocumented with legal migration, reinte-
gration programs for returning immigrants—were unanimously endorsed by both 
chambers of the Mexican Congress in February 2006. Broadly similar language 
appeared in the platforms of all three major parties during the 2006 presidential 
campaign.
U.S. Preferences
U.S. policymakers have typically viewed Mexican migration through an eco-
nomic lens—as a source of cheap labor, for better or worse—but security and 
diplomatic concerns have also influenced the debate, especially during periods 
of U.S. overseas conflict. Each of these views of migration, along with cultural 
and national identity concerns, has intensified in the post-Cold War and post-
9/11 period, raising the stakes of the debate for U.S. policymakers and the public 
(Rosenblum forthcoming). 
Historically, the overall U.S. preference was for a stable and reliable—and 
occasionally deportable—workforce for southwestern agricultural jobs. Thus, the 
first immigration inspectors on the Southwest border—seventy-five agents on 
horseback, commissioned in 1904—mainly guarded against illegal Chinese im-
migration. An independent Border Patrol was not established until the Immigra-
tion Act of 1924, again primarily for the purposes of controlling unwanted Asian 
and European entries (Meyers 2005). With agricultural interest groups and other 
pro-migration groups enjoying organizational advantages over labor unions and 
opponents of liberal migration flows, U.S. officials often have been more con-
cerned with ensuring access to needed labor than with preventing undocumented 
inflows (Freeman 1995; Tichenor 2002). These concerns became top priorities 
during World Wars I and II and the Korean War, when military planners warned 
that “food is as essential to victory as planes, tanks, ships, and guns” (U.S. Con-
gress 1951, 39).
The preference for access to cheap labor was balanced by episodic concerns 
about border security (again, especially during wartime), the harmful effects of 
immigration on U.S. workers, and equity for other countries of origin. These 
concerns contributed to termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 and passage 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act amendments of 1965 and 1976, placing 
Mexico on equal footing with other countries by restricting Mexicans to 20,000 
new permanent visas per year (plus an unlimited number of immediate-family-
member visas). 
These new restrictions on legal migration, along with boom–bust cycles in 
Mexico and growing hemispheric economic integration, contributed to a sharp 
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rise in undocumented immigration beginning in the 1970s and persisting into the 
present period. Combined with the focus on border enforcement as part of the 
“war on drugs” beginning in 1969 and intensifying during the 1980s and the “war 
on terrorism” since 2001, sustained undocumented immigration has made gaining 
control of the border a top priority.2
If border security is a universally accepted priority, important divisions exist 
with respect to additional immigration policy goals at this time. On one hand, 
demographic changes within the United States (falling birthrates, rising education 
levels) mean that increased migration has also been associated with increased de-
pendence on immigrant labor.3 In a break with the past, many labor unions have 
embraced these flows, joining business groups to demand not reduced immigra-
tion, but rather a predictable and legal migrant workforce (Haus 2002). Pro-immi-
gration business and labor interests are strengthened by the general integration of 
the U.S. and Mexican economies—Mexico is now the United States’ second-larg-
est trade partner—as most policymakers and analysts agree that border enforce-
ment must not disrupt legal commerce. On the other hand, a significant minority 
questions the economic benefits of immigration and argues either for absolute 
reductions in inflows or, at a minimum, for de-emphasizing access to immigrant 
labor and focusing on tougher migration control.
Overall Bilateral Relations 
The potential for translating these shifting migration preferences into 
collaborative policy outcomes depends not just on the extent to which prefer-
ences overlap but also on the broader strategic context in which policymak-
ing occurs. Overall, the U.S.–Mexican relationship passed through roughly five 
phases during the twentieth century. The first decades were characterized by a 
high degree of conflict and mistrust, especially in the wake of 1914 and 1917 U.S. 
interventions in Mexico’s revolution and civil war. Relations remained strained 
during the 1930s when President Cárdenas nationalized U.S. oil holdings within 
Mexico, and Mexico responded to the subsequent U.S. boycott of Mexican oil 
sales by increasing its exports to Germany on the eve of World War II. The oil 
controversy was resolved on terms favorable to Mexico in the context of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy toward Latin America, and Mexico joined the 
U.S. war effort.
The postwar period has been described as an era of “bargained negligence” 
(Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2001). Under a tacit Cold War agreement, 
Mexican politicians distanced themselves from the Soviet Union and kept the 
Mexican Communist Party in check, and the United States turned a blind eye 
to Mexico’s occasionally authoritarian style of governance. This benign neglect 
was strained during the 1970s as Mexican Presidents Luís Echeverría (1970–76) 
and José López Portillo (1976–82) adopted more stridently nationalist and anti-
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American rhetoric in positioning Mexico as a leader of the nonaligned nations 
movement. And relations deteriorated further during the 1980s as the two nations 
clashed over Mexico’s debt crisis, U.S. militarism in Central America and Mexico’s 
support for the Contadora peace process, fraudulent Mexican congressional elec-
tions in 1985, and conflict over the U.S. war on drugs (Chabat 1996). The bilateral 
relationship hit a low point when U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Special 
Agent Enrique Camarena was kidnapped and killed in Mexico in 1985. U.S. Cus-
toms Service Director William von Raab testified before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee the following year that high-ranking Mexican officials, including 
perhaps the family of Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, directly participated 
in and profited from the drug trade.
Finally, the pendulum swung in the other direction beginning with the inau-
gurations of Mexican President Carlos Salinas in December 1988 and U.S. Presi-
dent George Bush in January 1989. The once-every-twelve-years double inaugu-
ration provided a chance for a fresh start, and the Bush administration recognized 
that rapprochement would improve the United States’ ability to address each of 
the still-festering problems of the 1980s (Fauriol 1989/90; Thorup 1989). The 
two presidents met three times in 1988–89, and in 1989 Mexico abandoned its 
two-century struggle to escape the U.S. economic orbit by initiating bilateral free 
trade negotiations, a process that culminated with passage of NAFTA in 1993. Like 
Salinas and Bush, Presidents Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo continued to make 
personal investment in the bilateral relationship, and with the resolution of most 
1980s-era conflicts, the successful U.S.–Mexican trade deal seemed poised to 
be the cornerstone of the U.S. hemispheric integration agenda (Domínguez and 
Fernández de Castro 2001; Fishlow and Jones 1999).4
Bilateral Migration Relations 
The bilateral migration relationship has been shaped by these shifts in the 
broader strategic relationship but has also taken on a logic of its own, especially 
when U.S. vulnerability to Mexican emigration pressures overlaps with other eco-
nomic and security considerations, raising the stakes of a successful migration 
policy. Prior to World War II, conflicting preferences and strained overall rela-
tions caused both countries to pursue strictly unilateral migration policies. In the 
U.S. case, the free flow of Mexican workers was an unintended casualty of the 
U.S. effort to restrict Asian and European immigration at the turn of the century, 
including restrictions on the admission of contract workers and the imposition of 
a literacy requirement and head tax on immigrants. Policymakers recognized the 
importance of migrant labor for U.S. economic security and wartime prepared-
ness and suspended these new restrictions for Mexican migrants by establishing 
a new guest-worker visa during World War I (Reisler 1976).
Yet Mexican officials opposed the new program, which was initiated without 
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Mexican participation and which conflicted with Mexico’s postrevolution state-
building and economic development program. The federal government in Mexico 
City actively discouraged outflows at the distant northern border, but the effort 
met with little success (Fitzgerald 2006). Immigration relations took a turn for the 
worse during the Depression, when roughly one million Mexicans—along with 
an unknown number of U.S. citizens of Mexican descent—were rounded up and 
deported, while others were harassed into self-deportation or chose to leave in 
response to the poor U.S. labor market ( Jungmeyer 1988). Mexican Labor and In-
terior Ministry officials organized their own repatriation programs to protect their 
citizens from harassment. Thus, by the end of the 1930s, migration had become 
an independent source of bilateral conflict, and traditional circular flows had 
largely ground to a halt.
In this context, U.S. economic growth beginning in 1939 and the passage of 
the Selective Service Act in 1940 raised acute concerns about agricultural labor 
shortages as the United States prepared to enter World War II. Growers petitioned 
for a World War I-style guest-worker program in which Mexicans would be admit-
ted on private contracts, but the Roosevelt administration—in the midst of the 
Cárdenas oil controversy—rejected these calls for diplomatic reasons. Then in 
1942, Roosevelt directed diplomats and agricultural officials to approach Mexico 
about a bilateral guest-worker deal in which Mexican state actors would be re-
sponsible for labor recruitment. In the context of strained relations and fears 
about a German foothold in Mexico, negotiators were instructed to defer to Mexi-
can concerns about the specifics of the deal (Gamboa 1990; U.S. Department of 
State 1943, 538–44). Under the resulting agreement, Mexican workers were guar-
anteed a minimum wage (unlike American agricultural workers) as well as trans-
portation expenses, housing benefits, and basic health care. Mexico insisted that 
contracts be signed by the U.S. government, with agricultural employers acting as 
subcontractors. And Mexico also blacklisted the entire state of Texas, which had 
a particularly bad record of immigrant labor relations. As Lessard (1984, 42–47) 
observes, the overall agreement most closely resembled the Mexican Federal 
Labor Law of 1931, passed specifically to respond to abuses of earlier Mexican 
emigrants.
U.S. officials and growers were divided about the program. Growers pressed 
for more flexibility and twice (in 1943 and 1948) prevailed upon local border of-
ficials to admit Mexican workers to Texas in violation of the treaty. But the White 
House and State Department remained committed to their bilateral approach, 
intervening in both cases to prevent additional admissions. The Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations also resisted grower demands to renegotiate the treaty 
and angered members of Congress by holding growers accountable to the terms 
of their Bracero contracts. Nonetheless, contract enforcement weakened after the 
war, and state-to-state contracting and the prohibition on guest workers in Tex-
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as were both eliminated over Mexico’s objections when Congress threatened to 
pass legislation authorizing a unilateral World War I-style program (Calavita 1992; 
Rosenblum 2003).
Two additional turning points were reached, in 1951 and 1954. First, with the 
United States entering the Korean War, Mexico threatened to obstruct emigration 
unless the United States agreed to resume state-to-state contracting. The White 
House agreed, but Congress rejected Truman and Mexico’s additional demand 
that employers be prevented from hiring undocumented immigrants outside the 
program. Caught between a pro-grower Congress and a pro-agreement Mexico, 
Truman was forced to accept Congress’ version of the bill, and the so-called Texas 
Proviso gave employers immunity from the new crime of “harboring or abetting” 
undocumented immigrants.
Second, with the signing of the Korean armistice in 1953 and the inauguration 
of the more pro-business Eisenhower administration in January 1954, the United 
States adopted a tougher bargaining position, insisting that Mexico contribute to 
migration control efforts by patrolling its side of the border and that guest-worker 
contract disputes be arbitrated by the United States rather than bilaterally. Nego-
tiations broke down, and Mexico played its only remaining card by placing troops 
on the border to prevent Bracero exits. The move backfired, however, when U.S. 
border agents assisted illegal (from Mexico’s perspective) crossers and gave them 
visas; and Mexico was forced to accept the U.S. terms or be excluded from any 
role in the program. Thus, if bilateral relations were generally characterized by 
benign neglect during the 1950s, immigration relations after 1954 came to be 
characterized by gross exploitation of Mexican immigrants during the mature 
phase of the Bracero Program (Rosenblum 2003).
Mexico’s ability to manage guest-worker flows remained compromised 
thereafter, but bilateral relations still influenced the timing of the program’s de-
mise. Under pressure from the Democratically controlled Congress and from his 
domestic constituents to terminate the program, the pro-labor President Kennedy 
nonetheless agreed to Mexico’s request that the program be extended for two 
years in 1961 and one year in 1963. Kennedy had a long voting record against 
the program as a member of Congress but explained his support for the exten-
sion on the grounds that “I am aware … of the serious impact in Mexico if many 
thousands of workers employed in this country were summarily deprived of this 
much-needed employment” (American Reference Library 1999, 639 –40).
The possibility of a new bilateral guest-worker deal remained on the regional 
agenda for the next decade. Mexico petitioned the United States for a renewed 
guest-worker program throughout the 1960s, but the United States rejected 
the requests, and no formal talks were held. The 1973 oil shock reversed this dy-
namic, as the United States offered Mexico a new guest-worker deal in exchange 
for privileged access to Mexican oil reserves. Once again, no talks were held as 
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the nationalist Echeverría administration, emboldened by the promise of robust 
oil-fueled growth, rejected the offers (Fitzgerald 2006; Rico 1992). 
Migration relations deteriorated during the high-conflict 1980s. U.S. officials 
recognized that Mexico would bear the brunt of new enforcement measures con-
tained in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), but no bilateral 
talks were held on the legislation, and Mexico rejected a formal invitation to par-
ticipate in U.S. Senate hearings leading up to IRCA’s passage. Partly for these rea-
sons, even though earlier legislation debated in 1983 and 1984 included language 
to expand legal Mexican visas to offset the new enforcement measures, these 
provisions were eliminated from the final version of the bill without discussion. 
Similarly, even when relations improved under Bush and Salinas, Mexican nego-
tiators made an explicit decision not to raise migration issues as part of a new 
trade deal during NAFTA talks, and NAFTA’s “labor chapter” regulates workplace 
rules but not labor flows.5
Immigration became a still greater source of conflict during the 1990s as 
California Governor Pete Wilson based his successful reelection campaign on the 
demonization of undocumented immigrants leading up to the passage of that 
state’s Proposition 187 to deny undocumented immigrants access to education 
and health care. Republican House members made tough immigration restric-
tions a priority following their victory in the landslide “Contract with America” 
election in 1994, and Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan took a 
similar message on the national campaign trail. The trend culminated in 1996 with 
the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA), which restricted immigrants’ access to public services and strengthened 
migration enforcement. Meanwhile, the United States adopted a new policy of 
“prevention through deterrence” at the U.S.–Mexican border, dramatically ex-
panding enforcement personnel and equipment to discourage attempted entries. 
In practice, however, the partial militarization of the border produced no mea-
surable decline in attempted entries but led to a sharp increase in border-area 
violence and deaths as immigrants turned to professional smugglers and crossed 
the border in ever more remote areas (Cornelius 2001; Meyers 2005).
The contrast between steadily deteriorating immigration relations and im-
provements in other aspects of the bilateral relationship finally caused policy-
makers on both sides of the border to seek more collaborative solutions to the 
growing immigration crisis. The U.S.–Mexican Binational Commission, founded 
in 1977 by the Carter and López Portillo administrations but dormant during the 
1980s, led the way by elevating its immigration subgroup to full working group 
status in 1990 and then received sustained cabinet-level attention during the Clin-
ton presidency. The commission sponsored a major binational study of immigra-
tion, producing the first quasi-official consensus document on the causes of un-
documented immigration and on basic demographic characteristics of immigrant 
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stocks and flows (Binational Study on Migration 1997). Agreements were signed 
in 1996 and 1997 creating four separate programs to establish joint procedures 
for U.S. Border Patrol agents and Mexican consuls during deportation proceed-
ings (Mechanisms of Consultation), standing links between municipal officials 
along the border (Border Liaison Mechanisms), and a program to target U.S. 
resources to migrant-sending communities—all Mexican priorities (Domínguez 
and Fernández de Castro 2001; Rosenblum 2004a; Sassen 1999). These border-
level institutions produced significant improvements in the protection of immi-
grant rights, and the Clinton administration also responded to Mexican pressure 
by demanding important changes to the IIRIRA to mitigate some of its most harm-
ful effects (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Rosenblum 2004b).6 Thus, even though 
Mexicans scorned the IIRIRA and new U.S. border enforcement strategies for 
“criminalizing” undocumented immigrants, they praised the Clinton administra-
tion for its bilateral approach to the issue (Rosenblum 2004a).
Evaluating the Historical Record 
In sum, the United States and Mexico initiated a genuinely bilateral immigra-
tion regime for the first time in 1942, and both countries derived benefits from the 
Bracero Program during World War II. But this example is exceptional. In other 
cases, bilateral policymaking was limited by opposition from one or more policy 
actors in the United States or Mexico, as in 1951–53 when Congress agreed to 
Mexico’s demand that guest-worker contracting occur on a state-to-state level but 
blocked Truman’s effort to impose sanctions on noncooperative employers, and 
in the 1990s when congressional restrictionism ensured that Clinton’s outreach 
to Mexico on migration issues was limited to midlevel institutional changes and 
small modifications to the IIRIRA. Even fewer opportunities for collaboration exist 
when policymakers in either country uniformly oppose bilateral migration poli-
cymaking, as was the case in both countries prior to World War II, in the United 
States in 1954 and 1986, and in Mexico in the 1970s.
Why has successful collaboration been such an unusual policy outcome? On 
one hand, policymakers in both states confront domestic political obstacles. In 
Mexico, the revolutionary state’s founding mythology emphasizes economic na-
tionalism and independence from the United States; and U.S.–Mexican migration 
cooperation remains particularly controversial. In the United States, even though 
pro-immigration interest groups have often dominated the policymaking process 
(Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998), they have rarely viewed Mexico as an ally in this 
fight; and nativists and other opponents of generous immigration policies are 
even more hostile to a bilateral approach.
More important, collaboration has offered limited substantive benefits to 
either country. While the Roosevelt and Truman administrations enforced 
pro-Mexican contract requirements over employer objections in the early years 
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of the Bracero Program, for most of its history the program is correctly recalled 
as nakedly exploitative of immigrant workers, offering few benefits to Mexico 
beyond the veneer of a formal state role in emigration. Mexico’s rejection of 
an oil-for-guest-workers deal in the 1970s was based on the correct assessment 
that its workers enjoyed access to U.S. labor markets with or without a visa, 
and on skepticism that legal access would bring additional concrete protections. 
Similarly, with the exception of the initial Bracero period when bilateral recruit-
ment helped jump-start stalled labor flows, bilateralism has offered few tangible 
benefits to the United States. Once Mexico tried and failed to prevent outflows in 
1954, the U.S. preference for access to labor was reliably satisfied via unilateral 
recruitment policies. Thus, migration cooperation has been undermined because 
unilateral migration policies have done an adequate job of protecting core migra-
tion interests without taking on the additional costs associated with a bilateral 
regime.
For these reasons, the best predictor of migration cooperation has not been 
variance in the underlying structure of the migration problem but rather in the 
broader bilateral, regional, and global context. U.S. military vulnerability in 
1942 and 1951 substantially enhanced Mexican bargaining power not only 
because it increased the value of U.S. access to Mexican labor but also be-
cause U.S. planners saw linkages between a migration deal and their additional 
goals of a stable regional relationship and a damper on Mexico’s flourishing 
relationship with Germany prior to World War II. Then when the anti-Bracero 
Kennedy administration confronted a Democratic Congress inclined to termi-
nate the program, it was the administration’s Latin American agenda that caused 
the president to intervene in favor of gradually phasing out the program, as 
Craig (1971, 189) explains: “To abolish Mexico’s third-most-important source of 
foreign exchange on short notice would have been too much out of character 
with Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.” Even during the 1990s, Clinton admin-
istration officials de-emphasized the migration-specific benefits of border-level 
institutions and argued that the administration sought to balance congressional 
hard-liners primarily to protect the fragile U.S.–Mexican relationship (Rosenblum 
2004b, 88).
Conversely, strained relations have undermined opportunities for migration 
cooperation. Not only did Mexico perceive an immigration deal as unnecessary 
by the mid-1970s, but making such a deal would have been particularly difficult 
for the Echeverría and López Portillo administrations, which staked their domestic 
legitimacy on their independence from the United States. And during the 1980s, 
even though members of Congress sought Mexican input during the IRCA debate, 
the broader downturn in the bilateral relationship made it impossible for Mexico 
to accept Congress’ invitation.7
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Contemporary Opportunities and Obstacles to a Bilateral  
Migration Regime
The end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks may mark the beginning of a 
new era in U.S.–Mexican relations, and recent developments within the United 
States and Mexico signal the possible emergence of a new politics of migration 
within each country as well. While it is too early to reach conclusions about how 
these changes will affect bilateral migration relations, the following sections offer 
some tentative judgments about the potential for these changes to usher in a new 
era of cooperation and about remaining obstacles to bilateralism.
Opportunities for Collaboration
Have changes in the international context improved the prospects for a new 
bilateral migration regime? On their surface, the 9/11 attacks would seem to place 
a premium on collaborative enforcement efforts. Indeed, if Mexico was perceived 
as an indispensable ally during World War II and the Korean War by virtue of its 
ability to provide essential workers, it is similarly in the position today—when six 
out of ten new jobs are filled by immigrant workers (Sum et al. 2005)—to play a 
critical role in sustaining healthy U.S. economic growth. Moreover, with 80 per-
cent of undocumented immigrants to the United States coming from Mexico and 
the Caribbean Basin, and with 12,500 trucks and 660,000 people legally crossing 
the U.S.–Mexican border each day, Mexico is uniquely positioned to contribute to 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts.8
In addition, Mexico remains a gateway for U.S. interests throughout Latin 
America. As in the 1990s, hemispheric economic integration remains a high pri-
ority for many U.S. policymakers of both parties. Any immigration deal could 
substantially strengthen U.S.–Mexican economic institutions and political ties and 
would likely deepen Mexico’s commitment to pro-market economic policies fa-
vored by the United States but increasingly controversial in Mexico and through-
out Latin America.9
Second, domestic political changes in each country also seem to reveal new 
opportunities for a collaborative approach. In the Mexican case, an immigration 
deal would be the next logical step in the process of integrating the transna-
tional community within Mexican political life. This process began in earnest in 
1990 when the Mexican Foreign Ministry established its Program for Mexican 
Communities Abroad (reorganized in 2001 as the Institute for Mexicans Abroad), 
which promotes linkages between Mexicans in the United States and public and 
private institutions within Mexico, seeks to improve the image and self-image 
of Mexicans within the United States, promotes social and political organizing 
within Mexican-American communities, and strengthens the role of the Mexican 
consular network as a supporting organization in this effort (Figueroa-Aramoni 
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1999; González Gutiérrez 1999). Mexican legislation in 1996 to permit “dual na-
tionality,” in 1998 to permit dual citizenship, and in 2002 to permit voting abroad 
reinforced this agenda, as did Fox’s widely embraced pledge to “govern for 120 
million Mexicans” (that is, 100 million in Mexico and 20 million in the United 
States).
There are also reasons to believe that political space for a bilateral migration 
deal may exist within the United States. Public opinion polls during 2006 regis-
tered greater interest in immigration reform than at any point in the previous two 
decades, and demand for reform was arguably higher than at any point since 
the 1920s. Most Americans believe that the U.S. economy depends on immigrant 
labor; and numerous polls conducted in the spring and summer of 2006 and in 
the spring of 2007 found that between 60 and 80 percent of respondents favored 
immigration reforms that included a new, large temporary-worker program. Labor 
groups that actively opposed new inflows during the 1970s and ’80s (for example, 
the AFL-CIO) are now more focused on regularizing flows, and labor support 
for an immigration deal would be particularly strong if it also strengthened U.S. 
unions’ ability to organize Mexican workers. Employers who previously dismissed 
the possibility of effective migration enforcement now confront labor shortages 
and would welcome a system that guarantees access to workers even at the cost 
of new labor rights. These labor and business concerns were at the heart of the 
left–right coalition supporting the Senate’s Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
Act during the 2005–06 and 2007–08 sessions of Congress. Finally, top strategists 
in both parties see a long-term benefit to building support among Latino voters, 
who generally favor reform packages that include legalization and expanded le-
gal migration and who likewise presumably would support a bilateral deal. 
These contextual changes make it easy to describe the contents of a bilateral 
migration deal that could achieve widespread support in both countries. The first 
pillar of a new regime would be enhanced security on and around the U.S.–Mexi-
can border and greater collaboration on regional security issues in general. For 
years, Mexico perceived border insecurity as a U.S. problem: border crime con-
tributed to the flow of drugs and people into the United States but had few nega-
tive consequences for Mexicans per se. But border violence has begun to spread 
deeper into the Mexican interior, and in a democratic Mexico with an active, 
independent media, the failure to curtail border violence has become a liability 
for incumbents. For this reason, Mexican law enforcement agencies have already 
substantially expanded their efforts to prevent undocumented transmigration and 
to assist U.S. counternarcotics efforts.10
Existing Mexican enforcement efforts potentially represent the tip of the ice-
berg, and a bilateral agreement could substantially improve U.S. migration control 
if it expands existing interior repatriation programs (that is, deporting Mexican 
migrants to their hometowns, rather than to the U.S.–Mexican border), if Mexico 
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plays a more active role in discouraging undocumented emigration by its citizens, 
and if Mexico increases enforcement against transmigration. Mexican assistance 
on other security priorities could be even more significant, including enhanced 
connectivity of U.S. and Mexican counterterrorism databases, greater U.S. access 
to Mexican immigration data, a direct U.S. enforcement role at Mexican ports 
of entry, and a direct enforcement role for U.S. counternarcotics agents on the 
Mexican side of the border. Mexico has rejected many of these ideas in the past, 
but current and former Mexican officials have signaled their willingness in recent 
years to place some of these long-desired (by the United States) concessions on 
the negotiating table as part of a comprehensive deal.11
The second pillar of a bilateral migration deal would be enhanced Mexican 
opportunities for legal migration and protection of Mexican immigrants’ rights 
within the United States. Previous Mexican criticism of emigrants’ loyalty to Mex-
ico has given way to an embrace of the vital role of migrant remittances, which 
totaled $24.5 billion in 2006. Thus, Mexican politicians have spoken out in sup-
port of a new U.S. temporary-worker program even without the promise of privi-
leged access for Mexicans. Yet there is an inherent tension between promoting 
temporary migration—that is, formally establishing a two-tier labor regime—and 
protecting workers’ rights. Thus, to satisfy liberal and pro-labor allies within the 
United States, a temporary-worker program must also include significant new 
protections to guard against migrant exploitation.
Despite the Bracero Program’s many flaws, the early years of the program 
offer important lessons about the value of bilateral enforcement. Indeed, Mexi-
can oversight of guest-worker contracts between 1942 and 1947—during which 
time consular workers had the power to suspend contracts and blacklist abusive 
employers—contributed to a high level of contract compliance, which is why 
employer allies in Congress made elimination of Mexico’s oversight role a top 
priority in 1947–48 and again in 1954 after state-to-state contracting resumed 
during the Korean War (Rosenblum 2003). Mexico’s existing consular network 
and Institute for Mexicans Abroad are a natural resource for ensuring immigrant 
workers’ rights; and Mexico would have great incentives in the context of a bilat-
eral agreement to absorb some of the enforcement costs associated with contract 
oversight. In addition, Mexican labor officials could take responsibility for migrant 
screening and recruitment within Mexico, preventing exploitation by private labor 
contractors who would otherwise play such a role.
Finally, the third pillar of a new bilateral immigration deal could be restoring 
circular migration patterns and promoting development in Mexican communities 
of origin as a strategy for reducing long-term push factors. Mexican programs 
like Tres-por-Uno (three-to-one), which provides federal, state, and local match-
ing funds to supplement migrant remittances targeting community development 
projects, offer one template; U.S. matching funds could easily be folded into 
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such a program. Nongovernmental immigrant hometown associations have also 
funded development within sending communities, and a new immigration deal 
might emphasize public–private partnerships based on this model. Many U.S. 
actors recognize the logic of this approach, which has long been seen as the 
primary tool available to reduce emigration pressures (Commission for the Study 
of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development 1990). Efforts 
to target remittances to local development projects could be combined with pro-
grams to encourage return migration by temporary workers, a priority for some 
supporters of comprehensive immigration reform in the United States and a trend 
that would ultimately strengthen bilateral relations. Under a bilateral regime, re-
turn flows would be encouraged through market-based incentives, such as return 
bonds, withheld wages, or a binational pension program, rather than through an 
enforcement-only approach.
Obstacles to Collaboration
Each of the contextual changes discussed above cuts both ways, raising ob-
stacles to those who favor a bilateral approach, and specific proposals for bilater-
alism raise additional questions.
First, in terms of the broader international context, post-9/11 concerns about 
security make Mexico a more valuable ally, but they also raise new concerns 
about the “special peril of defection,” raising barriers to cooperation for the rea-
sons the traditional international relations literature predicts. That is, while U.S. 
security experts embrace a regional approach, they also worry that Mexican en-
forcement agents may be less committed to protecting U.S. security, less pre-
pared, or more prone to corruption. And the evidence so far is not that the United 
States has reached out to Mexico as a valuable ally in the war on terror, as during 
World War II, but that the two nations have reentered a Cold War-style era of be-
nign neglect.12 An immigration deal would also have ambiguous implications for 
U.S. hemispheric integration goals, as any deepening of U.S.–Mexican economic 
integration immediately raises questions about “parity” for other Caribbean Basin 
and Western Hemisphere states: Why should Mexico receive privileged access to 
U.S. markets while CAFTA-DR countries are excluded, for example?13
Second, clear political obstacles to reform also remain in place in each coun-
try. Fox placed such a deal at the center of his presidency in 2001 and suf-
fered the consequences throughout the remainder of his term from the definitive 
American withdrawal from bilateral negotiations. In a March 2006 poll, only 52 
percent of Mexicans considered good relations with the United States important 
to Mexico’s future (Zogby International 2006). The same poll found that a plural-
ity of Mexicans (32 percent) believed they had been personally harmed by the 
NAFTA treaty and that a majority (53 percent) opposed the idea of linking tighter 
immigration restrictions to a “Marshall Plan” for Mexico—though this would not 
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be the focus of an immigration agreement as described here.
On the U.S. side, opposition to a bilateral migration deal would come from 
the same actors who supported unilateral enforcement-only measures rather than 
comprehensive reform during the 109th and 110th Congresses. Indeed, House 
Republicans hardened their opposition to a temporary-worker program, legaliza-
tion, and other benefits in the wake of the Senate’s passage of the Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Act of 2006. And large-scale marches and rallies in support 
of comprehensive immigration reform in the spring gave way to a backlash by 
anti-immigration single-issue groups, which brought significant grassroots pres-
sure to bear on Republicans and Democrats alike throughout the summer of 2006 
and lasting into the following year.
Finally, the details of the three-pillar structure would also raise a number 
of questions. First, working out a Mexico-specific temporary-worker program 
would be difficult, raising questions about the timing of new admissions relative 
to enhanced enforcement efforts, whether temporary workers should have the 
opportunity eventually to become U.S. citizens, and how to handle temporary 
workers’ health and pension benefits, among other issues. Second, how would 
the agreement balance migrants’ rights within the United States against the goal 
of stronger migration enforcement? Bilateral negotiations would have to resolve 
disputes over specific enforcement measures under consideration in the United 
States, including limits on migrants’ access to the court system, expanded use of 
mandatory detention and expedited deportation, and the proposal to redefine 
undocumented status as a felony or misdemeanor criminal offense. The most 
fundamental questions regard the rights of undocumented immigrants within the 
United States: While a majority (often as many as three-quarters) of Americans 
polled in 2006 and 2007 favored proposals to allow undocumented immigrants 
who meet a range of requirements to earn legal status, a significant minority pas-
sionately opposes “amnesty” under any circumstances. Mexico would likely insist 
that a bilateral deal include realistic paths to legality for these Mexican citizens 
(Hernández et al. 2005). 
Conclusion: Prospects for Reform
In sum, despite the uncertainty about the future of immigration reform within 
the United States, this review confirms that ample areas of agreement exist around 
which a bilateral agreement could, in principle, be negotiated. A bilateral approach 
enjoys especially widespread support among Mexican elites, and Mexico’s appar-
ent willingness to offer substantial new support to U.S. law enforcement efforts 
in exchange for privileged access to U.S. labor markets could be at the heart of a 
new deal. Any such arrangement would be controversial within the United States. 
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But a well-crafted bilateral deal based on expanded legal access for Mexican 
workers and protection of immigrant rights, joint enforcement to prevent undocu-
mented migration and enhance U.S. security, and promotion of circular flows and 
Mexican regional development projects could achieve widespread support from 
the same left–right coalition of grassroots and elite groups and policymakers that 
supported comprehensive reform proposals in the Senate in 2006 and 2007 and 
the president’s proposed migration reform in 2005. Moreover, there is little doubt 
that an agreement based around these three pillars could be of substantial mutual 
benefit to the United States and Mexico. Thus, whereas a bilateral immigration 
regime failed to generate serious discussion in the post-Bracero period because 
no basic consensus existed on areas of mutual concern, today’s higher priorities 
on regional security and economic integration have changed these dynamics so 
that bilateralism offers the possibility of concrete benefits.
What is the likelihood that bilateral talks will resume and usher in major 
changes? In the short term, the political costs and benefits of a bilateral deal may 
turn on the election results of 2006 and 2008. House Republicans moved hard to 
the right on immigration reform during the summer of 2006, seeking to use migra-
tion as a wedge issue to mobilize conservative voters; but this strategy was unsuc-
cessful at best, and may have backfired in many cases. Overall, exit polls found 
that a solid majority of midterm voters (57 percent versus 38 percent) wanted 
immigration reform to provide undocumented immigrants working in the United 
States a chance to apply for legal status rather than face deportation (Kondracke 
2006). And while immigration was not at the center of most midterm races, pro-
comprehensive reform candidates defeated hard-liners in thirteen of sixteen races 
in which the immigration debate was prominently featured.14 Perhaps most im-
portant, Hispanic voters turned out in large numbers and voted overwhelmingly 
for Democrats, reversing gains made by the Bush administration during the 2004 
presidential race and jeopardizing the president’s highly touted plans for Hispan-
ics to become a core constituency for Republicans in the future.15 Even though 
the Democratically controlled Congress failed to produce immigration legislation 
in 2007—and many of the newly elected Democrats were lukewarm support-
ers of reform, at best—the early position-taking for the 2008 race suggests that 
comprehensive reform will remain an increasingly partisan issue, at least at the 
presidential level, with Democrats favoring a policy package that could lend itself 
to bilateralism and Republicans (with the exception of John McCain) coming out 
strongly for an enforcement-only approach.
As with any bilateral initiative—or any major immigration reform—a second 
key question concerns presidential leadership. Will President Bush find an oppor-
tunity to return to immigration reform during his final year in office? It would re-
quire strong presidential leadership in both countries to craft a multidimensional 
agreement and to sell it to skeptical publics. Despite his earlier outspoken sup-
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port for a bilateral deal, Bush failed to keep immigration on the bilateral agenda, 
and his support for the Senate’s comprehensive reform bill during 2006 was also 
less consistent than supporters had hoped. The president—along with Secre-
tary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez and Secretary of Homeland Security Michael 
Chertoff—was far more engaged during the 2007 Senate debate, but Republican 
opponents of the Senate bill and process ignored the administration’s appeals 
for support. Following three years of congressional false starts, the inauguration 
of a pro-reform president in 2009 may see a bilateral approach, working with a 
like-minded Felipe Calderón, as an opportunity to jump-start the U.S. immigration 
debate just as Bush initially intended in 2001. 
This raises a third question about the institutional venue for a bilateral deal. 
Many initiatives to enhance collaborative enforcement, streamline legal flows, 
and invest in Mexican communities of origin have already begun through the 
U.S.–Mexican–Canadian Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 
(SPP). Important examples include voluntary interior repatriation agreements, the 
joint countersmuggling program OASISS, the SENTRI program to allow pre-ap-
proved entry for “trusted travelers” who undergo background checks and obtain 
radio frequency ID cards, and the bilateral Border Security Initiative in which 
U.S. Border Patrol and Mexican Grupo Beta agents work and train together. Their 
shared mission is reducing illegal entries while preventing border deaths and im-
proving humanitarian conditions along the border. Further collaboration through 
the SPP would not require extensive public debate or cooperation from Congress, 
but the SPP does not offer the possibility of substantial additional Mexican ac-
cess to U.S. labor markets, nor do the executive agreements and memoranda of 
understanding upon which the SPP is based offer an opportunity to use an im-
migration deal as a high-profile tool of hemispheric diplomacy. As in the 1990s, 
bilateral progress through modest executive branch institutional reforms is thus 
easier to contemplate than major legislative or treaty-based changes but offers 
more limited benefits.
Any prospects for a new bilateral migration agreement require continued po-
litical and economic stability in Mexico. Mistrust of Mexican enforcement capacity 
and integrity is a key obstacle to good-faith bargaining on the part of many U.S. 
policymakers, and the new security context raises the stakes associated with an 
unreliable negotiating partner. The protest tactics employed by Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador and his supporters following Mexico’s disputed 2006 election rep-
resented a strong disincentive to risk-averse U.S. policymakers who might have 
considered investments in a more formal bilateral immigration regime, though by 
the middle of 2007, the Calderón administration had demonstrated an impressive 
ability to restore order to the Mexican capital and engender broader-than-expect-
ed support within the Mexican Congress. Even in the absence of additional con-
flict in Mexico, lingering questions about Mexico’s future economic and political 
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development and the breadth of support for López Obrador’s radical critique of 
U.S.-backed economic policies highlight the potential gains from a new bilateral 
migration agreement—but also the barriers to negotiating one.
Finally, in the long run, the successful implementation of a bilateral migration 
deal will depend to a great extent on the ability of Mexican politicians and the 
U.S.–Mexican transnational community to complete the project of redefining the 
issue in those terms. Migration differs from the cross-border movement of goods 
and capital because the movement of people represents more than a simple shift 
in factors of production. But at the same time, a globalization regime that liberal-
izes only some types of flows is fundamentally asymmetric, penalizing owners of 
labor relative to other participants in the global economy. The United States and 
Mexico confront deeper challenges in resolving this tension than in the cases, say, 
of the European Union or Mercosur states, but the challenge will only intensify 
as the U.S. and Mexican economies otherwise continue their broader integration. 
In this sense, how the United States and Mexico define their bilateral migration 
problem may be an important predictor of how the United States defines its fu-
ture relationship with the global economy.
Notes
The research for this chapter was supported by a Council on Foreign Relations International 
Affairs Fellowship.
1 As a former Mexican executive branch official involved in the effort to develop a more aggres-
sive migration policy explained, “It does not count as intervention in another country’s affairs 
when you are doing it to protect the rights of your own citizens” (Rosenblum 2004a, 108).
2 The focus on counterterrorism at U.S. borders began during the 1990s in the wake of the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing and the 1999 millennium bomber, intercepted at the U.S.–Cana-
dian border (Meyers 2005).
3 Immigrants combined to account for 15 percent of the U.S. workforce in 2004 and over 50 per-
cent of labor force growth since 1994 (Sum et al. 2005; Aspen Institute 2005).
4 Conflict over the Central American civil wars was resolved by the El Salvador peace treaty (1989) 
and Nicaraguan election (1990); conflict over Mexican democratization was resolved by free 
and fair elections in Mexico during the 1990s; conflict over Mexico’s debt crisis was resolved by 
Mexico’s commitment to “Washington Consensus” economic policies and the NAFTA deal; and 
conflict over narcotics was ameliorated by President Clinton’s consistent support for Mexico on 
this issue, including his use of the veto threat to block a congressional proposal to “decertify” 
Mexico as an ally in the war on drugs (Rosenblum 2004a).
5 Ironically, the only way immigration entered the NAFTA debate was when NAFTA’s supporters 
held out the promise of reduced Mexican emigration pressures as a reason for Americans to 
support the deal. Thus far the record suggests that NAFTA has had the opposite effect (Massey, 
Durand, and Malone 2002).
6 Clinton threatened a veto to eliminate the Gallegly amendment, which would have denied 
free public education to the children of undocumented immigrants; and the administration 
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also scaled back congressional limits on poor families’ ability to sponsor family members for 
immigrant visas (the “deeming” requirement) and eased restrictions on immigrants’ access to 
welfare.
7 Senate Judiciary Chairman Alan Simpson (R-WY) traveled to Mexico and discussed migration 
legislation with officials there during the summer of 1986. Simpson supported efforts by the 
Foreign Relations Committee to invite Mexican officials to discuss migration issues at a June 
hearing on the “Situation in Mexico,” but Mexicans boycotted the hearing in the wake of the 
inflammatory William von Raab testimony before the same committee just one month earlier.
8 The border is not the weakest link in U.S. counterterrorism efforts; yet Mexico is still uniquely 
positioned to enhance U.S. security by assisting in the creation of a North American security 
perimeter, by screening cargo before it reaches the U.S. border, and by assisting in tracking 
terrorist mobility (Council on Foreign Relations 2005; Ginsburg 2006). Also see Flynn (2004).
9 While U.S.–Mexican migration relations were not prominently featured in Mexico’s 2006 
presidential election, NAFTA, Mexico’s position in the global economy, and structural reform 
of the Mexican economy were among the most significant issues distinguishing the top two 
candidates, Felipe Calderón and Andrés Manuel López Obrador. In Mexico and throughout 
Latin America, U.S. unilateralism on migration issues, especially the “muro de muerte” (wall of 
death) at the U.S.–Mexican border, has become an inflammatory example of U.S. hypocrisy 
(for example, British Broadcasting Corporation 2006; Cormier 2006). Few developments would 
silence these critics more effectively than a formal U.S.–Mexican (or U.S.–regional) migration 
agreement.
10 According to the Mexican Embassy, Mexico arrested 57,000 individuals on drug trafficking 
crimes between 2000 and 2005; Mexico currently employs 38,000 civilian and military law 
enforcement personnel in its counternarcotics efforts; and Mexico detained 216,000 transmi-
grants in 2004 and 206,000 in the first ten months of 2005. New bilateral initiatives have also 
been launched, including the 2002 Border Partnership Accord, which provides U.S. screening 
technology to Mexican inspectors and coordinates shared data on airline passenger manifests; 
and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, which seeks to streamline legal border crossing 
within the NAFTA area by implementing common data and documentation procedures.
11 For example, Mexican members of Congress unanimously agreed that “if a guest country offers 
a sufficient number of appropriate visas to cover the biggest possible number of workers and 
their families, which until now cross the border without documents because of the impossibility 
of obtaining them, Mexico should be responsible for guaranteeing that each person that decides 
to leave its territory does so following legal channels” (Hernández et al. 2005; emphasis added), 
a radical break with Mexico’s previous position against the regulation of outflows. The same joint 
resolution suggests that in the case of a comprehensive immigration deal, “Mexico would be in a 
better position to exhort potential migrants to abide by the proper rules and to adopt measures 
in order to reduce undocumented migration.” Also see Council on Foreign Relations (2005).
12 As Castañeda (2003, 68) concludes, “the region, at least in terms of U.S. attention, has become 
once again an Atlantis, a lost continent.”
13 Still, these deepening-versus-broadening conflicts are not insurmountable, as there are ample 
historical and contemporary reasons to limit a migration deal to Mexico; and (as the CAFTA-DR 
example implies), a deal with Mexico could likewise be expanded to encompass other countries 
of origin in the future.
14 Pro-immigration or pro-comprehensive reform candidates were victorious in House races in 
Arizona’s Eighth District (defeating Randy Graf, founder of the anti-immigrant Minutemen group), 
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Indiana’s Eighth District (defeating House Immigration Subcommittee Chairman John Hostet-
tler), Colorado’s Seventh, and Arizona’s Fifth (defeating prominent immigration hard-liner J. D. 
Hayworth); in Senate races in Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington; and in guber-
natorial races in Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, and Wisconsin. Restrictionist Republican 
Senator Jon Kyl retained his seat in Arizona; and hard-liners won close races against pro-com-
prehensive-reform candidates in Pennsylvania’s Sixth District and Florida’s Thirteenth.
15 Eight percent of all voters in 2006 were Hispanic, the highest level ever recorded, and Hispanic 
voters reversed a recent trend by supporting Democrats over Republicans by a margin of 69 
percent to 29 percent, up from 65–35 in 2000, 62–38 in 2002, and 56–44 in 2004.
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Political Implications of 
U.S. Public Attitudes Toward 
Immigration on the Immigration 
Policymaking Process
Valerie.F..Hunt
Policymakers and researchers alike are concerned about the political chal-lenges that liberal states face when attempting to regulate immigration through policy reform amid increased migration and trade (Freeman 
1994; Hollifield 1992). At times, U.S. immigration (and immigration policy) cor-
responds with the ebb and flow of economic conditions—namely that during 
times of economic prosperity, policy is more expansive, and during times of 
economic downturns, it tends to be more restrictive. However, there are times 
when the U.S. government passes expansive immigration measures in the face 
of economic downturns. Irrespective of real-world conditions that can be traced 
to increased globalization and trade and to increased levels of both illegal and 
legal immigration, governmental drives toward expansive or restrictive immigra-
tion policy are mediated by the public’s acceptance of immigration and immi-
gration policy. 
I argue that liberal governments must take the public will into consideration 
when making policy. When does public opinion matter to the policy process? 
Anthony Downs (1972) tells us that not every issue that gains public attention 
gets addressed on the policy agenda. Indeed, the public, when confronted with 
the economic and/or social costs, may lose interest and cease pressuring the gov-
ernment to make policy reforms. For example, one policy option for curbing the 
hiring of illegal labor is to require both citizens and immigrants to carry a national 
identification card. Gallup polls show that, until recently, the American public has 
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considered a national identity card too great a cost to pay for resolving the prob-
lem of identifying undocumented migrants (cited in Hunt 2003).
Immigration reform has long been a source of internal divisions in both the 
Republican and Democratic parties (Tichenor 2002). Because of the potential for 
policy stalemate, parties have an incentive to keep immigration off the policy 
agenda as much as possible. For example, negotiations around the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement did not include provisions for regulating immigration 
from Mexico or Canada. The trade agreements were devoted to policy develop-
ment for the transfer of goods and services.
Lawmakers were able to keep immigration issues off the government’s policy 
agenda for two key reasons. First, opinion polls indicated that the American 
public considered immigration to be much less important than other issues, such 
as the state of the economy, crime levels, and, after the 9/11 attacks, the war in 
Iraq and terrorism. Second, the American public had seldom punished elected 
officials for immigration policy stances that may have been counter to public 
preferences. 
Heightened public attention to immigration has exacerbated the polarization 
within and between parties over immigration reform. In addition, factors such as 
rising levels of illegal immigration since the mid-1990s, the effects of globaliza-
tion on domestic labor markets, public uncertainty about individual and national 
economic well-being, and public concerns about national security due to the 
porous U.S. border have pushed out in the open the parties’ internal divisions 
about the most appropriate policy alternative for addressing unauthorized and 
legal immigration.
Public Attitudes Toward Immigration Issues: Before and After 9/11
For decades, Americans have displayed ambivalence toward immigrants and 
immigration policy (Fetzer 2000; Simon 1985; Simon and Alexander 1993; Simon 
and Lynch 1999). At certain times, Americans profess appreciation for the pres-
ence of immigrants and even embrace the notion of immigrants’ importance to 
the nation’s development. For example, American national identity is often as-
sociated with the concept of being a nation of immigrants (Reimers 1992). Yet, 
Americans express animosity toward each new wave of migrants into the nation’s 
social, political, and economic fabric. 
As public opinion scholars Simon and Lynch (1999) demonstrate, the Ameri-
can public expresses positive feelings about immigrants who came to America 
in the distant past and negative feelings toward immigrants who came during 
whatever period the survey was conducted. Since the late nineteenth century, 
Americans have regarded each new wave of migrants as a threat to economic 
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well-being and as a challenge to cherished touchstones of American identity. In a 
recent study, anthropologist Leo Chavez (2001) investigated the interplay of public 
discourse and media coverage of immigration on ten American national magazine 
covers from 1965 to 1999 and how the coverage coincided with real-world condi-
tions such as economic upswings and downturns. Patterns of positive and nega-
tive depictions coincided with shifts in the economy. Positive depictions appeared 
during economic upswings, while negative images and stories of immigrants ran 
during economic downturns. Chavez finds that national magazines published 
positive depictions of immigrants on their covers during the Independence Day 
period, a time when Americans are open to embracing their immigrant heritage.
Three developments in U.S. public attitudes have emerged since the 2001 
terrorist attacks. First, Americans have shifted their thinking about the salience or 
importance of immigration issues. Second, they have changed their level of atten-
tiveness to immigration as a national problem. Third, as awareness of immigration 
issues and divisiveness in political parties have increased, they have begun to use 
immigration as an evaluative criterion for vote choice. 
This study analyzes the causes and implications of these shifts in public at-
titudes toward immigration on the U.S. political landscape. Specifically, I address 
how changes in public attitudes have political implications for the 2006 midterm 
elections and on current policy reform efforts. Real-world conditions shape U.S. 
immigration policy and the country’s ability to control unwanted migration. The 
impact of these real-world conditions cannot be understood without taking into 
consideration the role of U.S. public attitudes in the policy process. I argue that 
the impact of these real-world conditions on immigration is mediated by public 
perceptions of these factors. 
Ebb and Flow of Public Attentiveness to Immigration Issues:  
Before and After 9/11
Before 9/11, the American public paid less attention to immigration than to 
other issues. When asked what they think is the most important problem facing 
the nation, Americans consistently rank immigration at the very bottom of public 
priorities, with crime, the economy, and the war in Iraq consistently polling as 
most important.
For example, political controversy over 1994 California Proposition 187 fo-
cused national public attention on illegal immigration issues. The California initia-
tive sparked public debate over whether immigrants constituted a fiscal burden by 
overcrowding schools and hospitals, depressing wages, and using scarce social-
service resources without paying into the public coffers. The public increased its 
attentiveness to immigration, particularly amnesty provisions for illegal migrants 
in the U.S., as well as guest-worker programs and the problem of unauthorized 
migration from Mexico. 
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Immigration moved from regional to national policy agendas. Congress ad-
dressed illegal immigration after the 1994 midterm elections, during which the 
Republican Party regained the majority of the House and Senate. It passed the 
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. 
After this flurry of legislative activity, public attentiveness to immigration 
waned for the rest of the 1990s. But after 9/11, Americans began to pay more 
attention to immigration. Several surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center 
for the People and the Press from 2005 to 2006 show that immigration moved to 
the top tier of most important problems facing the nation. Table 1 compares the 
results of five Pew surveys conducted between November 2005 and September 
2006. The September survey shows that immigration ranks as one of the top six 
most important problems. The issues Americans considered most important were 
the war in Iraq (25 percent), terrorism (14 percent), the economy (9 percent), 
energy prices (7 percent), immigration and government (6 percent each).
Public Understanding of Immigration Issues: Before and After 9/11
The public exhibits fairly consistent and articulated opinions about immi-
grants and immigration policy. Prior to 9/11, Americans generally understood 
immigration issues primarily as economic, fiscal, or social problems. Problems 
tended to focus on job displacement issues (for example, whether immigrants 
take jobs away from native-born workers or take jobs that native-born workers do 
not want) and the impact of immigrants on social resources (whether immigrants 
act as a drain on social services or represent a net gain by way of paying federal 
taxes). 
Two significant changes in public understanding about immigration and im-
migrant issues emerged after the 9/11 attacks. The first involves a shift in public 
perceptions of national security. Before 9/11, U.S. national security was often 
Q: “What do you think is the most important problem facing the nation?”
 Nov. 2005 Jan. 2006 March 2006 May 2006 Sept. 2006 
.
War.in.Iraq. 29. 23. 20. 18. 25
Terrorism. 6. 6. 8. 5. 14
Economy. 11. 11. 7. 7. 9
Energy.prices. 4. 5. 5. 14. 7
Immigration. 2. 3. 4. 10. 6
Government/politics. 7. 5. 10. 13. 6
SOURCE: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2006b).
Table 1
Most Important Problem (Percent)
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framed as an international or foreign-policy issue. After 9/11, Americans began to 
view security as a domestic issue. The second, related shift involves changes in 
the perceived threat that illegal immigration poses to the nation. Before 9/11, the 
threat of legal and illegal immigration was contextualized as threats to personal 
or national economic well-being or as threats to national identity. After 9/11, the 
public began to perceive immigration in general, and unauthorized immigra-
tion in particular, as threats to domestic security. Unauthorized migration became 
linked with terrorist infiltration of the U.S. through illegal border crossing. 
These two shifts in the public’s understanding or framing of immigration is-
sues, coupled with increased public attentiveness relative to other issues, helped 
move immigration from the margins to the center of public and national govern-
mental agendas. 
Impact of Public Attitudes Toward Immigration on Voters’ Decisionmaking: 
Before and After 9/11
A key implication of changes in the context and level of public attentiveness 
to immigration is the degree to which immigration now influences U.S. electoral 
politics. Until recently, there was little evidence that voters use their attitudes 
toward immigration as a factor for making electoral decisions. Several recurrent 
issues are high on the national policy agenda: crime, health care, the state of the 
economy, and unemployment (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Presidential races 
have usually involved voters’ evaluations of which candidate would be better on 
addressing crucial electoral issues such as crime, as in the 1988 Bush–Dukakis 
race (Mendelberg 2001); who is more fit to turn the economy around, as in the 
1992 Clinton–Bush race; or who is more fit to handle terrorism or the war in Iraq, 
as in the 2004 Bush–Kerry race.
Tarrance Group and Lake Research Partners (2006a, 2006b) surveys of regis-
tered voters conducted March 26–28, 2006, and July 9–13, 2006, however, pro-
vide preliminary evidence that voters are connecting their evaluations of immi-
gration with their prospective vote choices. The March 2006 survey asked voters: 
“What issue is the most important for your member of Congress to deal with?” 
The top response was the war in Iraq (15 percent). Next, tied with jobs and the 
economy at 11 percent, was immigration. The significance of this finding is that 
immigration ranks at the same level of importance as issues that voters tradition-
ally use to make voting decisions.
A large percentage of the respondents viewed immigration as a problem of 
serious magnitude. When asked about the severity of the problem, 61 percent 
considered illegal immigration to be a very serious (28 percent) or extremely seri-
ous (33 percent) problem.
The Tarrance survey results suggest that this perception has a “priming effect” 
on voters’ decisionmaking. In other words, when voters pay attention to immigra-
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tion issues, they use their understanding of the issue to evaluate the performance 
of elected representatives (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Table 2 displays the results 
of respondents’ answers to the following question:
“What if there were a candidate who stood for most of the things you believe in, 
but took a stand on immigration that you really disagreed with? Would you probably/
definitely vote for that candidate, or probably/definitely not vote for that candidate?”
Sixty-four percent of respondents said they would vote for a candidate 
who supports policy preferences with which the voter disagrees. One in three 
voters, or 30 percent, would not vote for a candidate who disagrees with the 
voter’s policy preferences.
The July 2006 Tarrance survey asked respondents about their attitudes toward 
the very different congressional legislative reform bills debated in the House and 
Senate.1 The House bill (HR 4437), referred to as the enforcement-only bill, pro-
vides resources for the deportation of unauthorized (illegal) immigrants with no 
option of returning to the U.S. The bill passed the House in December 2005 on 
a vote of 239–182, with 92 percent of Republicans favoring and 82 percent of 
Democrats opposing. The Senate bill (S 2611), referred to as the comprehensive 
immigration bill, provides expansive policy options for addressing the problem 
of illegal immigration and the presence of illegal immigrants already in the U.S. 
These include a guest-worker program and a process for unauthorized migrants 
who have been in the U.S. for at least two years to apply for permanent residence 
after payment of penalties and taxes (a pathway to citizenship). The Senate bill 
passed in May 2006 on a vote of 62–36, with 90 percent of Democrats approving 
and 59 percent of Republicans opposing.
Responses to several key survey questions about these bills give evidence 
for the shift of the immigration issue from the margins to the center of national 
politics (Tables 3A and 3B). A majority of respondents, or 62 percent, indicated 
that they felt illegal immigration was an important problem that Congress needs 
to resolve in 2006 (33 percent called it “extremely important” and 29 percent said 
it was “very important”). 
“What if there were a candidate who stood for most of the things you believe in, but took a stand on immigration that 




NOTE: Number = 1,010; margin of error ± 3.1 percent.
SOURCE: Tarrance Group and Lake Research Partners (2006a), March 26–28, 2006.
Table 2
Voter Attitudes on Immigration Reform (Percent)
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Yet, respondents were ambivalent about the policy alternatives on the gov-
ernment’s agenda. They were asked (Q2, Table 3A) if they would oppose or 
support legislation that would tighten borders, toughen penalties on employers and 
workers who violate immigration laws, create an expanded guest worker program, 
and make most current illegal immigrants ineligible for citizenship. Forty-six percent 
favored this restrictive measure, while 49 percent opposed it. In comparison, there was 
significant divergence in responses to the comprehensive bill (Q1, Table 3A). 
Seventy-one percent favored the comprehensive bill, while 23 percent opposed it.
The Tarrance study also polled respondents about the connection of their 
policy preferences on immigration with their prospective vote choices/support of 
candidates. Respondents were divided on whether they would vote for a candi-
date who supports the enforcement-driven policy option (Q3, Table 3A). Forty-
Would you favor or oppose passage of this legislation?
Q1: “…Provide resources to greatly increase border security; impose penalties on employers who hire illegal workers; 
allow additional workers to come to the U.S. to work for a temporary period; create a system in which illegal immigrants 
could come forward and register, pay a fine and receive a temporary-worker permit; provide these temporary workers 
with a multiyear path to earned citizenship if they get to the end of the line and meet certain requirements for living 
crime free, learning English, paying taxes?”
Q2: “…Tighten the borders; put tougher penalties on employers and workers who violate immigration laws; create an 
expanded guest-worker program that allows people to work here only temporarily; and most current illegal immigrants 
would never be eligible for citizenship?”
Follow-up.question.asked.after.Q1.(comprehensive).and.Q2.(enforcement.only):
Q3: “…And, would you be more likely or less likely to vote for a candidate who supports this legislation?”
 Q1 Comprehensive Q2 Enforcement only 











NOTE: Number = 1,000; margin of error ± 3 percent.
SOURCE: Tarrance Group and Lake Research Partners (2006b), July 9–13, 2006.
Table 3A
U.S. Voter Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy Reform Options (Percent)
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five percent said they were more likely and 47 percent less likely to support a 
candidate who supports this legislation.
When asked about supporting a candidate who delays action or passes en-
forcement-focused legislation (Q4 and Q5, Table 3B), respondents were also di-
vided. For example, 58 percent said they were less likely to support a candidate 
who supports restrictive legislation, compared with 38 percent who were more 
likely to do so.
Political Impact of Public Perception of Increased Levels of U.S. Immigration 
It is important that we examine the relationship between increased immi-
gration flows and U.S. public attitudes and the impact of that relationship on 
the policy process. The annual level of legal admissions had steadily increased 
beginning in the 1970s. Following the 9/11 attacks, legal admissions decreased 
from 1,059,356 in 2002 to 703,542 in 2003 but increased in subsequent years, from 
957,883 legal admissions in 2004 to 1,122,373 in 2005 and to 1,266,264 in 2006.2 
According to 2006 U.S. Census reports, the foreign born compose 12.4 percent of 
the total U.S. population.3 
The effects of increased levels of legal admissions on the potential for policy 
reform are mediated by public perceptions of the consequences. When the public 
connects increased levels of unauthorized immigration to specific costs borne by 
the public or state, it increases the likelihood that citizens will call for restrictive 
reforms. However, research provides mixed support for this thesis. Jack Citrin 
“Please tell me whether you would be more likely or less likely to support a candidate for Congress who supported that 
solution to the current immigration problem.”
Q: “Passing no legislation this year and taking a fresh look at this issue next year when election year politics will not be 
looming over the process.”
Q: “Passing legislation which only increases border security and enacts tougher penalties on employers but does not 
include a guest-worker program and does not include a path to citizenship for current illegal immigrants.”
 Q4 Q5 






NOTE: Number = 1,000; margin of error ± 3 percent.
SOURCE: Tarrance Group and Lake Research Partners (2006b), July 9–13, 2006.
Table 3B
U.S. Voter Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy Reform Options (Percent)
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and colleagues (1997) examine the degree to which Americans’ attitudes toward 
immigrants are based on their economic situations and concerns—namely, labor 
market competition, overall concern for the U.S. economy, and concerns due to 
increases in the percentage of foreign born. The researchers find that respondents 
in states with high levels of foreign born are no more likely than respondents in 
other parts of the country to support restricting immigration levels.
A 2006 Pew Research Center survey of voters in red (Republican) and blue 
(Democratic) counties shows similar responses in attitudes toward illegal im-
migration (Table 4). Red county residents have far less contact with the foreign 
born than residents in blue county areas. When asked if  illegals should leave the 
country, 44 percent of residents in counties with higher concentrations of foreign 
born (blue) agreed, compared with 57 percent of red county residents. Voter 
partisanship and concentration of foreign born seem to matter. Sixty percent of 
Republican respondents in red counties who reported their personal finances as 
excellent agreed with the statement, while 39 percent of their Democratic coun-
terparts believed illegal immigrants should leave the country. 
What are the options for policy reform resulting from shifts in public percep-
tion about the negative consequences of either legal or unauthorized migration? 
The public seems responsive to enforcement policies for regulating illegal im-
migration and overall favors decreasing or at least maintaining current levels of 
legal admissions.
  Red counties Blue counties Swing counties 
.
“Illegals should leave the U.S.” . 57. 44. 54
Total personal finances
.....Excellent/good. . 52. 45. 51
.....Only.fair/poor. . 62. 43. 56
Among Republicans
.....Excellent/good. . 60. 51. 59
.....Only.fair/poor. . 72. 65. 71
Among Democrats
.....Excellent/good. . 39. 44. 48
.....Only.fair/poor. . 53. 38. 54
NOTE: The term “red counties” denotes counties where the majority of voters vote for Republican presidential 
candidates. “Blue counties” refers to those counties where the majority of the voters vote for Democratic 
presidential candidates. The terms are generally used to refer to states.
SOURCE: Doherty (2006).
Table 4
Differences in Voter Attitudes in Red and Blue Counties in the U.S. (Percent)
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Where We Are Now: Political Impact of Immigration 
and Public Opinion
Immigration Policy Reform in the 109th Congress (2005–06)
To some observers, immigration as a major issue seems to have come out 
of nowhere and captured the attention of the public, the media, and national 
government. Media pundits on all the major news networks regularly feature 
programs about “broken borders,” invasions of illegal immigrants, and the threat 
of immigrants to job security for native workers. Cities such as Hazleton, Pennsyl-
vania, have taken up immigration in their city council meetings. Hazleton’s mayor 
and city council voted to fine landlords for renting to illegal immigrants and to 
withhold business permits to employers of undocumented workers. In Arizona, a 
group of citizens called the Arizona Minutemen has “volunteered” its services to 
the U.S. Border Patrol, its leader claiming that the efforts are necessary because 
the federal government has dropped the ball in protecting U.S. borders. Public 
protests and demonstrations by immigrant rights activists were joined by a body 
of newcomers, the immigrants themselves. Thousands of immigrants, legal and 
undocumented, took to the streets of major U.S. cities such as Dallas, Los Angeles, 
New York, and Chicago to protest the restrictive immigration-policy reform mea-
sures debated in Congress as well as in cities and states across the country. 
Republican Party leaders in the House and Senate are divided over support-
ing enforcement-only over comprehensive efforts to curtail illegal immigration. 
However, the current state of affairs in immigration policy is due to a confluence 
of economic, political, and institutional factors at work in this highly contentious 
policy arena. 
The current policy reform efforts are taking place in a very challenging po-
litical environment. I will identify and discuss each of the factors shaping these 
policy efforts. Next, I will discuss the policy reform alternatives in Congress.
The following factors are at play in the current immigration policy debates 
and policy process:
1. Internal divisions in the Republican and Democratic parties
2. Divisions between the House and Senate
3. Immigration’s salience to the president’s policy agenda
4. Increases in the percentage of foreign born in the U.S. and a shift in the 
   destinations of the foreign born from traditionally high-impact states 
    (Florida, California, and Texas) to new states (Indiana, Georgia, and North 
    Carolina)
5. The return of highly negative public sentiment toward immigrants and 
    public attentiveness to illegal immigrants
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In 2005, Congress took up its first major efforts on regulation of illegal immigra-
tion since the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. 
Table 5 reports the comparisons between the House and Senate bills. House mem-
bers reported out a bill (HR 4437) that is more restrictive than the Senate bill. While 
both chambers focus on illegal immigration, the House focuses exclusively on ef-
forts to curtail illegal immigration. HR 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism 
and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, deals only with border enforcement. 
The bill proposes to build a 700-mile fence along the U.S.–Mexico border. Instead 
of a “catch and release” policy, Border Patrol would be required to apprehend and 

















































SOURCE: Data for each bill are compiled from the online access of the Daily Digests of the Congressional 
Record.
Table 5
Comparison of House and Senate Immigration Reform Bills HR 4437 and S 2611
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to verify Social Security identification for all employees. Fines up to $40,000 would 
be imposed on employers of illegal immigrant workers along with prison sentenc-
ing. The bill does not include guest worker steps toward legalization. 
S 2611, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, also addresses 
border enforcement and employer sanctions. The bill calls for 370 miles of triple-
layer fence, with a 500-mile vehicle barrier at the border. The measure would 
create the Employment Eligibility Verification System, under which all employers 
would be required to verify the status and documentation of all employees. The 
measure also addresses what to do with the 11.5 million undocumented migrants 
in the U.S. The Senate measure provides multiple “pathways to citizenship” for 
undocumented migrants who have resided in the U.S. for different year inter-
vals. Undocumented migrants residing in the U.S. for five years or more would 
show verification of continuous employment, pay fines and back taxes, and take 
English-language courses to be eligible to apply for citizenship. Undocumented 
migrants residing in the U.S. between two and five years would be required to 
leave the U.S. and could apply for return upon receipt of a temporary work visa. 
As guest workers, they would be eligible to apply for citizenship status. Undocu-
mented migrants with less than two years’ residency would be required to leave 
the U.S., with no guarantee of a work visa or eligibility for the citizenship path-
way process. The measure also calls for a guest-worker program. 
President Bush’s policy preferences for immigration reform are closer to the 
Senate measure than to the House measure. House Republicans did not shy away 
from being vocal about the policy differences between House leadership and the 
president. Some of the open opposition can be traced to concerns the Repub-
lican leadership has about the president’s low approval ratings with the public 
and the need to minimize possible negative repercussions of those ratings in the 
2006 midterm elections. According to surveys conducted by the Pew Research 
Center for People and the Press (2006a) from September 6–10, 2006, 37 percent 
of people polled approved of the way the president handled his job, while 53 
percent disapproved of the president’s job performance.4 The president usually is 
a major positive factor in bolstering rank-and-file voter turnout for congressional 
candidates within his party. The president, as head of the party, can provide an 
electoral boost to candidates in contested races— if he has popular appeal. The 
Republican Party faced a midterm election year in which there was highly nega-
tive public sentiment toward Congress, Republican leadership, and presidential 
performance. The survey responses discussed in prior sections of this essay sug-
gest that the public is predisposed to punishing or rewarding candidates accord-
ing to their policy positions on immigration. 
The open divisions between House and Senate Republican leadership, and 
between House leadership and the president, may have induced the Republicans 
to delay sending the two measures to conference committee, where differing bills 
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from the two chambers are sent for resolution and final vote by the full Congress. 
Instead, Republican leadership held a series of public hearings on immigration in 
cities throughout the U.S. in the summer of 2006. 
Upon Congress members’ return to session in early September 2006, the 
House focused on passing a series of bills that were essentially pieces culled from 
HR 4437 (Table 6). The House passed HR 4844 (the Federal Election Integrity Act 
of 2006), requiring valid photo identification verifying U.S. citizenship for persons 
to register to vote in federal elections. A second measure, HR 6061 (the Secure 
Fence Act of 2006), authorizes the construction of a 700-mile, double-layer fence. 
A third measure, HR 4830 (the Border Tunnel Prevention Act of 2006), prohibits 
unauthorized construction of tunnels between the U.S. and its neighbors. These 
measures will provide Republican Party candidates with a legislative record of ef-
forts to address public concerns about curtailing illegal immigration. 
Immigration and the 2006 Midterm Elections 
What are the implications of increased public attentiveness to immigration 
for the midterm elections of 2006? Congressional (and presidential) candidates 
have seldom developed electoral strategies that included immigration issues. The 
notable exception is the 1994 California governor’s race, in which Republican 
incumbent Pete Wilson rode the negative public sentiment of California voters 
against illegal migrants and made illegal immigration a central theme in his suc-
cessful bid for reelection. Conventional wisdom is that the political divisiveness 
engendered by immigration issues makes it hard to contain public furor over 
any particular stance. Indeed, the Republican Party expressed concerns over the 
potential political backlash from Hispanic voters. Census data show that the His-
panic population is the fastest-growing voting bloc. Polls of the Hispanic voting-


























SOURCE: Data for each bill are compiled from online access of the Daily Digests of the Congressional 
Record.
Table 6
U.S. House Bills on Immigration Reform Acted On After Passage of HR 4437
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sanship and affiliation. Given the Republican Party’s concerted efforts to recruit 
Hispanic voters and the trajectory of Hispanic voters figuring more significantly 
in future national electoral races (DeSipio 2006), the development of a coherent 
Republican national policy platform on immigration will be important.
Public perception of the degree to which immigration has specific public 
costs will determine the likelihood of public calls for policy reform. Many pub-
lic policy and congressional scholars argue that when policy costs are diffuse 
and benefits are specific, the public and, thus, voters are less likely to connect 
the harms of a policy and call for legislative reform (Arnold 1990; Gimpel and 
Edwards 1999; Wilson 1980). Congressional scholars Gimpel and Edwards make 
a case for this in their study of immigration policy process in Congress. They 
contend that the costs of immigration are diffuse and the benefits are specific to 
particular segments within the economic and political realms. Specifically, agri-
cultural and service-industry employers benefit significantly from a steady and 
reliable source of immigrant labor. 
Immigration’s appeal as an electoral issue has increased during the 2006 mid-
term election cycle. While a comprehensive analysis of all House and Senate races 
in 2006 is beyond the scope of this essay, it is helpful to review an illustrative case 
of how candidates have included immigration issues in their campaign strategies. 
In border states such as New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, and California, national 
and state legislators have had to contend with the public’s concerns about illegal 
immigration and have felt the repercussions of the public’s shift in using immigra-
tion issues in vote choice. Of the estimated 11.5 million unauthorized migrants in 
the U.S., approximately 500,000 live in Arizona, a state that shares a 375-mile bor-
der with Mexico. From 2000 to 2005, Arizona experienced a 45 percent increase 
in unauthorized migration (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006). Arizona 
leans Republican in partisanship; the Republican presidential candidate from the 
2000 and 2004 presidential elections carried the state.
Conclusion
Congressional scholar John Kingdon (1984) says that a political issue is an 
idea whose time has come. This observation rings true for immigration policy 
debate in the twenty-first century. Immigration has been on and off the national 
policy agenda. Throughout history, Americans have revisited the debate over 
what it means to be a nation of immigrants, to be a country that opens its doors 
to scientists, laborers, and refugees. However, the degree to which the nation has 
become attentive and involved in the policy debate is unlike any other period 
since the early 1920s. We now see immigration debated in city councils in tiny 
burgs and in municipalities of new destination states such as Iowa, Georgia, and 
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Indiana. Immigration is an issue whose time has come in almost all sectors of the 
American political and social landscape.
The political implication for the short term of this heightened attention is 
that immigration has gained a place that is high on the media, governmental, and 
policy agendas. The degree to which this heightened attention leads to policy 





2	 The	data	for	U.S.	legal	permanent	residents	are	derived	from	Table	1	of	the	2005 Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics.	The	category	 legal	permanent	resident	comprises	immigrants	who	had	
already	been	in	the	country	and	have	been	granted	legal	residence	status	(i.e.,	adjustment	of	
status)	and	new	arrivals	of	that	given	year.	See	2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,	Office	
of	Immigration	Statistics,	Washington,	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office. 






Arnold,	R.	Douglas	(1990),	The Logic of Congressional Action	(New	Haven,	Conn.:	Yale	Univer-
sity	Press).
Baumgartner,	Frank	R.,	and	Bryan	D.	Jones	(1993),	Agendas and Instability in American Poli-
tics (Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press).














Fetzer,	Joel	S.	(2000),	Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and 
Germany	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press).	
Freeman,	Gary	(1994),	“Can	Liberal	States	Control	Unwanted	Migration?”	The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science,	534.	
Gimpel,	James	G.,	and	James	R.	Edwards	Jr.	(1999),	The Congressional Politics of Immigration 
Reform	(Boston,	Mass.:	Allyn	and	Bacon).	
Hollifield,	James	F.	(1992),	Immigrants, Markets and States: The Political Economy of Postwar 
Europe	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press).	
Hunt,	Valerie	F.	(2003),	“Is	There	a	Place	for	Human	Rights	in	U.S.	Immigration	Policy	in	the	
Wake	of	9/11?” Princeton Political Quarterly; Issues in Equality, Morality and Justice (Spring):	
11–15.
Iyengar,	Shanto,	and	Donald	R.	Kinder	(1987),	News that Matters: Television and American 
Opinion	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press).	
Kingdon,	John	(1984),	Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies	(Boston,	Mass.:	Little,	Brown).	






Reimers,	David	(1992),	Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America, 2nd	ed.	(New	
York:	Columbia	University	Press).
Simon,	Rita	J.	(1985),	Public Opinion and the Immigrant: Print Media Coverage, 1880–1980	
(Lexington,	Mass.:	Lexington	Books).	
Political Implications of U.S. Public Attitudes Toward Immigration   13










Tichenor,	Daniel	(2002),	Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America	
(Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press).





Wilson,	James	Q.	(1980),	“The	Politics	of	Regulation,”	in	The Politics of Regulation	(New	York:	
Basic	Books),	357–94.
139
Commentary on Session II 
The Politics of Migration 
and Trade
Gary.P..Freeman
The field of political economy has long produced theoretically informed empirical research on the politics of international trade. For example, few books have enjoyed a better reputation than E. E. Schattschneider’s 1935 
classic study of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff (Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff). Since 
that early date, trade politics has developed into a major subfield in political science. 
Immigration, on the other hand, hardly attracted the interest of political scientists of 
Schattschneider’s generation. The Immigration Act of 1924 did not inspire a book 
capable of launching a new field of study as did Schattschneider’s investigation 
of the tariff. Indeed, it took well over a half century for political scientists to turn 
to the analysis of the politics of immigration, and the literature is not nearly as 
strong empirically or theoretically as that on trade in goods, services, and money. 
Most work on the politics of immigration does not treat the movement of people 
across borders as a factor of trade at all. Whether ideas, methods, hypotheses, and 
analytical techniques employed by political economists of trade can be applied to 
the political economy of immigration is a question a disconcertingly small number 
of political scientists have asked. 
Summary of the Papers
Trade theory predicts that an open migration system increases efficiency, 
productivity, and wealth but that “politics” rears its ugly head and imposes restric-
tions. Most political science models developed to explain why politics confounds 
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the adoption of open immigration regimes focus either on material interests (the 
costs and benefits of migration, who wins and who loses from the competition 
and redistribution of income that migration always entails) or on cultural factors 
(the ethnic, religious, and other differences between migrant and native popula-
tions).
Both by the subjects they investigate and by implication, if not explicit argu-
ment, the papers on this panel provide interesting evidence on the question of 
the political dynamics of trade and immigration policies. Valerie Hunt investigates 
the development and evolution of mass opinion on immigration. Marc Rosenblum 
presents, in the context of a North American case study, an analysis of oppor-
tunities for and obstacles to multilateral agreements on immigration that, since 
Smoot–Hawley, have been a regular feature of international relations. Mexico, 
the United States, and Canada adopted a free trade agreement in 1994. Why 
have those same countries had such difficulty agreeing on a common migration 
regime? 
Both Hunt and Rosenblum document how “politics” in the guise of security 
concerns in the wake of 9/11 derailed a process that appeared well on its way to the 
achievement of a migration agreement between Mexico and the United States.
Paper-by-Paper Comments
Valerie Hunt
Hunt’s paper, “Political Implications of U.S. Public Attitudes Toward Im-
migration on the Immigration Policymaking Process,” has two objectives: to 
tell us how and when the public cares about immigration and how and when 
what the public thinks matters. We are in a novel situation, as was indicated 
by the November 2006 midterm elections. The American public is thinking 
about immigration policy; what the public thinks about it appears to be af-
fecting vote choices in congressional and gubernatorial races; and it is at least 
possible, as Hunt predicted, that the immigration records of public officials 
affected a few marginal races. This is unusual, to say the least, because public 
opinion on immigration in the U.S. normally has only the most insignificant 
effects on electoral outcomes. Immigration typically falls far down the list of 
voter concerns, and it rarely determines vote choice (Gimpel and Edwards 
1999). The Tarrance Poll results (in Table 2 of Hunt’s paper) show that about 
one-third of respondents say they would not vote for a candidate who stands 
for most of the issues they support except immigration. This is really quite a 
strong finding. 
Hunt’s paper deals directly with the effect of 9/11 and heightened concerns 
about terrorism on public attitudes toward illegal migration and the ways in 
11 Commentary on Session II
which politicians and activists frame the issue. The direct connection of the ter-
rorist attacks with people in the country under various immigration statuses, legal 
or illegal, was, depending on your view, either a stunning wake-up call for those 
who had been too complacent about immigration or a golden opportunity for 
critics of U.S. immigration policy to attach immigration restriction to the war on 
terror. In both cases, security became more of a focus of research and political 
debate. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize how much resistance there was 
among academics and policy wonks to conceding the legitimacy of analyzing im-
migration from a security angle. 
Even after the terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe, resistance 
to a security focus persists, perhaps even growing in reaction to enhanced state 
policies to control and monitor migration here and abroad. A large literature in 
political science and related fields critiques the “securitization” of immigration, 
that is, turning an innocent economic and humanitarian phenomenon into a 
potentially criminal law enforcement matter. A popular line is that with the end 
of the Cold War, the police and intelligence services of Western states have noth-
ing to do now that they aren’t hunting down communist subversives. Dangerous 
immigrants, in this scenario, are a convenient pretext for maintaining and even 
expanding the budgets of security services (Bigo 2005).
A common criticism of trade-based interpretations of migration is that politics 
distorts the economic relationships trade theory predicts. This is because some 
groups that appear to be harmed economically by immigration support it anyway, 
and others that appear to gain nevertheless oppose it.
A book that relates to this problem is Mikhail Alexseev’s Immigration Phobia 
and the Security Dilemma. Hunt talks about the connection, or disconnect, be-
tween “real world” conditions and public perceptions of these conditions. This is 
admittedly a difficult issue for the analyst. Alexseev offers one promising frame-
work. He observes a number of cases he considers surprising or irrational—situ-
ations in which the negative reaction to immigration seems grossly dispropor-
tional.
How can such overreactions be explained? Alexseev employs the concept 
of the security dilemma, an idea developed in the international relations field to 
refer to the dynamics that emerge when state A decides to enhance its security by 
investing in defense, thereby alarming its neighbors, states B and C, which either 
expand their own armaments or launch a pre-emptive strike. As applied to ethnic 
conflict, it captures the competition that arises among proximate groups that ob-
sess over their relative power, especially when the central government authorities 
appear to have lost their capacity to maintain law and order.
Alexseev identifies four general factors that shape perceptions of ethnic inse-
curity. Each, I think, has relevance to specific contemporary U.S. attitudes toward 
Mexican immigration.
12 Gary P. Freeman
Anarchy   (broken borders)
Intent   (reconquista, an invasion)
Groupness   (non-English speaking, refusal to assimilate)
Socioeconomic impact (migrants depress wages, take our jobs, live 
      on welfare)
     Critics of illegal immigration from Mexico point out that the federal govern-
ment has failed to assert its right to regulate national borders; that the fact that 
Mexicans have a unique historical claim to the American Southwest makes 
migration from Mexico especially problematic; that because of their numbers, 
concentration, and contiguity with their homeland, they have fewer incentives 
to learn English and embrace American culture and identity; and finally, that 
they constitute a major threat to the livelihoods of low-income Americans.
An interesting datum in Hunt’s paper is found in Table 4, which reports 
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press survey results. These show 
stronger anti-immigrant sentiment in red counties than in blue, what you would 
expect. What is surprising and needs explaining is why negative sentiment is 
higher in counties with low proportions of immigrants and weaker in counties 
with more.
Alexseev’s model may help with this. It’s a pattern that will likely persist 
and become more prominent due to changing population patterns. Numerous 
observers have noted the growing tendency of Americans to cluster in residential 
areas where most of their neighbors share their socioeconomic and political char-
acteristics. The resulting homogeneity makes even small numbers of immigrants 
highly visible.
Marc Rosenblum
Rosenblum provides a smart, detailed review of the major characteristics of 
the contemporary U.S.–Mexico immigration context in his paper, “U.S.–Mexican 
Migration Cooperation: Obstacles and Opportunities.” His main question is what 
factors facilitate or impede cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico over im-
migration policy.
In his short theoretical discussion, he presents a lucid summary of the rel-
evance of bargaining models from international relations scholarship to immi-
gration regimes. He might have come at the problem a bit differently, and more 
directly linked the politics of immigration with the politics of trade, by asking why 
Mexico and the U.S. were able to negotiate a free trade agreement but not broker 
even a bilateral immigration deal, let alone a free movement regime. Does immi-
gration produce the same sorts of coalitions as trade politics? The raw materials 
of an answer are in the paper.
Rosenblum presents a thorough and authoritative summary of the factors that 
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affect migration agreements between the two countries—national preferences, 
domestic politics, and so forth—but he concludes that the key factor determining 
whether cooperation succeeds or fails is the general political context, the broad 
bilateral, regional, and global setting. Impulses to cooperate over immigration get 
swallowed up in the larger context, which most likely has little or nothing to do 
with immigration per se. This was certainly how the plans of Presidents Fox and 
Bush were sidetracked by the attacks in September 2001. 
On first inspection, it would appear that the U.S. has little to gain from a bilat-
eral immigration agreement with Mexico. The U.S. is interested, at least officially, 
in reducing the scale of illegal migration across its southern border. Mexico, on 
the other hand, has little interest in stemming the tide; indeed, it has every incen-
tive to see it continue. Even if Mexican officials were more sympathetic to U.S. 
complaints, both human rights and civil liberties norms keep a democratic state, 
even a fledgling one, from preventing its citizens from exiting the country.
Unlike the U.S., Mexico has many concrete objectives in its cooperative agen-
da: a guest worker program, less enforcement at the border, fewer deportations, 
maintaining and facilitating the flow of remittances, and so on. All of these require 
politically costly concessions on the part of the U.S. government. (See the report 
of the Bilateral Commission [1989], which contains a laundry list of what the U.S. 
should do for Mexico and almost nothing that Mexico should do for the U.S.)
Rosenblum makes a strong case, however, that in the post-9/11 context, any 
immigration settlement between the two countries would entail substantial re-
forms on Mexico’s part. These might include agreement by Mexico to accept and 
facilitate long-distance returns of illegal crossers to the interior of the country, 
serious efforts to create security on the Mexican side of the border, and active as-
sistance in counterterrorism efforts. The bilateral relationship is still asymmetrical, 
with the U.S. facing the necessity of giving more than it receives, but it is more 
equitable than it has been in years, and that should support greater collaboration 
in the future.
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Although there is much discussion of immigration’s impact on the U.S. domestic economy, there is also renewed interest in immigration’s effects on low-income, sending countries. However, in this latter discussion, 
there is an under-appreciation of two important features.
First, a significant proportion of the skill residing in low-income countries is 
produced in high-income countries. Four countries—United States, Great Brit-
ain, Australia, and Canada—provide over 525,000 student visas per year. In the 
U.S., over 250,000 student visas were issued in 2004, compared with 73,212 em-
ployment visas for permanent immigrants screened for skill. The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimates that there 
are over 2.5 million foreign students in the world, and more than half are from 
low-income countries.
Second, many “permanent” skilled migrants—those entitled to stay for the 
rest of their lives in the receiving country—and those who migrate to acquire ad-
ditional schooling (and get good jobs) return to their home country.
Little is known about the international net flow of high-skill human capital 
and its effects on developing countries. The immigration literature has three defi-
ciencies in studying the determinants of who immigrates and who returns:
1. Existing frameworks and data are inadequate to appropriately describe 
measures of gaps in rewards to skill across countries.
2. Empirical analyses lump together immigrants selected via family reunifica-
tion rules and those selected on the basis of skill and jobs. Decision rules 
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are likely to be quite different for the two groups. Indeed, permanent 
resident aliens in the U.S. are admitted mostly (over 90 percent) based on 
family criteria and subject to country ceilings. Standard economic models 
of self-selection may not be adequate to understand international flows of 
people, as they ignore networking and marriage markets.
3. No representative databases have tracked either foreign students or im-
migrants over time to enable estimates of return rates.
I will consider three questions. First, how inefficient is the global allocation of 
workers and how large are the gains from increased international migration? How 
do you measure these gains? We will see that standard GDP comparisons are not 
sufficient. Second, how would reallocating high-skill workers from low- to high-
wage areas affect low-wage countries? Third, what is the relationship between the 
net international flow of skilled individuals and the development of low-income 
countries? Which countries benefit the most and least from skill migration? 
I use simple analytics combined with new data on immigrants, foreign stu-
dents, and out-migrants. Two main data sources are newly available:
• New Immigrant Survey (NIS): 4 percent sample of all U.S. adult (18+) 
permanent resident aliens who received their visas between April and 
November 2003 (number surveyed = 8,575).
• New Immigrant Survey–Pilot (NIS–P): smaller sample of all U.S. adult (18+) 
permanent resident aliens who received their visas in July and August of 
1996 (number surveyed = 1,032).
Other sources I will draw on are an immigration survey of Australia, Inter-
national Labor Organization (ILO) data on international wages, and databases on 
students in the U.S.
Two sets of mechanisms will be discussed for how international movements 
of the skilled affect sending countries:
• Direct short- and long-run effects on wages in sending countries: distin-
guishing between changes in prices of skill, skill composition effects, and 
skill upgrading incentives.
• Return migration: brain drain and brain gain issues and evidence. I will 
discuss the potentially large biases in recent World Bank estimates of the 
brain drain from low-income countries based on census data and look at 
determinants of foreign students’ inflows and the return rates of foreign 
students and skilled “permanent” immigrants.
First, we will consider the principal source of the global migration/labor mis-
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allocation problem: differing cross-country rewards for skills.
What are wage differences for comparable workers across countries? One ex-
ample: A construction carpenter’s monthly wage is $42 in India, $125 in Mexico, 
$1,113 in Korea, and $2,299 in the U.S. (ILO 1995 data). The problem: Carpenters 
in India may have much lower schooling than carpenters in the U.S. or even Ko-
rea. This does not capture correctly the gains from the migration of a person of 
a given skill. Per capita GDP gaps are used in most analyses of the determinants 
of migration (Figure 1). But cross-country variation in GDP is due to differences 
in the proportion of the population in the labor force and in skill levels, not just 
rewards to skills. Per-worker GDP also is not adequate. Workers vary substantially 
in skill across countries. So we can’t know how the rewards to skills differ across 
countries from the databases that have been available.
Skill-Price Model and Identification of Cross-Country 
Skill Rewards
The simplest economic model, a one-skill model, illustrates the main direct effects 
of migration and is key to understanding the migration of skills across countries.
Figure 1

















NOTE: S = average years of schooling.
SOURCES: World Bank and Occupational Wages Around the World.
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Worker i’s wage Wij in home country j is
(1)       Wij = ωjxi,
where xi = the skill level of the worker (amount of skill units) and 
ωj = the amount each unit of skill is valued in the economy in which the worker 
is located, referred to here as the skill price.
Variation in wages across workers within a country is due to variation in skill 
levels. Variation in the average wages of workers across countries is due to inter-
country differences in (a) average skill levels xi and (b) skill prices ωj. Increasing 
incomes in a country thus entails increasing either (a) the price paid for skills or 
(b) skill levels.
Much attention has been given to raising skills in low-income countries (for 
example, greater access to education, improved school quality). But why skill 
prices—rewards to skills—differ across countries is really the key question of 
development economics, as difference in skill levels across countries is substan-
tially smaller than differences in skill rewards. Some of the suspects are natu-
ral endowments (geography), population density, the level of technology, the 
amount of capital, the amount of aggregate skill, or, on a deeper level, the quality 
of institutions. The question today is how international migration affects skill lev-
els, skill prices, and the determinants of skill prices.
The model has implications for the number and quality (skill composition) 
of immigrants from and to a country. The expected initial earnings that worker 
i in country j could earn in destination country u (ignoring for simplicity skill 
transferability) is given by:
(2)       pWiu = pωuxi,
where ωu = the destination-country skill price and p = the probability of obtain-
ing a permanent destination-country job.
The economic gain from migrating from j to u, Gij, for worker i is
(3)       Gij = xi[pωu – ωj(1 + πj)] – Cj,
where Cj = direct costs of migrating and πjWij = time costs of migrating.
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Implications of the Skill-Price Migration Model
1. Higher-skill persons always have greater gains from out-migration, com-
pared with lower-skill persons, for a given skill-price gap (selectivity). 
Thus, immigrants from high-skill-price countries will be more skilled on 
average than those from low-skill-price countries.
2. The higher the domestic skill price, the lower is the gain from out-migra-
tion. Thus, there will be fewer immigrants from high-skill-price countries.
3. Schooling acquired in the destination country may increase p and thus 
facilitate migration (and skill transferability, too).
4. The lower the domestic skill price, the more an increase in skill increases 
the gain from migrating. Thus, increasing access to schooling in low-skill-
price countries can lead to higher rates of out-migration.
But how do we know what skill prices are around the world? And isn’t using 
differences in per capita GDP good enough to gauge the gains from migrating (as 
used in almost all studies of the determinants of migration)? In fact, variations in 
the skill price and GDP per capita can have opposite effects on migration (Figures 
2 and 3). For given direct migration costs, a rise in the skill price at home low-
ers the gain from migration. For a given skill price, higher per capita GDP may 
facilitate financing of the direct costs of migration.
And what about within-country inequality and its effects on emigration, as 
highlighted by George Borjas (1987)?
Estimating World Skill Prices
Estimating world skill prices requires comparable information on the earn-
ings of workers of the same skill across all countries of the world. Three recently 
available sources of data are
1. New Immigrant Survey–Pilot (NIS–P), 1996 (Jasso et al. 2000): This data 
set provides the earnings of new U.S. immigrants in their last job in their 
home country.
    Advantages:
      • Information is obtained from a common questionnaire.
      • Information is obtained on workers’ schooling, age, and work 
     experience.
    Disadvantages:
      • This is a selective sample: The model implies immigrants are 
     positively selected on unobservables.
      • The sample size is small: 332 workers for 54 countries.
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Figure 3
Alternative Measures of the Net One-Year Benefit from the U.S. Immigration of One 











U.S.–Mexico GDP per capita U.S.–Mexico GDP per worker Actual immigrant gain
SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey.
Figure 2
Alternative Measures of the Net One-Year Benefit from the U.S. Immigration of One 
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SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey–Pilot.
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  2. Occupational Wages Around the World (OWW) (Freeman and Oosten-
dorp 2000): This data source provides monthly earnings (estimated) for 
workers by occupation, industry, and year.
     Advantages:
      • The sample size is large: 4,924 observations in a single year 
     (1995).
      • It is meant to be nonselective.
     Disadvantages:
      • The information is not necessarily comparable across countries.
      • The number of countries represented is small in any one year: 67.
      • There is no information on the education, work experience, or age 
     of workers (see carpenters example above).
  3. New Immigrant Survey (NIS), 2003 baseline: Like the NIS pilot, this data 
set provides earnings of new U.S. immigrants in their last job in their home 
country.
     Advantages:
      • Information is obtained from a common questionnaire.
      • Information is obtained on workers’ schooling, age, work experi- 
     ence, and occupation.
      • The sample size is over 2,200 workers for 130 countries.
     Disadvantages:
      • It is a selective sample: The model implies immigrants are positively 
     selected on unobservables.
Table 1 shows some characteristics of these three data sets.
To estimate skill prices from microdata on wages “around the world,” assume 
the number of skill units of a worker is a function of schooling, occupation, and 
an unobservable skill endowment. For example:
(4)       xij = µijexp(bSij + Iijkγk),
where S
ij
 = schooling, b = schooling “return,” µij = skill endowment (schooling 
missing in OWW), Iijk = a vector of occupation dummies for worker i in country 
j, and γk  = a vector of occupation coefficients.
Then the log of worker i’s wage in country j, from equation (1), is
(5)        Ln(Wij) = Lnωj + bSij + Iijkγk + Lnµij.
The intercept in equation (5), which may differ across countries, provides the 
log of the skill price for each country represented in the data.
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What is the relationship between GDP and skill prices? Assume aggregate 
output Y in country j is produced according to Cobb–Douglas technology:
(6)       Yj = ALj
aKj
γ,
where Kj = country j’s stock of nonlabor resources (for example, land, capital, 
minerals) and Lj   =  country j’s aggregate stock of labor in skill, given by
(7)       Lj  = Nj [a(xij)],
where Nj = the total number of workers in j and a( ) is an inverse function yield-
ing the average skill units per worker in country j in terms of observables.
The skill price ωj is the marginal product of an efficiency unit of labor, given 
by
(8)       ωj = aYj/Nj [a(xij)].
Thus,
Table 1
Characteristics of Global Earnings Data Sets
 1996 NIS-P home- OWW, 2003 NIS home-
Data set/variable   country workers 1995 country workers
Mean.annual.earnings.of.respondents.(U.S..$). 21,854a. 10,208b. 23,250a
. (77,608). (13,289). (54,596)
Mean.age.of.respondents. 34.6. –. 33.5
. (8.53). . (11.1)
Mean.years.of.schooling.of.respondents. 14.4. –. 13.9
. (4.5). . (3.7)
Number.of.industries. –. 49. –
Number.of.occupations. –. 161. 363
Number.of.countries. 54. 67. 130
Number.of.workers. 332. 4,924. 2,823
a PPP-adjusted, full-time earnings
b Exchange-rate adjusted, country-specific calibration with lexicographic imputation.
NOTE: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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(9)       Ln(ωj) = Lna + Ln(Yj/Nj) – Ln[a(xij)]
or, for the individual worker data on wages from the NIS–P, for example,
(10)      Ln(Wij) = Lna + Ln(Yj/Nj) – Ln[a(xij)] + bSij + Lnµij.
Equations (9) and (10) imply that aggregate output per worker is positively, 
and average skill levels are negatively, correlated with skill prices across coun-
tries. Estimating equation (9) or (10) should yield a coefficient of 1.0 on the log of 
output per worker and a coefficient with a minus sign for the log of the aggregate 
skill measure (Table 2).
In Jasso and Rosenzweig (2005), we used the NIS-P data and cross-country 
information on per-worker GDP and average education levels, based on equation 
(10), to estimate country-specific rewards to skill (ωj), controlling for the skills of 
the individual workers from the different countries represented in the NIS-P. Fig-
ure 4 displays the estimated earnings of high school versus college graduates for 
five countries based on the estimates using equation (5), with a common b (“re-
turn” to schooling) estimated to be 0.07. There are two features to note. One is 
the enormous difference in rewards to skills across the world. Second, compared 
with the differences in earnings across these countries, differences in earnings by 
schooling level are relatively minuscule.
How well does the variation across countries in (estimated) skill prices pre-
dict the number and skill composition of immigrants by country? In Jasso and 
Rosenzweig (2005), the NIS and the Longitudinal Survey of Australian Immigrants 
were used to compute:
• The number of skilled immigrants (employment-based principal appli-
cants) by country of origin coming to the United States and Australia in 
the survey years of each data set.
• The average schooling level of these skill/employment immigrants by 
country of origin for U.S. and Australian immigrants.
In addition, we can ask how well does the cross-country variation in esti-
mated skill prices predict the number of student visas issued per country. We use 
State Department information on F-1 student visas issued by country, averaged 
over 2003–04 (excludes Canada). To answer these questions we also look at the 
roles of the distance from the sending country to the receiving country, GDP per 
adult-equivalent, measures of school quality, the number of universities, and the 
number of ranked universities (Tables 3 and 4). Not surprisingly, for both Aus-
tralia and the U.S., the higher the skill price in the home country, the fewer the 
immigrants from that country. What is surprising is that, given the skill price, GDP 
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per adult-equivalent is positive. So, for a given skill price, if a country has higher 
income per capita, there is actually more out-migration. Why? One hypothesis 
would be that there are financial costs to migration and having more income 
for given rewards enables more people to take advantage of those gaps. Costs 
of migration are important, as distance is significantly negatively related to the 
number of migrants.
Table 2
Estimates of the Determinants of the Country Log Skill Price
 U.S. immigrant home OWW
Sample        wages (NIS-P) wages
Variable/estimation procedure GLS GLS-SC   GLS
Country.characteristics:
...Log.GDP.per.worker. 1.41. 1.35. 1.10
. (5.01). (5.21). (10.4)
...Log.mean.schooling. –1.77. –1.97. – .33
. (3.18). (3.23). (1.47)
...Log.teacher–pupil.ratio,.primary.schools. –1.90. –2.17. – .509
....... (3.68). (3.80). (1.83)
...Log.teacher–pupil.ratio,.secondary.schools. 1.44. 1.36. .457
....... (2.51). (2.56). (1.60)
Immigrant.skill.characteristics:
...Schooling. .0683. .0745. –
.. (3.50). (3.79)
...Age. .0428. .0436. –
. (4.32). (4.50)
λ	 –. .800. –
. . (1.46)
Constant. –1.02. .713. –3.75
. (2.10). (2.04). (2.60)
Number.of.countries. 54. 54. 57
Number.of.immigrants. 332. 332. –
R2. .35. .36. .82
NOTES: GLS = generalized least squares; SC = selectivity-corrected. Absolute value of t statistics corrected for 
clustering at the country level in parentheses.
SOURCE: Rosenzweig (2006).
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Regarding student visas, the number of people who come from another 
country to study in the U.S. varies inversely with the rewards to skill in that coun-
try. Moreover, the larger the number and the higher the quality of universities 
in the home country, the more students come to the U.S. to study (Table 5). In 
Rosenzweig (2006), these results are shown to be supportive of the hypothesis 
that foreign students are attracted to the United States because of the rewards to 
obtaining jobs here and not primarily because of inadequate supplies of school-
ing opportunities at home.
What About Inequality and Immigration?
Using the “Roy model,” Borjas has popularized the idea that inequality, and 
thus differences in the returns to schooling across countries, is an important de-
terminant of immigration. However, the original Roy model assumes that wages 
are the same across countries! In the simple skill-price model outlined above, 
inequality has two sources: inequality in skills and the level of the return to 
schooling b. The higher b is, the greater the earnings difference between high- 
and low-schooled persons in the country. However, differences in returns to 
schooling (and inequality) across countries will only have second-order effects 
compared with differences in skill prices in determining the amount and selectiv-
ity of migration.
Figure 4
Estimated (Purchasing-Power-Adjusted 1996) Earnings of High School and College 









Nigeria India Indonesia Mexico Korea
High school graduate
College graduate
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Table 2.
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What is the effect of home-country relative “inequality” on the skill selectivity 
of immigration? In the one-skill model, higher inequality is due to higher “return” 
to schooling b. How does a rise in b in the sending country affect the differential 
gain of, say, high school and college graduates?
We can write the differential gain, high school and college graduates, as:





Gain for high school graduate = eβUSSHS(ω
US
 ) – eβMSHS(ω
M
),
and compute the gains for b = 0.07 in the U.S. and Mexico. Then we can increase 
b to 0.10 in Mexico (more inequality) but keep average wages the same. The an-
nual migration gain for high school graduates increases by $269 (0.9 percent). 
The annual migration gain for college graduates decreases by $329 (0.8 percent) 
(Figure 5).
Migration is trivially less selective compared with changes in the skill-price 
differential; inequality is second-order.
Table 3
Determinants of Employment-Visa Immigration Rates by Receiving Country: 
Sample Immigrants per Country Population (x106)
Variable/country Australia United States
Country.skill.price.(NIS-P). –20.9. . –17.3
. (1.92). (2.15)
GDP.per.adult-equivalent. 3.03. . .29
. (1.99). (2.93)
Distance. –8.55. . –1.22
. (1.38). (1.50)
Population. – .0475. – .00178
. (1.43). (.58)




NOTE: Absolute values of robust t statistics in parentheses.
SOURCES: For immigrant characteristics: New Immigrant Survey and Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to 
Australia 2, Wave 1 (Jasso and Rosenzweig 2005).
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Direct Effects of Out-Migration on Wages in Sending Countries
Short-Run Effects
General-Equilibrium Effect. This is basically supply and demand: If aggre-
gate skill quantity decreases, skill prices (wages) rise. This will increase sending-
country wages. Computable world general-equilibrium models show this.
Compositional Effect. If out-migrants are higher (lower) than average in 
skill compared with the home-country population, then average skill decreases 
(increases) in the home country due to out-migration.
Skilled out-migration thus has an ambiguous effect on sending country 
wages: It raises the skill price but reduces average skill. Some analysts confuse 
these two effects. Borjas (2002), in discussing the effects of creating greater op-
portunities in the U.S. for skilled migrants, writes:
“Such a drain of human capital would further widen the income gap between 
the United States and the rest of the world, creating more incentives for migration 
to this country....” 
Table 4
Selectivity: Determinants of the Log Educational Attainment of Employment-Visa 
Immigrants in Australia and the United States (Combined)















NOTE: Absolute values of robust t statistics in parentheses.
SOURCES: For immigrant characteristics: New Immigrant Survey and Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to 
Australia 2, Wave 1 (Jasso and Rosenzweig 2005).
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The skill price actually goes up in the sending country and the skill price gap, 
the incentive for migrating, narrows, so this is wrong.
Long-Run Effects
General-Equilibrium Effect. Changes in the skill price induced by the loss 
of skill raise the returns to skill investments—skills become scarcer and thus 
more valuable. Skills are not fixed but can respond to changes. Because the 
higher the out-migrants’ skill level the greater the rise in the skill price, more 
Table 5
Determinants of the Demand for (Log)U.S. Student Visas, 2003–04
Country characteristic NIS-P skill price OWW skill price
Log.of.country.skill.price. – .361. – .234. – .947. – .883
. (2.42). (1.32). (2.41). (2.23)
Log.of.GDP.per.adult-equivalent. .682. .692. 1.35. 1.35
. (2.95). (3.00). (2.95). (2.96)
Log.of.number.of.universities. .218. .768. .266. .435
. (1.90). (2.28). (2.26). (1.60)
Log.of.number.of.universities.x. –. – .0796. –. – .0328
...log.of.country.skill.price. . (1.86). . . (.67)
Any.ranked.universities.(top.200). .467. .630. .312. .381
. (1.72). (2.20). (1.10). (1.36)
Log.of.students.per.teacher,.primary.schools. – .377. – .418. – .240. – .246
. (1.17). (1.31). (.77). (.79)
Log.of.students.per.teacher,.secondary.schools. .783. .770. .659. .628
. (2.09). (2.03). (1.86). (1.75)
Log.of.population. .476. .492. .487. .491
. (3.57). (3.60). (3.47). (3.44)
Log.of.distance.to.nearest.U.S..city.of.entry.(miles). – .293. – .289. – .313. – .315
. (1.98). (1.92). (1.95). (1.94)
Constant. .– .801. –1.73. –4.04. –4.19
. (.30). (.66). (1.30). (1.34)
Number.of.countries. .124. 124. 124. .124
R2. .733. .741. .729. .730
NOTE: Absolute values of robust t ratios in parentheses.
SOURCE: Rosenzweig (2006).
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skilled out-migration will have a bigger effect on skill upgrading than less skilled 
out-migration. This long-run effect on incentives to invest in skills is ignored in 
the general-equilibrium models computing the consequences of migration. For 
evidence of responsiveness of school investments to change in returns in low-
income countries, see the development economics literature.
Migration Prospect Effect. Opening up the possibility of migration directly 
raises expected returns to skill investments. Assume that residents of a country 
face an exogenous probability p of being able to migrate to a higher skill-price 
country. Then residents respond to changes in the expected skill price:
(11)     (1 – p)ωj + pωk.
How large is the effect of increasing out-migration on the “return” to domes-
tic schooling? Consider the case of Mexico, using NIS–P skill prices (Figure 6). 
The expected annual wage difference, college vs. high school in Mexico, given 
the skill price, and with no migration is
(12)     E (WC – WHS)M = e
β∆S(ωM) = $1,392,
Figure 5
PPP-Adjusted 1996 Estimated Annual Earnings in Mexico and the United States, 








Mexico (r = .07) U.S. (r = .07) Mexico (r = .10)
High school
College
U.S. (r = .07)
NOTE: r = rate of return to schooling.
SOURCE: Rosenzweig (2006).
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where β∆S = college – high school (four years).
The expected annual wage difference, college vs. high school, with an out-
migration probability p = .015 is
(13)     E (WC – WHS)M = e
β∆S[(1 – p)ωM + pωUS] = $1,623.
The expected annual wage difference, with out-migration probability p = 
.015 for college-educated only (only the college-educated can migrate), is
(14)     E (WC – WHS)M = e
βSC[(1 – p)ωM + pωUS] – eβSHS(ωM) = $2,137.
The total annual gain in the college vs. high school wage differential (A – C) 
= $745 from taking into account the prospect of migration is small.
The Return of Skilled Immigrants. Returning immigrants may bring back 
to the home country increased skills and knowledge that could only be picked 
up abroad but are transferable to the home environment. And compared with 
low-skill migrants who work temporarily in low-skill jobs for a short period, high-
skill individuals working in dynamic sectors of the economy are more likely to 
Figure 6
Expected PPP-Adjusted 1996 Estimated Annual Earnings in Mexico, 
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contribute, upon return, to the institutional development of the home country.
What are the magnitudes of return migration by skilled immigrants who have 
acquired significant skills in the receiving country and who were not required to 
return home? We have two ways to find this for U.S. immigrants:
1. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) combined Immigration and Naturalization 
Service administrative records at entry for the FY1971 cohort of legal per-
manent immigrants with their subsequent naturalization and address re-
port records to estimate ten-year emigration rates: 30 percent, as high as 
50 percent in some countries.
2. New Immigrant Survey: New 2003 (“permanent”) immigrants were asked, 
“Do you intend to spend the rest of your life in the U.S.?”
The Training of Students in Developed Countries and Their Return. 
Many individuals come to developed countries for schooling. Borjas offers this 
“criticism” of the U.S. student visa program (Borjas 2002):
“The program is best viewed as yet another redistribution program, taking 
wealth away from native workers and taxpayers and redistributing it to universi-
ties and foreigners [italics mine].”
To the extent that schooling is publicly subsidized in receiving countries and 
foreign students do not remain in the receiving country, there is an important 
subsidy from receiving-country taxpayers going to immigrant-sending countries.
How Do We Measure Brain Drain?
Now turn to two final questions. First, how large is the brain drain and return 
migration? Second, what are the principal determinants of return migration by 
foreign students and by “permanent” immigrants? I present two alternative defini-
tions (there are others).
The first is the proportion of highly educated persons born in a country liv-
ing outside the country. Recent estimates of this definition of brain drain (BD) are 
based on census-type data, supported by the World Bank (Docquier and Marfouk 
2006):
(15)     BDi  = ΣFBij/(Si + ΣFBij),
where FBij = tertiary-educated persons age 25+ born in country i residing in des-
tination country j and Si = tertiary-educated persons residing in origin-country 
i. For example:
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82 percent of tertiary-educated Jamaicans reside outside Jamaica.
43 percent of tertiary-educated Ghanaians reside outside Ghana.
The second definition is the number or proportion of highly educated per-
sons who leave low-income countries for high-income countries, that is, the emi-
gration only of those educated in the sending countries (domestic brain drain):
(16)     DBDi = (ΣFBHij)/(Si + ΣFBHij – ΣSFBij),
 where FBHij = foreign-born residents educated in i living in j and SFBij = home-
country residents in i educated in j.
Although the first construct can be useful, the notion of skill out-migration is 
better captured by the second. The World Bank (BD) estimate thus overstates the 
outflow rate of skilled persons for a country for two reasons:
• Many foreign born (FB) in destination countries received their schooling 
there, not in their home country. Thus the numerator is biased upward.
• Some “stayers” (S) also received their schooling in the destination country 
and then returned to the home country. These educated-abroad native 
residents should be subtracted from the denominator.
How off are these estimates? We need to know:
• Where permanent immigrants in receiving countries are schooled—at 
home or in the host country?
• Where stayers in sending countries are schooled—how many were for-
merly foreign students?
Where are the highly educated foreign-born schooled? Some emigrants left 
permanently as children and received all their higher schooling in the destina-
tion country. According to Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services data 
(FY2003), 20 percent of permanent resident aliens in the U.S. arrived before age 
18. For Jamaica, 38 percent arrived before age 20; for the Gambia, only 10 percent 
arrived before age 20.
Thus, BD overstates the migration of the already skilled, and the bias in the 
estimates varies by country. Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2006) recomputed 
their country-specific brain drain estimates to take into account those foreign-
born who arrived before age 22 (and could not possibly have completed their ter-
tiary schooling at home). On average, their corrected estimates of the brain drain 
are 68 percent of the ones published initially, with some as low as 51 percent of 
those reported in the earlier work.
•
•
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There is a caveat: Can the census data be used to correct the bias—remove 
those who arrived as children using information on date of arrival? For the U.S. 
(the major receiving country by far), date of entry is based on answers to the 
ambiguous question: “When did you first come to stay?” This contains a subjective 
element. They might answer when they received a permanent visa (not student 
visa) or when they first came at all (and some who have “permanent” visas, as we 
will see, never intend to stay).
The Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2006) estimates still do not take into ac-
count the training and experience received abroad by those residing in the home 
country. They neglect the reverse brain drain.
To examine foreign student return rates, we can construct a return rate for 
each country using the NIS data by dividing the number of permanent immigrants 
in 2003 (NIS) who had ever held a student visa (stayers) by the total stock of for-
eign students in 2003 (Student Exchange Visa Information System).
Estimates indicate about 6 percent of the stock convert to legal permanent 
resident status, consistent with about 80 percent of students not becoming per-
manent resident aliens in the United States and presumably returning home with 
their new skills (Rosenzweig 2007). We would like to know how skill prices in 
the home country affect the proportion who stay as legal permanent immigrants. 
In Rosenzweig (2007), I looked at the relationship between the return rate of 
students and skill prices and found that return rates of students were significantly 
higher to countries with higher skill prices.
Without tracking immigrants over time, it is not possible to obtain an accurate 
measure of how many highly skilled permanent immigrants return to their origin 
countries. As noted, the first round of the NIS asked the new immigrants whether 
they intended to stay in the United States for the rest of their lives. Figure 7 dis-
plays the proportions of immigrants, by visa type, who answered no and don’t 
know to this question. Among immigrants who never held a student visa (Figure 
7A) or who had not obtained employment visas (Figure 7C), 21 percent did not 
say they intended to stay, and 10 percent of those indicated they would not stay.
However, among the highly skilled “permanent” immigrants who obtained 
their tertiary schooling in the United States (Figure 7B), 38 percent did not an-
swer affirmatively—almost double the rate for those who did not receive their 
schooling in the U.S., with 16 percent saying no. Thus, the estimated return rates 
of students based on who immigrates among the students evidently understate 
the proportions who eventually return.
Among those who immigrated with an employment visa (Figure 7D), more 
than a third did not say they intended to stay in the United States for the rest 
of their lives, 50 percent more than immigrants outside this “skill” class. Thus it 
appears that more-skilled immigrants are more likely to return (or at least not 
stay). 
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Figure 7
“Do You Intend to Stay in the United States the Rest of Your Life?”
SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey.
How do skill prices in the home country affect the proportions of immigrants 
who say they will not stay, from the NIS question? Table 6 reports linear regres-
sion estimates of the effects of home-country skill price on the probabilities of 
not answering affirmatively to the “stay” question of the NIS, for the immigrants 
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groups from higher skill price countries were more likely to not intend to stay in 
the United States. 
The estimates in Table 6 thus suggest that better-off countries on average at-
tract back more immigrants. Moreover, the skill price effect is stronger for those 
immigrants with more education. Higher-skill immigrants are more likely to re-
turn to the better-off countries.
How large are these effects? Figure 8 displays the percentage increase in the 
probability of not staying associated with a doubling of the home-country skill 
price by the schooling level of the immigrant, based on the estimates in Table 6. 
These indicate that while a doubling of the skill price increases the probability of 
not staying by 5 percent for those with less than a high school education, among 
high school graduates the increase is 25 percent. And for college graduates the 
same doubling of the skill price leads to a 47 percent increase in those not in-
tending to stay.
Another way of using the regression estimates is to compare the difference 
in the percentage of immigrants not intending to stay across college and high 
school graduates at different skill-price levels. Figure 9 shows these differences 
for three countries, based on their estimated skill prices. In the high-skill-price 
country, Great Britain, there is a 20 percentage point difference in the “return” 
of college versus high school graduates. This compares with a 7 percentage 
Table 6
Determinants and Selectivity of the Proportion of New “Permanent” Immigrants 
Intending to Leave, 2003
Country characteristics/immigrant type Former U.S. student                          All
Log.of.country.skill.price.(NIS.estimate). .0250. .0812. –.0355
. (3.26). (2.39). (2.49)
Log.of.country.skill.price.x.years.of.schooling. –. –. .00509
. . . (4.01)
Years.of.schooling. .0004. .0015. .00854
. (.25). (1.12). (3.09)
Number.of.countries. .59. 121. 121
Number.of.immigrants. 212. 3,879. 3,879
R2. .12. .03. .03
NOTE: Absolute values of robust t ratios in parentheses. Other variables included log of students per teacher, 
primary and secondary; age; age squared; gender; entry visa (employment principal, spouse of citizen); log of 
distance; any ranked universities; number of universities.
SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey.
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point difference for Korea. However, in a low-skill-price country like Mexico, 
high school graduates are more likely to return compared with college graduates.
Conclusions
Some of the news about immigration’s impact on sending countries is posi-
tive. In fact, the greatest impact of the international flow of skilled immigrants 
on low-income countries may lie in the return of individuals experiencing good 
institutions—working markets, high-quality educational organizations—in the 
destination country who then may have both the models and the means to effect 
institutional change in their home country. These will be returning students and 
skilled immigrants (for example, former President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico).
In addition, the number of foreign-born skilled residing in developed coun-
tries substantially overstates the number of people educated in low-income coun-
tries who emigrated and especially overstates the net brain drain.
Further, a large number of people born in low-income countries receive their 
expensive, higher education in high-income countries, and the vast majority re-
turn to their home country despite the fact that the main motivation for acquiring 
education abroad appears to be wage improvements via migration.
Finally, a large fraction of “permanent” immigrants return to their home coun-
Figure 8
Percentage Increase in the Proportion of “Permanent” Immigrants Intending to Return 












Grade school graduate High school graduate  College graduate
SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey.
The Circulation Migration of the Skilled and Economic Development 19
try. This rate is especially high among immigrants chosen on the basis of their 
skill.
On the negative side, the gaps between low-skill-price and high-skill-price 
countries, and thus the private gains from migration, are enormous, especially for 
the high-skilled.
And although high-skill out-migration is more prevalent in high-skill-price 
countries, both high- and low-skill immigrants leave low-skill-price countries in 
greater proportions.
Efforts to increase the number of domestic skilled persons through improving 
schools will be less effective in a low-skill-price country compared with a high-
skill-price country because of out-migration.
Last, return migration rates of the schooled-abroad and immigrants are sig-
nificantly lower and such returnees are significantly less skilled on average for 
low- than for high-skill-price countries.
The first-order issue is addressing why rewards to skills are low in low-
income countries, for which high out-migration and low return-migration are 
important symptoms. The training of people in high-income, high-quality institu-
tions may be the best assistance high-income countries provide.
Figure 9
Percentage Difference in the Proportion of “Permanent” Immigrants Intending to Return 










Great Britain Korea Mexico
SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey.
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Migrant remittances have become a major source of external development finance. They can play an effective role in reducing poverty. And they provide a convenient angle for approaching the complex migration 
agenda.
Remittances are personal flows from migrants to their friends and families 
and should not be taxed or directed to specific development uses. Instead, the 
development community should make remittance services cheaper and more 
convenient and indirectly leverage these flows to improve financial access of 
migrants, their beneficiaries, and the financial intermediaries in the origin coun-
tries.
The Growing Importance and Development Impact of Remittances
Remittances received from migrants abroad are one of the largest sources 
of external finance for developing countries. In 2006, recorded remittances sent 
home by migrants from developing countries reached $206 billion, up from $193 
billion in 2005 and more than double the level in 2001 (Table 1). The true size of 
remittances, including unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is 
believed to be even larger. They are almost as large as foreign direct investment 
and more than twice as large as official aid received by developing countries 
(Figure 1).
The doubling of recorded remittances over the past five years is a result of a 
combination of factors: better measurement of flows; increased scrutiny since the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001; reduction in remittance costs and expanding 
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networks in the industry; depreciation of the dollar (raising the dollar value of 
remittances in other currencies); and growth in the migrant stock and incomes.
Poor Countries Receive Relatively Larger Remittances
In 2006, the top three recipients of remittances—India, Mexico, and China—
each received nearly $25 billion (Figure 2). But smaller and poorer countries tend 
to receive relatively larger remittances when the size of the economy is taken 
into account. Expressing remittances as a share of GDP, the top recipients were 
Moldova (30 percent), Tonga (27 percent), Guyana (22 percent) and Haiti (21 per-
Table 1
Global Flows of International Migrant Remittances (U.S.$ billion)
                        Percent change
INFLOWS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (est.)  2005–06  2001–06
All developing countries 85 96 117 145 165 193 206 7 115
Low-income.countries. 22. 26. 32. 40. 42. 48. 55. 15. 112
Middle-income.countries. 63. 70. 85. 105. 123. 145. 152. 5. 117
..Lower.middle-income. 43. 48. 61. 75. 86. 98. 102. 4. 113
..Upper.middle-income. 20. 22. 24. 30. 37. 47. 50. 6. 127
. . . . . . . . .
East.Asia.and.the.Pacific. 17. 20. 29. 35. 39. 45. 47. 4. 135
Europe.and.Central.Asia. 13. 13. 14. 17. 23. 31. 32. 3. 146
Latin.America.and.the..
..Caribbean. 20. 24. 28. 35. 41. 48. 53. 10. 121
Middle.East.and..
..North.Africa. 13. 15. 16. 20. 23. 24. 25. 4. 67
South.Asia. 17. 19. 24. 31. 31. 36. 41. 14. 116
Sub-Saharan.Africa. 5. 5. 5. 6. 8. 9. 9. 0. 80
High-income.OECD. 46. 50. 52. 59. 66. 68. 68. 0. 36
World 132 147 170 205 233 262 276 5 88
                       Percent change
OUTFLOWS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005    2004–05  2001–05
All developing countries 12 14 21 25 32 38   19 171
High-income.OECD. 76. 83. 88. 98. 111. 119. . 7. 43
High-income.non-OECD. 22. 22. 22. 21. 20. 22. . 10. 0
World 110 118 131 144 163 179  10 52
NOTES: Remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant 
transfers. Dollar amounts are nominal. The complete data set, including country-specific information, is available 
at www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances. 
SOURCE: World Bank staff calculations based on International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments 
Statistics Yearbook 2007.
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cent). Remittances are thus more evenly distributed across developing countries 
than are private capital flows.
Remittances Are Stable or Even Countercyclical
Remittances tend to be more stable than private capital flows and may even 
be countercyclical relative to the recipient economy. They tend to rise when the 
recipient economy suffers a downturn in activity, an economic crisis, natural di-
saster, or political conflict, as migrants may send more funds during hard times to 
help their families and friends. Remittances rose during the financial crisis in 1995 
in Mexico and in 1998 in Indonesia and Thailand (Figure 3). They also increased 
following hurricanes in Central America. In Somalia and Haiti, they have provided 
a lifeline for the poor. In addition to bringing the direct benefit of higher wages 
earned abroad, migration helps households diversify their sources of income and 
thus reduce their vulnerability to risks.
Remittances Reduce Poverty
Remittances directly augment the income of the recipient households. In ad-
dition to providing financial resources for poor households, they affect poverty 
Figure 1
Remittances and Capital Flows to Developing Countries


















SOURCES: Author’s calculations based on World Bank’s Global Development Finance 2007 and IMF’s Balance 
of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2006.
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and welfare through indirect multiplier effects and also macroeconomic effects. 
Also, these flows typically do not suffer from the governance problems that may 
be associated with official aid flows. 
Cross-country regression analysis shows significant poverty reduction effects 
of remittances: A 10 percent increase in per capita official remittances may lead to 
a 3.5 percent decline in the share of poor people. Recent research indicates that 
remittances reduced poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, although 
with heterogeneous effects across countries.
Household survey data show that remittances have reduced the poverty 
head-count ratio (percent of population below the national poverty line) signifi-
cantly in several low-income countries—by 11 percentage points in Uganda, 6 in 
Bangladesh, and 5 in Ghana. In Nepal, remittances may explain a quarter to a half 
of the 11-percentage-point reduction in the poverty head-count rate over the past 
decade (in the face of a difficult political and economic situation).
The analysis of poverty impact of remittances must account for counterfactual 
loss of income that the migrant may experience due to migration (for example, if 
the migrant has to give up his or her job). Such losses are likely to be small for the 
poor and unemployed but large for the middle- and upper-income classes.
Very poor migrants may not be able to send remittances in the initial years 
after migration. Also, the remittances of the very rich migrants may be smaller 
than the loss of income due to migration. But for the middle-income groups, re-
Figure 3
Remittances Rise During Crisis, Natural Disaster, or Conflict
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mittances enable recipients to move up to a higher income group. In Sri Lanka, 
for example, households from the third through the eighth income decile moved 
up the income ladder thanks to remittances (Figure 4).
Remittances Finance Education, Health, and Entrepreneurship
Remittances are associated with increased household investments in educa-
tion, entrepreneurship, and health—all of which have a high social return in most 
circumstances. Studies based on household surveys in El Salvador and Sri Lanka 
find that children of remittance-recipient households have a lower school dropout 
rate and that these households spend more on private tuition for their children. 
In Sri Lanka, the children in remittance-receiving households have higher birth 
weight, reflecting that remittances enable households to afford better health care. 
Several studies also show that remittances provide capital to small entrepreneurs, 
reduce credit constraints, and increase entrepreneurship.
Remittances May Cause Currency Appreciation
Large remittance inflows, like any other foreign currency inflows, can cause 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate and raise the international price of 
traditional exports. Although empirical evidence of such Dutch disease effects of 
Figure 4
Remittances Help Reduce Poverty
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remittances is still lacking, the impact is likely to be large in small economies. Sev-
eral countries, including El Salvador, Kenya, and Moldova, are concerned about 
the effect of large remittance inflows on currency appreciation.
The traditional “sterilization” technique used to prevent currency apprecia-
tion due to natural resource windfalls, however, is not appropriate for addressing 
currency appreciation due to remittances. Unlike oil windfalls, remittances persist 
over long periods. Trying to sterilize their impacts year after year can be very 
costly. Countries have to learn to live with these persistent flows. Government 
spending on infrastructure and efforts to raise labor productivity can to some 
extent offset the currency appreciation effects of remittances.
The Effect of Remittances on Growth Is Mixed
To the extent that remittances finance education and health and increase 
investment, remittances could have a positive effect on economic growth. In 
the economies where the financial system is underdeveloped, remittances may 
alleviate credit constraints and act as a substitute for financial development. On 
the other hand, large outflows of workers (especially skilled workers) can reduce 
growth in countries of origin. Remittances may also induce recipient households 
to choose more leisure than labor, with adverse effects on growth.
Remittances may be more effective in a good policy environment. For in-
stance, a good investment climate with well-developed financial systems and 
sound institutions is likely to imply that a higher share of remittances is invested 
in physical and human capital. Remittances may also promote financial develop-
ment, which in turn can enhance growth.
Empirical evidence on the growth effects of remittances, however, remains 
mixed. In part, this is because the effects of remittances on human and physical 
capital are realized over a very long time. This is also partly due to the difficulty 
associated with disentangling remittances’ countercyclical response to growth, 
which implies that the causality runs from growth to remittances, but the correla-
tion between the two variables is negative. Finding appropriate instruments for 
controlling such reverse causality is a challenge. It would be easy to conclude that 
remittances have a negative effect on growth, but that would be erroneous. Also, 
to the extent that they increase consumption, remittances may raise individual 
income levels and reduce poverty, even if they do not directly impact growth.
Leveraging Remittances for Development
Governments in destination and origin countries can facilitate remittance 
flows and enhance their development impacts through the application of ap-
propriate policies. However, some current policy practices pose pitfalls. Almost 
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all developing countries offer tax incentives to attract remittances, but such tax 
exemption on remittances may encourage tax evasion. Matching-fund programs 
(such as Mexico’s three-to-one program) may effectively leverage small volumes 
of collective remittances from migrant associations for small community develop-
ment projects, but such programs may not be scalable and may divert funds from 
other local funding priorities. Efforts to channel remittances to investment have 
met with little success. Instead, efforts should be made to improve the overall 
investment climate in the origin countries. Some governments have been toying 
with the idea of taxing remittances. This would have an effect similar to that of 
raising remittance costs and would hurt the poor migrants and their families in or-
igin countries. Taxation would also drive remittance flows further underground.
Remittances should not be viewed as a substitute for official development 
aid. Fundamentally, they are private money that should not be expected to fund 
public projects. Not all poor households receive remittances; official funding is 
necessary to address the needs of such households.
Leveraging Remittances for Financial Access of Migrants and Their  
Beneficiaries
Encouraging remittances through banking channels can improve the devel-
opment impact of remittances by encouraging more saving and enabling better 
matching of saving with investment opportunities. Remittances received as cash 
are less likely to be saved than those received through a bank account.
For many poor households and migrants, remittances are the only point of 
contact with the formal financial sector. By providing remittance services, banks 
and other financial institutions can attract new customers for their deposit and 
loan products. Microfinance institutions can use the history of remittance receipts 
to judge the credit history of potential customers.
Both sending and receiving countries can increase migrants’ banking access 
by allowing origin country banks to operate overseas and providing identification 
cards (such as the Mexican matrícula consular), which are accepted by banks 
to open accounts. Access to remittance services in rural and remote areas can be 
improved by encouraging the participation of microfinance institutions, credit 
unions, and saving banks (including postal saving schemes) in the remittance 
market. Existing regulations may need to be amended to allow these institutions 
to more fully participate in providing remittance services. In many countries, mi-
crofinance institutions would need legal permission to receive foreign exchange. 
In some cases, they may need limited access to national clearance and settlement 
systems.
Leveraging Remittances for Capital Market Access of Financial Intermediaries
Remittances can improve a country’s creditworthiness and thereby enhance 
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its access to international capital markets. Hard currency remittances, properly ac-
counted, can significantly improve country risk rating. The ratio of debt to exports 
of goods and services, a key indebtedness indicator, would increase significantly 
if remittances were excluded from the denominator (Figure 5). Model-based cal-
culations using debt-to-export ratios that include remittances in the denominator 
indicate that including remittances in creditworthiness assessments would im-
prove credit ratings for Lebanon (by two notches) and result in implied sovereign 
spread (the difference in interest rates between a sovereign bond and comparable 
U.S. treasuries) reductions ranging from 130 to 334 basis points.
Future flows of remittances can be used as collateral to improve the rating 
of the subsovereign borrowers, allowing them to pierce the sovereign rating ceil-
ing. Several banks in developing countries (such as Brazil, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Mexico, and Turkey) have been able to raise cheaper 
and longer-term financing (more than $15 billion since 2000) from international 
capital markets via securitization of future remittance flows. By mitigating cur-
rency convertibility risk, a key component of sovereign risk, the future flow se-
curitization structure allows securities to be rated better than the sovereign credit 
rating. In the case of El Salvador, for example, the remittance-backed securities 
were rated investment grade, two to four notches above the subinvestment grade 
sovereign rating. Investment grade rating makes these transactions attractive to a 
Figure 5
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wider range of “buy-and-hold” investors (for example, insurance companies) that 
face limitations on buying subinvestment grade. As a result, the issuer can access 
international capital markets at a lower interest rate spread and longer maturity. 
Moreover, by establishing a credit history for the borrower, these deals enhance 
the ability and reduce the costs of accessing capital markets in the future.
Reducing Remittance Costs
Reducing remittance fees would increase the disposable income of poor mi-
grants, boost their incentives to send more money home, and encourage the use 
of formal remittance channels.
The cost of sending remittances tends to be high and regressive. A typical 
poor migrant sends about $200 or less per transaction. The average cost through 
the top three money transfer operators (Western Union, MoneyGram, and Dolex) 
can be as high as $16 for $100 and $18 for $200. These fees are highly regressive 
because the smaller remittances sent by poor migrants cost more.
With increased awareness among policymakers and migrants and falling 
costs of technology, remittance costs have been declining in recent years. In the 
U.S.–Mexico corridor, for example, the cost of sending $300 fell by 54 percent 
between 1999 and 2004, from more than $26 to $12. Since then, however, costs 
have remained sticky, dropping only to $10.60 by the end of 2006.
South–south remittance costs are even higher than north–south remittance 
costs (Figure 6). Nearly half the migrants from the south live in the south. Yet 
south–south remittances are either impossible due to capital and exchange con-
trols, or they are prohibitively expensive because currency conversion charges 
have to be paid at both ends.
High remittance costs faced by poor migrants can be reduced by increas-
ing access to banking and strengthening competition in the remittance industry. 
Banks tend to provide cheaper remittance services than money transfer operators. 
Entry of new market players can be facilitated by harmonizing and lowering bond 
and capital requirements, as well as avoiding overregulation such as requiring a 
full banking license for specialized money transfer operators.
Although regulations for anti-money-laundering and countering the financing 
of terrorism are necessary for security reasons, they should not make it difficult for 
money service businesses to operate accounts with correspondent banks. These 
regulations are currently unclear, and to make matters worse, they are not system-
atic or harmonized. Developing transparent compliance guidelines on anti-mon-
ey-laundering and antiterrorism-financing regulations should be a policy priority.
Sharing payment systems would avoid duplication of efforts. Establishing 
partnerships between remittance service providers and existing postal and other 
retail networks would help expand remittance services without requiring large 
fixed investments. However, exclusive partnerships between post office networks 
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and money transfer operators have often resulted in higher remittance fees than 
when there are no such partnerships. Partnerships should be nonexclusive.
Requiring greater disclosure on fees from remittance service providers would 
help remitters make informed choices. Poor migrants would also benefit from 
financial education.
Summary: The International Remittances Agenda
Remittances can contribute significantly to poverty reduction and other mil-
lennium development goals. Following the discussion above, the international 
remittances agenda can be summarized under four headings (Figure 7):
Figure 6
South–South Remittance Fees Are Higher Than North–South Remittance Fees
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1. Monitoring, analysis, and projection
2. Retail payment systems
3. Financial access of individuals or households
4. Leveraging remittances for capital market access of financial 
      institutions or countries
1. Monitoring, analysis, and projection. This includes understanding 
the size, corridors, channels, and costs of remittance (and migration) flows and 
the cyclical behavior of these flows; analysis of impacts on poverty, inequality, 
education, health, and investment in remittance recipient countries; and analysis 
of policy factors affecting remittance costs—for example, entry barriers and 
exclusivity contracts affecting market competition and exchange controls affecting 
foreign exchange commission. The effect of cost reduction on size and channels 
of flows also falls under this group.
2. Retail payment systems. The changes in the payment system relating to 
personal remittances impact all retail or small-value payments, including person-
to-business and business-to-business payments. The items in this category include 
new payment platforms or instruments (including cell-phone-based, card-based, 
or Internet-based remittance instruments); prudential capital requirements and 
regulations governing access of remittance agents to clearing and settlement 
systems; compliance with anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of 
terrorism; disclosure of remittance fees; and cross-border arbitration in the event 
Figure 7
The International Remittances Agenda
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that a remittance transaction is not delivered as per the service promise.
3. Financial access of individuals or households. While financial 
intermediaries such as banks, microfinance institutions, credit unions, and savings 
banks can help deliver remittance services, they can also benefit by offering 
remittance services that may attract new customers and then encourage them to 
save and invest. Besides encouraging saving out of remittances, these financial 
intermediaries can develop remittance-linked consumer or housing loans and 
insurance products. They can also use the history of remittance receipt to evaluate 
a recipient’s creditworthiness.
4. Leveraging remittances for capital market access of financial 
institutions or countries. Large and stable remittance flows undoubtedly 
improve country creditworthiness and thereby creditworthiness of subsovereign 
entities as well. Banks in many countries have used future remittances as 
collateral for raising significant bond financing (sometimes billions of dollars) 
from international markets. The interest spread on these bonds was lower, and 
the tenor higher, than comparable plain sovereign bonds. Some estimates show 
that the potential for such bond financing remains untapped, especially in many 
poor countries that also receive significant remittances. The funds raised via these 
bonds can be targeted to specific development projects.
Notes
This paper draws heavily on Ratha (2003) and World Bank (2005). For more references, see World 
Bank (2005). Thanks to Uri Dadush and Sanket Mohapatra for extensive discussions and Zhimei Xu 
for research assistance. The views expressed are the author’s own, not those of the World Bank. 
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Remittances and Their 
Microeconomic Impacts: 
Evidence from Latin America
Catalina.Amuedo-Dorantes
Remittances, defined as the money transfers made by migrants to their families and friends back home, have increasingly captured the attention of policymakers as their magnitude keeps rising and their role in 
economic development becomes more obvious. Nowhere is this more true than in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a region in which growth in domestic 
incomes and capital flows has stagnated while private transfers in the form of 
remittances have reached $53.6 billion (Inter-American Development Bank 2006). 
The flow of remittances to LAC countries is the highest and fastest growing 
in the world, exceeding foreign direct investment and net official development 
assistance to the region. Remittances surpass tourism income and almost always 
exceed revenues from the largest export in these countries, accounting for at least 
10 percent of gross domestic product in six of them. Furthermore, remittances are 
the least volatile source of foreign exchange in many of these economies, thus 
playing a crucial role in economic development.  
In what follows, I provide a general overview of the remitting patterns of 
migrants to the U.S. who are from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. Subsequently, I summarize some microeconomic 
evidence of the impact that remittances have on various spheres of economic 
development, as is the case with employment, business ownership, education, 
and health care investments in two LAC economies. These findings underscore 
the importance of remittances as a resource for the accumulation of human 
capital investments in education and health and as a determinant of employment 
patterns in remittance-receiving households in developing economies.   
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Data Sources
For the analysis of immigrant-remitting patterns, I rely on information from 
two companion data sets: the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and the Latin 
American Migration Project (LAMP).1 MMP started in 1982 to study the migration 
patterns of Mexicans within Mexico and to the United States. I use detailed social, 
demographic, and economic information from approximately 16,000 households 
in 93 communities in 17 Mexican states.2 For each household, interviewers gather 
a complete life history for the household head that includes detailed informa-
tion on past migration experiences in the United States. Afterward, interviewers 
travel to destination areas in the U.S. to administer identical questionnaires to 
households from the same communities in Mexico whose members have settled 
in the U.S. and no longer return home. Altogether, I work with a sample of 5,837 
authorized and unauthorized Mexican immigrants. 
LAMP, the companion set to MMP, uses the same methodology in a variety of 
other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Only one wave of data—col-
lected between 1999 and 2003, depending on the country—is available so far. As 
such, I rely on data from immigrants who are from Costa Rica (192 respondents), 
the Dominican Republic (166), Nicaragua (161), Peru (61), and Haiti (36).
Latin American Immigrants’ Remitting Patterns 
What Percentage of Migrants Remits and How Much Do They Send Home?
Table 1 compares the percentage of immigrants sending money home across 
six Latin American and Caribbean countries. Of the 5,703 immigrants providing 
information regarding their remitting practices, 71 percent declare sending money 
home monthly during their last U.S. trip. This figure is in line with the more than 
60 percent of immigrants from Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Mexico, and Haiti remitting home. The portion of migrants sending money to their 
families monthly drops to 46 percent among the 52 Peruvian immigrants in the 
sample.
Table 1 also lists the average dollar amount ($302 a month) remitted home 
by immigrants from these LAC nations. Yet, there are significant differences in the 
funds sent by migrants from these countries. For instance, money transfers are the 
smallest among immigrants from the Dominican Republic ($179) and the largest 
among immigrants from Costa Rica ($493).   
Who Remits?
A longstanding series of empirical papers have noted that remittances differ 
according to immigrants’ ages, family responsibilities back home, earnings, and 
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temporary versus permanent status (Taylor 1999; de la Garza and Lowell 2002). 
Table 2 examines these characteristics as well as the variability of immigrants’ 
remitting patterns and remitting purposes according to whether they were au-
thorized upon entry, their educational attainment, decade of visit, and area of 
residence in the United States. Several findings are worth discussing. 
A higher share of unauthorized immigrants (75 percent) than legal immi-
grants (64 percent) remits money home. Likewise, less educated immigrants ap-
pear more likely to remit than their more educated counterparts (59 percent ver-
sus 50 percent, respectively). Yet, by country, there are no statistically significant 
differences in the remitting likelihood of less and more educated immigrants.  
Other interesting findings refer to remittance trends. According to Table 2, 
a higher fraction of Latin American immigrants has transferred money to family 
during the present decade than in the 1990s. This is indeed the case for Costa 
Ricans, Dominicans, Peruvians, and Mexicans. The opposite trend is observed 
among Haitians, though the limited number of observations for Haiti calls any 
conclusions into question.  
A final result revealed by Table 2 is the change in remitting patterns according 
to where immigrants resided in the United States. Immigrants were more likely to 
remit (73 percent versus 67 percent) if they resided in smaller cities or rural areas 
rather than big cities. This finding is partially a by-product of the sample’s larger 
number of Mexicans, most of whom were employed in the agriculture sector. 
However, in the case of Dominicans and Nicaraguans, the percentage of remitting 
immigrants was larger among those who last resided in a big U.S. city. This pat-
Table 1
What Share of Migrants Remits and How Much?
                       All countries        Costa Rica         Dominican Republic             Haiti
Variables N Mean SD N Mean SD N  Mean  SD N Mean SD
Migrants.remitting. 5,703. .....71. .....46. 167. .....69. .....46. 154. .....67. .....47. 19. .....74. .....45
Average.amount
..remitted.(monthly).4,034.301.68. 418.48. 115. 492.91. 865.46. 103.179.18.195.31. 14. 284.56. 251.78
                       Mexico          Nicaragua                       Peru 
Variables N Mean SD N Mean SD N  Mean  SD
Migrants.remitting. 5,179. .71. .45. 132. .61. .49. 52. .46. .50
Average.amount
..remitted.(monthly).3,698.300.43. 403.35. 80. 223.18. 255.03. 24. 376.55. 371.75
NOTES: N = number of observations; SD = standard deviation. Amounts in U.S. dollars. 





                       All countries Costa Rica  Dominican Republic   Haiti
Variables Share t-stat  Share t-stat  Share t-stat Share t-stat
By documentation status:
Legal. .64. –. . ..66. –. . .68. –. . .69. –...........
Unauthorized. .75. –8.36. .80. –1.76. .57. ...75. 1.00. .–2.61
By educational attainment:
Up.to.15.years. .59. –. . .60. –. . .69. –. . .75. –
16.years-plus. .50. ..2.37. .33. ...1.48. .73. –.35. .50. ...48
By decade of visit:
During.1990s. .67. –. . .45. –. .58. –. . .92. –
2000.and.later. .79. –9.79. .81. –4.76. .83. –3.39. .33. 2.63
By area where they stayed in the U.S.:
Not.a.large.city. .73. –. . .68. –. . .54. –. . .70. –
Large.city. .67. 5.42. .78. –.86. .73. –2.28. .78. –.37
                         Mexico    Nicaragua                Peru
Variables Share t-stat  Share t-stat  Share t-stat
By documentation status:
Legal. .66. –.. .. .57. –. . .44. –...........
Unauthorized. .75. –7.34. .80. –2.22. 1.00. –7.90
By educational attainment:
Up.to.15.years. .58. –. . .56. –. . .56. –
16.years-plus. .50. 1.44. .53. 29.37. –. 1.29
By decade of visit:
During.1990s. .68. –. . .56. –. . .22. –
2000.and.later. .79. –8.92. .67. –1.28. .64. –3.42
By area where they stayed in the U.S.:
Not.a.large.city. .75. –. . .56. –. . –. –
Large.city. .66. 6.56. .73. –1.82. –. –
NOTES: The null hypothesis being tested is whether the two shares are significantly different from each other. 
Information on migrant residency while in the U.S. is not available in the Peruvian survey.
SOURCES: Author’s tabulations using data from the Mexican Migration Project and the Latin American Migration 
Project. 
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tern may be simply indicative of the location preferences of emigrants from these 
countries; for example, Dominicans may primarily concentrate in New York City.
For What Purposes Do They Remit?
The literature has long examined immigrants’ remitting motives (Amuedo-
Dorantes, Bansak, and Pozo 2005). A variety of reasons have been identified, 
including altruism, exchange, investment, and co-insurance. 
The altruism motive suggests that remittance payments made by migrants to 
their families increase with the needs of household members back home (Becker 
1974). The exchange motive, or at least one of the motives, refers to existing 
evidence of immigrants repaying family members and friends back home for fi-
nancing their trips (Cox 1987). Another motive discussed in the literature is invest-
ment, which occurs when immigrants remit money home to purchase assets with 
the intent of earning an economic return. Finally, Lucas and Stark (1985) brought 
attention to yet another motive for sending money home: co-insurance. Both im-
migrants and family members/friends provide monetary and in-kind transfers to 
each other to hedge against economic shocks. 
MMP and LAMP ask remitters about the purpose for sending money home. 
Remitters are allowed to choose up to five motives. For practical purposes, these 
motives can be grouped into “consumption” or “asset accumulation/investment,” 
depending on whether remittances are sent to cover the consumption needs of 
families and friends back home or to be invested in productive activities. Which 
expenditure categories should constitute consumption versus asset accumulation 
is debatable, particularly when it comes to assets such as housing. However, for 
this presentation, I group under the category of consumption the following ex-
penditures: food and maintenance, purchase of a vehicle, purchase of consumer 
goods, financing a special event, recreation/entertainment expenses, and debt 
payments. Asset accumulation comprises the following: construction or repair of 
a house, purchase of a house or lot, purchase of tools, purchase of livestock, pur-
chase of agriculture inputs, start/expand a business, education expenses, health 
expenses, and savings. 
Figure 1 addresses migrants’ remitting motives in a variety of countries. Be-
cause migrants can indicate up to five motives, the percentages of migrants send-
ing money back home for consumption and asset accumulation purposes do not 
add to 100. According to Figure 1, consumption is the overwhelming purpose 
behind immigrants’ remitting practices. Yet, a nontrivial fraction of remitters in-
dicates asset accumulation as a reason for sending money home. Consumption 
appears to be a more pressing remittance motive for immigrants coming from the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Peru. Only a small fraction 
of immigrants from each of those economies (not more than 18 percent) indicates 
sending money home for asset accumulation purposes. 
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Microeconomic Evidence: Implications of Remittance Inflows
One reason policymakers and development organizations are paying more 
attention to migrant remittances is that they constitute a significantly larger, less 
volatile, and more reliable source of financial-development aid than foreign aid 
and other public transfers. As such, much of the focus on remittances has been 
oriented toward measuring the impact of these money transfers on the receiving 
economies. In what follows, I summarize some of the key findings from my work 
with Susan Pozo regarding the implications of remittances on the employment, 
business ownership, education, and health care investments carried out by receiv-
ing households, using data from the Dominican Republic and Mexico. Overall, 
remittances have the potential to significantly alter household labor supply pat-
terns. 
Remittance-Receiving Households and the Labor Supply
Among the ways remittances can impact economic development is via their 
effect on the employment patterns of men and women in remittance-receiving 
areas (Funkhouser 1992; Rodriguez and Tiongson 2001). Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo (2006a) examine the impact of remittances from Mexican migrants on the 
supply of working-age men and women in Mexico, using data from the Encuesta 
Figure 1
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Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH). ENIGH is a nationally 
representative income and expenditure survey carried out biennially by the Mexi-
can statistical institute since the late 1980s. Using data on sixteen- to sixty-four- 
year-olds from the 2002 ENIGH—the most complete wave yet—we (1) account 
for the endogeneity of remittance income with respect to the labor-supply pat-
terns of individuals in remittance-receiving households,3 and (2) examine differ-
ences in the hours worked in various types of employment by men and women in 
urban and rural areas in response to this income. We find that remittances seem 
to be associated with variations in the allocation of the male labor supply across 
various types of employment. In contrast, remittances are accompanied by an 
overall drop in the female labor supply resulting from reductions in informal-sec-
tor and nonpaid work in rural areas.  
What might account for these differences? One plausible explanation is that 
when measuring the labor-supply impact of remittances, the income effect from 
these monetary inflows is confounded by the disruptive effect of the preceding 
out-migration of family members. The income effect appears to dominate in the 
case of women in rural areas, who seem to be using remittances to purchase time 
away from informal and nonpaid work. Likewise, higher remittance incomes ap-
pear to be associated with reduced male labor supply in formal-sector work and 
urban self-employment. However, among men, the income effect seems offset by a 
higher incidence of informal-sector employment, possibly signaling the disruptive 
effect of household out-migration. Overall, remittances have the potential to signif-
icantly impact household labor-supply patterns in remittance-receiving countries. 
Remittances and Business Ownership 
The development literature has long emphasized the important role that re-
mittance inflows can play in promoting microentrepreneurship by lifting budget 
constraints in areas with poor access to credit (Woodruff and Zenteno 2001). 
Using household-level data from the Dominican communities in LAMP, Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006b) examine the links between remittance receipt and 
business ownership. Recognizing their likely joint determination, we estimate a 
system of simultaneous probit models examining the likelihood of both events. In 
this manner, we are able to identify some of the determinants.
While it has been suggested that workers’ remittances may loosen the capital 
constraints of households in developing economies with regard to business own-
ership, our findings do not support this hypothesis in the case of the Dominican 
Republic. Specifically, household remittance receipt appears to be associated with 
a lower household likelihood of business ownership. Why does this occur? One 
possibility is that remittances are used to fulfill basic consumption needs, contrib-
ute to the housing stock, increase the availability of health care for individuals, or 
contribute to the education of household members.  
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Although remittance receipt does not appear to enhance the household’s 
likelihood of business ownership, business owners seem more likely than non-
business owners to receive international remittances. One explanation is that the 
existence of a family business may signal to emigrants the availability of good 
investment opportunities in the home community. Another is that emigrants may 
send money home in order to claim household assets upon their return; that is, 
remittances may respond to a bequest motive.  
Remittances and Educational Investments Back Home
Remittances can also influence economic development via their impact on 
educational investments (Edwards and Ureta 2003). Using LAMP’s Dominican sur-
vey data, known as LAMP-DR7, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006c) work with 
a sample of school-age children from 907 households who were interviewed in 
seven Dominican communities in 1999 and 2000. Our purpose is twofold: (1) to 
examine how remittances impact the household’s decision to invest in education 
while attempting to account for the disruptive impact of household out-migration, 
and (2) to consider the differential impact of remittance inflows on the distribu-
tion of educational investments by gender. 
We take advantage of the fact that only 44 percent of children in remit-
tance-receiving households have family members abroad to examine the impact 
of remittances on the educational attainment of children in households without 
migrants relative to all other children. Specifically, we examine the effect of remit-
tance inflows on the likelihood that children have an age-appropriate education, 
which we refer to as being “academically on target.” 
We find that the receipt of remittances has no discernible impact on the likelihood 
of achieving an age-appropriate education among children when we include in our 
sample households with, as well as without, migrants. However, remittance receipt 
is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of being academically on target 
among children in households without migrants. The difference suggests that among 
children in households with migrants, remittance income may help neutralize the dis-
ruptive effect of household out-migration on children’s educational attainment.
We also look at the differential impact of remittance inflows on the edu-
cational attainment of boys as compared with girls. When we do not distin-
guish among children according to whether the household has migrants currently 
abroad, girls seem to benefit significantly more than boys from the receipt of re-
mittances by the household. However, when we focus on children in households 
without migrants, the receipt of remittances benefits both boys and girls. Again, 
the difference suggests that the disruptive effect of household out-migration dis-
proportionately falls on boys.  Furthermore, the findings suggest that remittances 
help palliate the negative impact of household out-migration on the educational 
attainment of boys while also helping girls.
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Remittances and Health Care Expenditures of Families in Mexico
Finally, remittances have also been deemed responsible for changes in health 
outcomes (Kanaiaupuni and Donato 1999; Levitt 1997; López-Córdova 2006; Dur-
yea, López-Córdova, and Olmedo 2005). Using Mexico’s 2002 wave of ENIGH, 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006d) examine the impact of remittance income 
on the health care of Mexican families by income strata. 
We find that international remittances increase both the likelihood and level 
of spending on health care. We also find that the sensitivity of health care expen-
ditures to variations in the level of international remittances by and large exceeds 
the impact of nonremittance income, thus hinting at the critical role played by 
remittances in this type of household expenditure. Finally, remittance income 
has significantly greater influence in shaping the health care expenditures of 
households in lower-income quartiles relative to those of households in higher-
income quartiles. In particular, a one-peso increment in remittance income raises 
the health care expenditures of households in the bottom income quartiles by 
21 percent, whereas a similar increment in remittances increases the health care 
expenditures of households in the top income quartiles by only 4 percent. As 
such, remittance income has the potential to significantly impact health care ex-
penditures among poorer households. 
Hence, our findings add to the existing evidence on remittances as a valu-
able resource for human capital investments among lower-income households in 
developing economies.  
Concluding Remarks
This presentation covers the similarities and differences in remitting patterns 
of Latin Americans in the United States. About 70 percent of immigrants in the 
sample declare remitting money home on a monthly basis during their last U.S. 
trip. On average, migrants remitted just over $300 a month. Yet, these figures sig-
nificantly varied across countries, with Dominicans sending an average of $179 
and Costa Ricans as much as $493. 
The data confirm that consumption is the overwhelming and increasingly 
more important motive for sending money home. However, a non-negligible 
fraction of immigrants indicates asset accumulation as one motive for transferring 
money to their families, particularly in Mexico.
I also summarize previous findings that show how remittance funds can 
significantly impact the employment, education, and health care use of their re-
cipients and, in this manner, help shape the economic development of receiving 
areas. Altogether, given the role of remittances in shaping household decision-
making, the findings suggest that policymakers take the differences in remit-
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tance patterns across various Latin American countries into consideration when 
designing policies that maximize the economic potential of these money flows in 
improving the livelihoods of their recipients. 
Notes
1 The Mexican Migration Project and the Latin American Migration Project are collaborative 
research projects based at Princeton University and the University of Guadalajara, supported 
by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD). Their website can 
be found at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu. 
2 The sample covers communities in the states of Aguascalientes, Baja California Norte, Chihua-
hua, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Nuevo 
León, Oaxaca, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, and Zacatecas.
3 One source of this endogeneity is in the potential for reverse causality between remittance flows 
and labor-supply patterns in the country of origin. In particular, while remittances may impact the 
labor-supply decisions of individuals in the receiving household, it is also true that the employ-
ment or unemployment patterns of individuals at home may drive migrants’ remitting patterns. 
As such, the causality runs in both directions.
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The Relationship Between 
International Migration, Trade, 
and Development: 
Some Paradoxes and Findings
J..Edward.Taylor
The interactions among trade, international migration, and economic development in migrant-sending areas are complex, and paradoxes abound. This paper summarizes global trends in world migration and 
remittances, discusses some paradoxes surrounding the trade–migration–
development relationship, and reports findings from new research on Mexico-
to-U.S. migration, using data from rural Mexico. It concludes with some thoughts 
about designing policies to raise the development potential of remittances in 
migrant-sending areas. 
Trends in International Migration and Remittances
The international migration of labor is critical to how globalization and eco-
nomic development are experienced by many less developed countries (LDCs). 
The number of international migrants, or people residing in a country other than 
their country of birth, has increased more or less linearly over the past forty years, 
from an estimated 76 million in 1965 to 188 million in 2005, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. About one half of the world’s international migrants are women. However, 
some international migrant flows are dominated by males, others by females. For 
example, more men than women immigrate to the United States from India and 
El Salvador, but U.S. immigration from China and South Korea is dominated by fe-
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males. The differences in international migration between the genders are just now 
becoming a focus of international migration research.
International migration creates both losses and gains for the LDCs from 
which international migrants originate. LDCs lose millions of highly educated 
people where human capital often is already scarce (e.g., see Özden and Schiff 
2005). LDCs also lose significant numbers of relatively low-skilled workers whose 
productivity and wages are far higher abroad than at home. 
International migrants send substantial amounts of remittances back to their 
countries of origin. The flow of international migrant remittances has increased more 
rapidly than the number of international migrants themselves: from an estimated 
US$2 billion in 1970 to US$216 billion in 2004.1 While the growth in international 
migration has been linear, the growth in remittances has been nonlinear, as one 
can see in Figure 2. In other words, on average, each of the world’s international 
migrants is sending home more remittances today than in the past. There is not a 
single convincing explanation for this phenomenon. Nearly 70 percent of all remit-
tances go to LDCs. It is likely that remittance figures understate true international 
remittance flows, which include an unknown amount of cash that does not enter 
countries through formal banking channels as well as goods that migrants send or 
carry home. There is evidence, however, that more migrants are using formal chan-
nels to remit today than in the past.
Figure 1


























SOURCE: International Organization for Migration (2005).
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Remittances make people the most important “export” of many LDCs in terms 
of the foreign exchange they generate. In 2004, remittances were equivalent to 78 
percent of the total value of exports in El Salvador and 108 percent in Nicaragua. 
International migrant remittances are also an increasing share of national income 
in many countries. For example, in 2004, remittances represented 11 percent of 
the gross domestic product of Guatemala, more than double the share in 2001. 
In the same year, remittances constituted 16 percent of the total GDP of El Sal-
vador. 
There is little information on where, within countries, international migration 
originates and remittances flow. Data from the limited number of national and 
regional surveys that include migration reveal that both migration and remittances 
are concentrated within, as well as among, LDCs. This means that international 
migration affects some countries and some regions within these countries more 
than others.
International Migration and Development Puzzles  
and Paradoxes
Recent economic studies suggest that migration and development—and 
thus, trade integration affecting development—are closely linked to one another. 
Figure 2
































SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (2005).
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Development shapes migration, and migration, in turn, influences development, 
sometimes in ways that are surprising and not recognized by researchers and 
policymakers.2 Paradoxes and puzzles abound. 
Does Migration Affect Development or the Reverse?
A big problem for researchers trying to test whether migration affects devel-
opment is that underdevelopment also drives emigration. One usually does not 
see streams of migrants leaving economies that are dynamic centers of employ-
ment. If migration and underdevelopment seem to go hand in hand, it might 
be because the loss of people to migration retards development, as pessimistic 
studies of migration and development assert (and new research findings contest). 
Or it might be that people migrate away from underdeveloped areas, which have 
little to offer them if they stay. Naturally, both may be true; the question is which 
dominates. It is difficult to separate cause from effect. 
Do Higher Incomes Mean Less Emigration?
Low incomes create an incentive for people to emigrate, but paradoxically, 
there are many cases where both incomes and international migration are in-
creasing in poor regions of LDCs. Usually it is not the poorest households that 
send migrants abroad. The very poorest households have an incentive to send 
migrants abroad and reap the reward of remittance income that is higher than 
what family members could earn at home. However, international migration is 
costly and risky, and the poorest households often cannot afford the costs and 
risks. At the other extreme, relatively well-off households in poor regions have 
the liquidity to pay the international migration bill and are often more willing to 
assume risks (or else have ways to insure themselves against risks). However, 
while they are more likely to have the means to migrate abroad, they are less 
likely to have the will. As a result, in poor areas of LDCs, international migrants 
tend to come from the upper-middle part of the income distribution, not from the 
poorest households. This raises some questions about the effectiveness of remit-
tances at reducing poverty.
When There Is No Brain Drain (and Maybe a Brain Gain)
The loss of human capital to international migration, commonly known as 
the brain drain, is well documented.3 If individuals who migrate abroad are more 
skilled and highly educated than those who stay behind, productivity and in-
comes in migrant-sending areas can fall. Some research suggests that the op-
posite may be true. In some cases, migration creates a brain gain instead of a 
brain drain. One study found evidence that the migration of highly educated 
individuals from developing countries has had a positive impact on aggregate 
human capital formation in those countries. This is because the possibility of 
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someday migrating abroad induces children to go to school. Another study found 
that internal migration by relatively skilled villagers in Mexico raised, rather than 
depleted, average schooling levels in villages. No study of the dizzying growth 
of India’s information technology industry would be complete without mention-
ing migration connections with Silicon Valley and the incentives they create for 
Indian youth to go to school.4
International migration does not always select the most educated, however. 
In theory, more highly educated people should take their schooling to wherever 
its economic returns are highest. For a Mexican villager with above-average edu-
cation (i.e., seven or more years of completed schooling), this is not likely to be in 
the United States. It is more likely to be at an internal migrant destination. Studies 
find that education does not stimulate international migration from rural Mexico, 
but it significantly increases the likelihood of internal migration.
A Self-Perpetuating Process
By far the most important variable driving international migration is migration 
networks, or contacts with family members and perhaps also with neighbors who 
have previously migrated. “Pioneer” migrants send home not only remittances 
but also information about how to migrate, where to look for work, which labor 
recruiters or smugglers to trust, what wages to expect, and how to overcome 
migration costs and risks. Past migrants also may support new migrants at their 
destination. They may even be willing to help finance the migration costs and 
insure against the risks. 
The value of networks depends on where they go; networks can negatively 
affect migration to destinations to which they do not lead. It also depends on 
gender. Recent findings suggest that the value of networks may be higher for 
women than for men because female migrants appear to be more deterred by 
risky border crossings, uncertain prospects abroad, and concerns for personal 
safety.5 Research also suggests that the benefits created by networks are not lim-
ited to just those households that have already sent family members abroad: Ac-
cess to networks eventually spreads to benefit other households. For example, 
the more households in a village that have migrants, the more likely it is that 
other households in the village eventually will send migrants abroad.6 Networks 
with international labor recruiters play an important role in shaping international 
migration from some, but not all, LDCs. 
Regional Trade Integration and International Migration
It is many LDCs’ hope that new trade opportunities will stimulate income 
and employment at home. One would think that this might deter emigration, but 
history suggests that often this is not the case in the short run. The final report of 
the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic 
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Development concluded that “expanded trade between the sending countries and 
the United States is the single most important remedy” for unwanted migration (U.S. 
Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic 
Development 1990). That is, in the long run, trade and migration are substitutes. 
However, the Commission also warned that “the economic development process 
itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration.” It concluded that 
the same policies that accelerate economic growth—including privatization, land 
reform, and freer trade—temporarily increase migration pressures because of the 
displacement and disruptions that accompany development. The fact that trade 
and migration may be complements in the short run may create a short-run ver-
sus long-run dilemma for countries concerned about migration (Martin 1993).
Emigration may increase in the short run if trade reforms spur imports that 
compete with labor-intensive production. In the long run, if export activities 
expand and remittances create income and investment multipliers, emigration 
pressures may subside.7 
There is empirical evidence that economic growth is accompanied by tempo-
rary increases in emigration. The 48 million people who emigrated from Europe 
between 1850 and 1925 represented about one-eighth of Europe’s 1900 popula-
tion, suggesting that “large scale emigration was quite common during Europe’s 
period of industrialization” (Massey 1991). When southern European nations such 
as Italy and Spain industrialized and were integrated into the European Commu-
nity (EC, today the European Union, or EU), they, too, experienced significant 
emigration pressures. However, these countries had to wait six to ten years before 
their citizens were permitted to search freely for jobs in other EC countries. In the 
meantime, economic gaps narrowed enough that once Italians and Spaniards had 
the right to work elsewhere in the EC, few did.8
In Asia, South Korea has experienced one of the world’s fastest migration 
transitions in the context of its export-led economic growth. In 1982 alone, more 
than 200,000 Korean workers emigrated. Korea sent 25 percent more immigrants 
to the United States during the 1980s than it did during the 1970s, despite rapid 
economic growth at home.9 By 1994, the South Korean government was debating 
how to deal with its immigration problems, including 20,000 legal foreign “train-
ees” and 50,000 to 100,000 illegal alien workers. 
The most comprehensive data on international migration over time are from 
the 2003 Mexico National Rural Household Survey. This survey compiled retro-
spective migration histories for all family members (regardless of whether they 
were present at the time of the survey) from a nationally representative sample of 
rural households between 1980 and 2002. With this information it is possible to 
reconstruct migration trends from rural Mexico over a period spanning years both 
before and after the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1994. These trends are illustrated in Figure 3. There is no obvious 
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break in the migration trend after 1994, only a continuation of an upward trend 
that started years earlier. When we use a dynamic econometric model to test for a 
NAFTA effect, we find that this effect is small or insignificant. There is some evi-
dence that NAFTA had a slightly negative effect on male migration and a positive 
effect on migration to U.S. farm jobs, but no clear influence one way or another 
on total migration from rural Mexico to the United States.10
The Ambiguous Effects (and Gender Bias) of Immigration Policies
The effects of immigration reforms and border enforcement on immigration 
are almost always ambiguous. Only an empirical analysis can tell us whether the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) increased or decreased the prob-
ability of migration from, say, Mexico to the United States, or whether heightened 
border enforcement has increased or decreased the number of unauthorized im-
migrants in the U.S. In the case of IRCA, there is now strong evidence that the 
legalization effect (a positive for immigration) dominated the employer sanctions 
effect (a negative for immigration). The intent of increased border enforcement is 
to deter new unauthorized immigration. However, border enforcement also may 
deter return migration.
Our analysis of migration from rural Mexico finds that IRCA did not sig-
nificantly affect overall migration and may have increased migration to U.S. farm 
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jobs. It also finds that U.S. expenditures on border enforcement have not reduced 
the probability of Mexico-to-U.S. migration, and they may have increased it. 
The Alternative to International Migration Generally Is Not to Stay at Home
One often hears of investing scarce resources (including remittances) in stay-
at-home development of rural areas. Yet the alternative to international migration 
usually is not staying at home—it is migrating somewhere else. Figure 4 illustrates 
that as per capita incomes increase, the share of the workforce in agriculture not 
only goes down—it plummets. In 2004, in Burundi, Burkina Faso, Niger, Malawi, 
and Rwanda, with a per capita income (PPP adjusted) of US$620 to $1,230, 90 
percent or more of the national workforce was in agriculture.11 Between 79 per-
cent and 94 percent of the population lived in rural areas. China, at $4,980 per 
capita PPP, had 49 percent in farm jobs and 63 percent living in rural areas, and 
these percentages were falling fast. Rich countries typically have less than 5 per-
cent of their workforce in agriculture and 25 percent or less of their populations 
living in rural areas. Remarkably, per capita income alone can explain 85 percent 
of the variation in the percentages of country workforces in agriculture. 
Enormous differences in rural development policies seem to have little ef-
fect on whether people stay in agriculture or not. Economic mobility requires 
Figure 4
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geographic mobility, and for most farmers and their children, the question is not 
whether to migrate but where. It is instructive to look at some of the world’s 
rural development success stories. China, where agriculture production has ris-
en sharply and international migration is generally not an option for the rural 
population, is one. Between 1990 and 2004, the percentage of China’s workforce 
employed in farm jobs plunged from 72 percent to 49 percent. Chile, despite its 
famous agricultural export boom, saw the share of its agricultural workforce fall 
from 19 percent to 14 percent.
 In Japan and France, despite expensive agricultural support programs, 
agriculture’s share of the workforce today is 5 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 
In the United States, where farm support programs are legendary and the ques-
tion of emigration is academic (but immigration is huge), less than 2 percent of 
the workforce is in agriculture (nearly all of the farm workforce is foreign-born), 
and 23 percent of the population is rural (this includes many high-income people 
for whom rural living is an amenity and the Internet transforms rural homes into 
offices). In the U.K., 2 percent of the workforce is in agriculture and 11 percent 
of the population lives in rural areas.
Many or Most of Migrations’ Impacts Are Not in the Migrant-Sending  
Households
Migration transforms the economies of the households that send migrants 
abroad and receive remittances from them. Studies find that the loss of labor 
to migration can discourage household production activities that require large 
amounts of labor, particularly where hired workers are not readily available. How-
ever, remittances can enable household to overcome credit and other constraints 
and invest in new production technologies and activities. There is evidence that 
when one controls for lost labor, the effects of remittances on production in mi-
grant-sending households are positive. As a result, the activities of households 
that send migrants abroad change.
This is illustrated in Figure 5. Households in a village in Michoacán, one of 
Mexico’s major migrant-sending states, were surveyed in 1983 and again in 1993. 
During the interim, migration from this village to the United States increased 
sharply, as did remittances. However, the average share of remittances in house-
hold incomes went down, from 45 percent in 1983 to 27 percent in 1993, because 
total income also increased. The principal income driver was livestock. The aver-
age share of livestock income in household total income rose from 23 percent 
to 42 percent. In this village, livestock was an ideal complement to international 
migration. Land for grazing was abundant in the hills surrounding the village, re-
mittances provided the financing households needed to invest in their herds, and 
livestock production uses little labor; in many cases, children tend the animals, 
while their older siblings migrate to destinations in Mexico or abroad.
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Despite the far-reaching impact migration and remittances can have on 
households that send migrants, it appears that most of migration’s effects are 
found outside these households. When a migrant-sending household’s income 
increases as a result of remittances and the activities they stimulate, its spending 
also increases. New demand for goods and services, from bricklayers to butchers, 
is created inside and outside the village, and income in the households that offer 
these services increases. They, in turn, spend their new income, creating addi-
tional rounds of income increases. The result is the creation of income multipliers 
inside and outside the rural economy, akin to the fiscal multipliers made famous 
by John Maynard Keynes’ seminal work. Economywide models are required to 
estimate the size of remittance multipliers. Findings from such models indicate 
that each additional dollar remitted increases Mexico’s GDP by between $2.69 
and $3.17, depending on which households in Mexico receive the remittance.12 
The Importance of Gender
International migration affects men and women differently. Since at least the 
1960s, the number of female international migrants has been nearly as large as the 
number of male migrants. Today, the share of females in the world’s total interna-
tional migrant population is close to one half. However, some LDCs send more men 
than women abroad, while others send more women. Developed countries attract 
more men than women from some LDCs but more women than men from others. 
Recent research finds that both the determinants and impacts of international 
migration are different for women than for men. A new study from Mexico finds 
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that migration experience and networks raise the likelihood of international migra-
tion more for women than for men (Richter and Taylor 2006). It also finds that U.S. 
border enforcement expenditures decrease the likelihood of female migration, but 
they have no significant effect on male migration. More educated women (but not 
men) are more likely to migrate from rural Mexico to the United States. Male (but 
not female) migration may have been slightly lower after NAFTA.
Conclusions
Our brief discussion of trends and paradoxes of international migration leads 
us to the following conclusions: 
 • Underdevelopment drives migration, but migration also affects under-
development.
 •  Income gaps between rich and poor countries create the incentives for 
international migration, but they are a necessary—not a sufficient—con-
dition. Most people do not migrate, even when incomes are far higher 
abroad than at home.
 • Income growth in migrant-sending areas often is associated with more 
international migration, not less. In all countries that experience rapid 
income growth, the share of people in farm jobs and rural areas goes 
down.
 • International migration is driven by networks. Once international migra-
tion from a particular region reaches a certain point, it tends to take on 
a life of its own.
 • Half of the world’s international migrants are women, whose motives 
for migrating, constraints, concerns, and impacts on sending areas often 
are different from those of males.
 
These findings point to a rich set of potential policy implications. First, it is 
probably not a good idea to make “keeping people on the farm” a policy prior-
ity. This might seem controversial and provocative, but it is really common sense. 
History teaches us convincingly that trying to keep people at home is not only 
very costly, it is futile. Increased mobility is a concomitant part of economic suc-
cess: As per capita incomes grow, people leave the agricultural sector (they also 
move out of rural areas). Even in countries with the biggest rural development 
success stories, the share of the workforce in agriculture is decreasing. The coun-
tries that have been most successful at keeping population in rural areas have 
been precisely those that have been least successful at raising their people’s living 
standards and developing their agricultural base.
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This does not mean that governments should be passive or not try to promote 
development in migrant-sending areas, for at least two reasons. First, when low 
incomes are compounded by poor access to markets for inputs, outputs, credit, 
and insurance, there may be too much migration. Second, many of the world’s 
migrants come from rural areas, and it is now well known that in countries where 
agriculture is not growing, the rest of the economy usually does badly, too. How-
ever, occupational migration away from farm jobs and geographic migration from 
rural areas are, if anything, likely to be higher when incomes are growing. 
The challenge for policymakers is how to make migration a development 
tool and part of a dynamic process of income growth instead of a response to 
limited opportunities in migrant-sending areas. The ability of countries to create 
an environment that is conducive to broad-based economic growth generally 
can shape the economic landscape in migrant-sending areas, the contributions of 
migration to development, and the nonmigration options available to those who 
stay behind.
Notes
I am grateful to the United Nations and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for supporting 
parts of this research, to Veronica Hernandez for her excellent research assistance, and to Peri 
Fletcher and Catherine Taylor for their valuable comments and editorial assistance.
1 Part of this sharp increase is probably due to an improved accounting of migrant remittances; 
however, the actual amount of remittances probably is higher than these numbers indicate, for 
reasons detailed below.
2 A few surveys are Massey et al. (1998), Taylor and Martin (2001), and Stark (1991).
3 For example, see the World Bank’s recent study (Özden and Schiff 2005). 
4 See Stark and Wang (2002); Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001); and Boucher, Stark, and 
Taylor (2005). 
5 For example, see Richter and Taylor (2006) and Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003).
6 A number of studies show this, including Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) and McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2005).
7 See recent work on CAFTA and migration by Taylor and Yúnez-Naude (2006).
8 Straubhaar (1988) and Martin, Hönekopp, and Ulmann (1990). 
9 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1990), 50.
10 See Boucher et al. (2007) and Richter and Taylor (2006). It is not known whether the same can 
be said for emigration from urban Mexico to the United States because the data to do such an 
analysis are not available.
11 PPP refers to purchasing power parity. This is a better way to compare standards of living 
because it takes into account differences in the purchasing power of a given unit of income 
across countries. 
12 The remittance multiplier is larger for households that spend a larger share of their new income 
on locally produced goods and services with a low import content. See Taylor et al. (1996).
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U.S.–Mexico Remittances: 
Recent Trends and 
Measurement Issues
Jesus.Cañas,.Roberto.Coronado,.and.Pia.M..Orrenius
International migration can be costly to a country in terms of the loss of human capital. In the case of massive out-migration, such as what Mexico has experienced over the past thirty years or so, the losses can be staggering. 
It is estimated that about 8 million Mexican-born workers—15 percent of the 
Mexican-born labor force—are in the United States.
The loss of labor results in a smaller economy, and aggregate income falls. 
However, it is not clear whether income per capita declines as a result of out-
migration. That depends largely on who leaves. Remittances—migrants’ money 
transfers to the families they have left behind—provide a migration offset that 
helps maintain income and consumption in the home country. 
As the papers from this panel illustrate, remittances offer many bene-
fits, both to recipient households, as Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes’ work shows, 
and to the larger local economy, as Ed Taylor demonstrates. Taylor stud-
ies migration and remittances in a general-equilibrium context and finds that 
the multiplier effects of remittances are large (Taylor et al. 1996). This finding 
partly answers critics who complain that remittances that go to consumption 
do not have the same beneficial impact as remittances directed to investment. 
New research has even shown that remittances can help build financial mar-
kets. In the Mexican case, the process of remitting has sown the seed of fi-
nancial intermediation in small communities that might otherwise have little 
access to banking and other formal financial services (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2007). 
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Dilip Ratha argues that given the benefits of remittances, taxing or otherwise creat-
ing barriers to legal international money transfers makes for bad public policy. 
The rest of this commentary explores recent trends in U.S.–Mexico remit-
tances, explaining how they are measured and comparing them with forecasts of 
remittances based on an econometric model and with trends in other developing 
countries.  
Growth in U.S. Remittances to Mexico 
The panel’s compelling research on the development impact of remittances 
relies overwhelmingly on microdata collected through household surveys in mi-
grants’ home countries. For data on total remittance flows between countries, 
however, researchers, the government, and the media rely on official statistics. In 
the case of Mexico, the central bank is the best source of remittance data.
Banco de México data indicate both high levels and growth of remittances in 
the past decade. In fact, the volume and growth rate seen in these official data 
are much higher than what is implied by household survey data on senders and 
receivers and by other measures, such as remittance estimates from the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. 
According to Banco de México, remittances totaled $20 billion in 2005 and 
by 2006 had grown to $23.1 billion. The 2006 level was 375 percent higher in real 
terms than 1995 remittances. In the post-2000 period, average annual growth was 
a remarkable 20.4 percent. 
Many factors drive remittance growth, while others curtail it. As migrants 
spend more time away from home, for example, remittances generally fall, par-
ticularly if migrants take their families with them or form new families in the 
destination country. Drivers of growth, on the other hand, include increases in 
the migrant population and its income, declines in money transfer costs, and a 
currency depreciation or an economic crisis in the home country.   
Several of these factors have been pushing up Mexican remittance totals, but 
they can’t fully explain the recent growth. As real remittances grew 170 percent 
between 2000 and 2005, for example, the Mexican-born population in the U.S. 
grew 20 percent and real median weekly earnings of U.S. Hispanics rose 18 per-
cent. Meanwhile, migrant inflows are estimated to have fallen in 2001, 2002, and 
2003 as the U.S. economy entered recession and then experienced a weak labor 
market recovery (Passel and Suro 2005). In addition, in-migration in 2005 was 
estimated to have been below 2000 levels, and the dollar rose only 7.4 percent 
against the peso during these years. For remittance drivers, the biggest change 
came in the transaction cost of money transfers, with average costs falling more 
than 50 percent since 2000 (Orozco 2006). 
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In sum, with the possible exception of transaction costs, it is difficult to rec-
oncile the remittance growth pattern with underlying economic and demographic 
variables. But there is a third factor that may be the single most important deter-
minant of the increases in observed remittances: better measurement. 
Measuring Remittances
In 2000, Banco de México launched a major overhaul of the collection and 
recording of remittance data. Efforts initially focused on better recordkeeping 
within the central bank and then on better collection from sources outside the 
bank (Cervantes 2007). To this end, in October 2002, Banco de México issued 
rules under which all banks and money transfer companies had to register with 
the central bank and report monthly remittances by Mexican state of destina-
tion. Before 2003, monthly remittance levels were inferred from a 1990 census 
of financial institutions, money exchange houses, and wire transfer companies. 
The result of the reporting requirement was much improved data collection and 
a clear break with past trends in remittance numbers.
Figure 1 shows monthly U.S.–Mexico remittance data in 2006 dollars. In line 
with the measurement changes, the growth rate of remittances appears to have 
roughly three phases: 1995 to 2000, 2000 to 2002, and 2002 to 2006.1 After 2002, 
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SOURCES: Banco de México; authors’ calculations.
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the series clearly shows more rapid growth and greater seasonality. 
In addition to mandatory direct reporting by money transfer firms, Banco de 
México also incorporates remittances that go through informal channels. Every 
December, the central bank conducts a border survey that asks returning migrants 
questions about cash and goods they are bringing to relatives. 
With the border survey and migrants’ increased use of formal channels for 
transmitting remittances, the cash migrants carried home in the past is now being 
captured by the official statistics. So better measurement of remittances has itself 
contributed significantly to the growth rate observed in recent years. 
The main reason for the move from informal to formal channels has been the 
decline in transaction costs for both senders and recipients (Freund and Spatafora 
2005). Greater competition and enhanced technology have driven down costs. 
More than 100 money transfer organizations served Mexico in 2005, compared 
with only five in 1995 (Mascaró 2007). Technological innovations like debit and 
credit cards and low-cost options like the Federal Reserve’s automated clearing-
house system (Directo a México) have further reduced costs. As a result, elec-
tronic transfers rose from 53 percent of remittances in 1996 to 85.8 percent in 
2003 and 93 percent by 2006 (Cervantes 2007; Coronado 2004). 
U.S. Government Data on U.S.–Mexico Remittances
There are other sources of information on remittance flows to Mexico, and 
some of their estimates differ starkly from the Banco de México’s numbers. The 
U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates that 
remittances were $10.7 billion in 2005 and $11.1 billion in 2006—roughly half 
the official volume. Figure 2, which compares annual remittance data from the 
BEA and Banco de México, shows the two series diverging after 2002. The timing 
coincides with the central bank’s adoption of the new measurement methodol-
ogy, but the BEA and Banco de México have always used different remittance 
estimation techniques. 
BEA estimation is not based on direct reporting by banks and other fund 
transfer companies but on a model built on assumptions about remittance behav-
ior and estimates of the size and characteristics of the migrant population. The 
BEA methodology has the advantage of being low cost, and it includes transfers 
sent through both informal and formal channels. However, it is highly sensitive to 
assumptions about who is remitting and how much they are sending. In addition, 
while the BEA defines remittances as transfers by migrants who have been in the 
U.S. for at least one year, one report suggests the BEA model may capture some 
of the initial transfers (U.S. General Accountability Office 2006). In any case, the 
exclusion is not large enough to account for the difference between the BEA data 
and the official, Banco de México numbers. And given recent growth rates in such 
fundamental measures as population and income of Mexicans in the U.S., any 
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model-based estimate will clearly not generate the double-digit growth official 
measures have documented. 
Microdata on Remittances 
In addition to government, or macro, measures of remittances, there are sur-
vey-based, or micro, measures of remittances by senders and receivers. Esquivel 
and Huerta-Pineda (2005) discuss recipient-based measures from a large, nation-
ally representative household survey in Mexico called ENIGH (Encuesta Nacional 
de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares). ENIGH data report that in 2002, 1.4 million 
households received an average of $2,560. Based on this, remittances to Mexico 
totaled $3.6 billion in 2002, only 37 percent of the official estimate.
Some Mexican officials have questioned the discrepancy between the mi-
crodata, from such sources as ENIGH, and official remittance estimates. They 
contend the Banco de México methodology does not do enough to exclude illicit 
business transactions, such as payments to human smugglers and drug traffickers, 
or legitimate nonfamily transfers, such as donations to nonprofit organizations 
(Muñoz 2006).  
Sender-based microdata on the quantity of remittances also differ from official 
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estimates. Amuedo-Dorantes finds that in Mexican Migration Project (MMP) data, 
79 percent of Mexican workers in the U.S. remit an average of $350 per month. If 
migrants in the MMP were representative of Mexicans in the U.S., these numbers 
would be consistent with official remittance estimates of more than $20 billion. 
Of course, MMP is a survey of return migrants with characteristics that distinguish 
them from Mexican immigrants in general. MMP migrants tend to be experienced 
migrants who maintain households in Mexico while they work temporarily in the 
U.S. and send or carry very large percentages of their incomes back home. They 
are poorer and have less education than Mexicans on average and tend to come 
from states with established migrant networks in the U.S. In sum, it would not be 
prudent to apply the characteristics of MMP migrants to the Mexican population 
in the U.S., which is more affluent but also has fewer ties to home.
A Model of Remittances
The BEA and microdata cannot replicate the trends found in the remittance 
data from Banco de México in the post-2002 period. What would a macroeco-
nomic forecast based on official data before the measurement changes predict for 
this period? To explore this question, we construct an autoregressive integrated 
moving average model (ARIMA) of quarterly remittances as a function of several 
macroeconomic variables, including U.S. and Mexican GDP, the dollar–peso ex-
change rate, the U.S. Consumer Price Index, and maquiladora employment. We 
difference the data to ensure stationarity and use autocorrelation functions to esti-
mate the lagged structure of each variable and the residuals vis-à-vis remittances. 
Then we run the model of remittances on its determinants and lagged values of 
itself, including current and lagged values of independent variables and allowing 
for the appropriate ARIMA structure of the residuals. A forecast is generated by 
projecting the fitted values of remittances as of fourth quarter 2002. 
The results, together with remittances and BEA estimates, are shown in Fig-
ure 3. Interestingly, macroeconomic determinants plus lagged remittances can 
explain most of the gap between BEA and Banco de México estimates. The model 
predicts that remittances would have been $21.5 billion in 2006, only about $1.5 
billion short of the actual number. The central bank’s new methodology, discussed 
above, and the decline in transactions costs more than account for the shortfall. 
Adding control variables to capture the effect of the post-2002 change suggests 
the impact of the new methodology amounted to $700 million at most in 2006.2 
Estimates of the cost elasticity of remittances suggest that the decline in transfer 
costs between 2000 and 2005 likely boosted 2006 transfers by $1.5 billion.3
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Comparing Remittances Across Countries
Remittances have been rising worldwide, and other countries’ experiences 
are helpful for putting the Mexican case into context. Mexico’s double-digit an-
nual growth rates are not unusual. Figure 4 shows an indexed series of real re-
mittances from 1994 to 2005 for a group of developing countries, many of which 
have experienced growth rates as high as or higher than Mexico. According 
to International Financial Statistics data, remittances more than doubled in real 
terms in India, Mexico, the Philippines, China, Bangladesh, Poland, Colombia, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, and Jamaica, among other countries.4 
Conclusion
There is no doubt that remittances to Mexico are high and have grown quick-
ly. What factors are driving the rapid growth are less well known, particularly 
since microdata and other sources are out of line with official statistics. This situ-
ation is not unique to Mexico. As we have seen, remittances to many developing 
countries have more than doubled over the past decade, far outpacing changes in 
demographic or economic fundamentals.
Better measurement is the most important factor underlying changes in the 
data. At the same time formal transfers are being better measured, informal trans-
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fers are shrinking as migrants increase their use of formal channels. The switch 
is due to many factors, but none as important as the sharply falling cost of remit-
ting. 
Remittance data have historically been of poor quality and grossly underesti-
mated migrant transfers. To remedy this, a global effort is under way to standard-
ize the definition and measurement of remittances. This will facilitate cross-coun-
try comparisons and analysis as well as appropriate policy responses to growing 
transfer flows.
Given the significance of remittances to the home country, precise measure-
ment is extremely important. Governments need accurate measures of where 
remittances are going and how large they are to track the impact on the poor and 
better target social programs, infrastructure improvements, and financial indus-
try regulation. In Mexico, several government matching programs leverage the 
power of remittances to improve conditions through investment in schools and 
infrastructure. 
Remittances give rise to policy issues in the host country as well. A crucial is-
sue is financial access for immigrants, particularly those who are undocumented. 
Governments struggle with trying to block illicit money flows that may go to ter-
rorist groups or other criminals, while at the same time allowing immigrants ac-
cess to banks. As measurement and standardization issues are resolved, the policy 
issues will surely come to dominate the debate over remittances.
Figure 4













Index, real (January 1994 = 100)
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics database.
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Notes
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas or Federal Reserve System.
1 The average annual growth rate in each period was 10.3 percent, 16 percent, and 20.6 percent, 
respectively.
2 To approximate the effect of the change in methodology, we fully interacted the model with a 
postchange dummy variable that takes the value 1 starting in fourth quarter 2002.
3 The cost elasticity of remittances is assumed to be –0.4, as reported in Freund and Spatafora 
(2005).
4 Data for India are available only through 2003.
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Given the intensity of the current debate about the impact of globalization on brain drain in the Third World and inequality in the First World, it might be useful to look at these forces during the first 
global century, ending in 1914. This paper reviews what we know about the 
impact of trade and mass migration on low-wage, labor-abundant European 
economies and high-wage, labor-scarce overseas New World economies.1 It 
reviews the distribution impact everywhere in the Atlantic economy, the extent 
of the European brain drain, and the schooling responses in both Europe and 
the United States.
The Impact of Globalization on Income Distribution 
in the Pre-1914 Atlantic Economy
The Heckscher–Ohlin Prediction
Shortly after the First World War, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin looked back 
on the nineteenth century and pondered the distributional consequences of glo-
balization. They argued that trade and labor migration must have had important 
income distribution consequences in both Europe and the New World (Flam and 
Flanders 1991, 90–92). The high-wage New World countries must have become 
more unequal, while the low-wage European countries must have become more 
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equal, ceteris paribus. After all, trade would use abundant land and skills in 
the New World—lowering unskilled labor’s income relative to that of landlords 
and skilled workers—and abundant unskilled labor in Europe—raising unskilled 
labor’s income relative to that of landlords and skilled workers. The emigration 
of unskilled and poorly schooled Europeans to the New World should have rein-
forced the trade impact. These Heckscher–Ohlin predictions were formalized by 
Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) to become central pillars of modern 
trade theory.
The insights of Heckscher and Ohlin still inform public debate today, as 
evidenced by the ongoing controversy about the causes of the late twentieth 
century rise in inequality in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) nations. Has globalization led to an increase in wage inequality 
in the rich, skill-abundant First World, while reducing it in the poor, unskilled-
labor-abundant Third World? Does immigration to the First World displace native 
unskilled workers, leading to wage inequality? And does Third World emigration 
raise wages and reduce inequality?
Given the intensity of the current debate over these questions, it might be 
useful to review what we know about nineteenth century globalization experi-
ence—the first global century. Since Heckscher and Ohlin thought that trade 
and mass migration worked together to make factor prices converge, what did 
that imply for changes in income distribution more generally? Labor’s wage 
should have fallen relative to land rents in the New World. Since landlords 
were at the top of the distribution pyramid, skilled labor in the middle, and 
unskilled workers at the bottom, globalization (trade and migration) should 
have contributed to rising inequality in the resource- and skill-abundant New 
World. Similarly, globalization should have contributed to rising wages relative 
to land rents and skill premia in Europe, and thus to falling inequality there. 
Were Heckscher and Ohlin right?
The Historical Inequality Facts
The evolution of relative factor prices has been documented for the late nine-
teenth century Atlantic economy, so we can explore whether the big globalization 
winners were New World land and European labor and whether the big losers 
were European land and New World labor. Were nineteenth century globalization 
forces strong enough to leave their inequality mark? After all, the Heckscher–Oh-
lin predictions are based on a static trade theory that assumes trade and mass mi-
gration were the only shocks affecting the world economy. Nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth. This was a period of dramatic industrialization, technological 
change, and demographic revolution—forces that also must have had an impact 
on real wages, farm rents, and income distribution more generally. In particular, 
economic growth meant that wages in the New World were rising rapidly, so 
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American and Australian unskilled labor certainly did not lose in absolute terms. 
In the expanding world of the late nineteenth century, trade and mass migration 
meant that European real wages grew more rapidly than they otherwise would 
have, and it meant that New World real wages grew less rapidly than they other-
wise would have. Clearly, factor price trends cannot by themselves tell us whether 
these counterfactual predictions were fulfilled, but recent empirical analysis has 
shown the predictions to be accurate.
There are four questions that we can sensibly ask of the historical data. First, 
did real wages converge in the late nineteenth century Atlantic economy? Second, 
did land rents converge? Third, was there relative factor price convergence? That 
is, did the ratio of wages to rents rise in Europe and fall in the New World? Finally, 
if there was relative factor price convergence, did it translate into rising inequality 
in the New World and falling inequality in Europe?
Elsewhere, the first question has been examined using real wages adjusted 
for purchasing power parity, and the answer was an unambiguous yes (Hatton 
and Williamson 2005, Chapter 6). There was real wage convergence within the 
Atlantic economy during the late nineteenth century, and the bulk of this conver-
gence was accounted for by convergence between Europe and the New World.
To answer the second and third questions, we need rent data for land of 
comparable quality across countries and over time. Alas, such data are unavail-
able. Nevertheless, if we make the plausible assumptions that European qual-
ity-adjusted land was initially more expensive than New World quality-adjusted 
land and that land rents moved like land prices, land rent convergence during 
this period is a certainty. Between 1870 and 1910, real land prices increased in 
Australia by 400 percent and in the U.S. by 250 percent, far greater than the big-
gest real land price increases we can document for Europe (Denmark, where 
land prices increased by only 45 percent: O’Rourke and Williamson 1999, Figures 
4.1–4.3). Moreover, in three important European countries—Britain, France, and 
Sweden—land prices actually fell, in Britain by over 50 percent. Land rents and 
values rose in the American Midwest, the Australian outback, and the Argentine 
pampas relative to those in Europe, as predicted.
It is the third question that is really central to any test of any globalization 
theory, especially in the context of a growing economy and especially because 
the theory relies so heavily on relative factor endowments and relative factor 
prices. The second column of Table 1 documents the evolution of the ratio of 
wages to land rent for three New World immigration countries—Argentina, Aus-
tralia, and the United States; for four European free trading and high-emigrating 
countries—Denmark, Britain, Ireland, and Sweden; and for three European pro-
tectionist and low-emigrating countries—France, Germany, and Spain.2 Relative 
factor price convergence certainly characterized the period from 1870 to 1913. In 
the New World, the wage–rental ratio plunged. By 1913, the Australian ratio had 
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fallen to one quarter of its 1870 level, the Argentine ratio had fallen to one-fifth of 
its mid-1880 level, and the U.S. ratio had fallen to less than half its 1870 level. In 
Europe, the ratio boomed. The British ratio in 1910 had increased by a factor of 
2.7 over its 1870 level, while the Irish ratio had increased even more, by a factor 
of 5.5. The Swedish and Danish ratios had both increased by a factor of 2.3. This 
increase was less pronounced in protectionist and low emigrating economies. 
The ratio increased by a factor of 1.8 in France and 1.4 in Germany and not at 
all in Spain. 
Of course, correlation is not causation. Just as rising inequality in the OECD 
	 (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Real wage Wage–land Real GDP Real GDP per
 per urban worker rental ratio per capita worker-hour
 1870–1913  1870–1910  1870–1913 1870–1913
.
Denmark. .2.63.. 2.85. .1.57. .1.90.
Finland.. n.a... n.a... 1.44.. 1.80.
Norway.. 2.43.. n.a... 1.31.. 1.65.
Sweden. 2.73.. 2.45. .1.46. .1.74.
Italy. 1.74.. n.a... 1.28.. 1.33.
Portugal.. .37.. n.a... .69.. 1.10.
Spain. .44. .–.43. .1.11.. 1.52
Austria. n.a.. n.a.. 1.46.. 1.76
Ireland. 1.79.. 4.39.. n.a.. n.a.
The European Periphery 1.73.. 2.32. .1.29. .1.60
.
Belgium. .92.. n.a... 1.05.. 1.24.
France. .91.. 1.80. .1.30. 1.58.
Germany. 1.02.. .87. .1.63. 1.88.
Great.Britain. 1.03.. 2.54. .1.01. 1.23.
The.Netherlands. .64.. n.a.. 1.01.. 1.34.
Switzerland. n.a... n.a.. 1.20.. 1.46.
The European Industrial Core .90.. 1.74. .1.20. 1.46
 
Europe 1.39.. 2.10. .1.25. .1.54
.
Argentina. 1.74.. –4.06. n.a... n.a..
Australia. .14. .–3.30. ..87. 1.08.
Canada. 1.65.. n.a.. 2.29. 2.31.
U.S.. 1.04. .–1.72. 1.81. 1.93.
New World 1.14. .–3.03. 1.66. 1.77 
SOURCE: O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, Table 2.2).
Table 1 
Relative Economic Performance of the European Periphery 
in the Late 19th Century: Growth Per Annum (Percent)
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after the 1970s may have plausibly been due to technical change rather than glo-
balization, so, too, other forces may have affected nineteenth century income dis-
tribution independent of any globalization-induced shocks. But what factor price 
evidence we have seems to offer support for the predicted impact of mass migra-
tion and the trade boom on late nineteenth century income distribution. While 
real wages grew everywhere before 1913, they grew faster in labor-abundant Eu-
rope than in the labor-scarce New World. Rents surged in overseas land-abundant 
countries and plunged in land-scarce European countries. And the wage–rental 
ratio increased dramatically in Europe, especially in free-trading and high-emi-
grating countries, while it declined equally dramatically in the frontier economies 
overseas. All in all, globalization had exactly its predicted impact on relative factor 
prices around the Atlantic economy from the mid-nineteenth century to World 
War I (O’Rourke, Taylor, and Williamson 1996).
What about trends in inequality more generally? Complete income distribu-
tions are unavailable before World War I, except for a few countries and a few 
benchmark dates. But even if they were available, it is not obvious that we would 
want to rely on them when considering the impact of mass migration. Like econo-
mists involved in debates about more recent distributional experience, our inter-
est is in the structure of factor prices and factor rewards—the size of the average 
income gap between the upper and lower classes. Indeed, if rising inequality was 
explained by more unskilled workers who were all new immigrants, the rising 
inequality would be far less interesting and certainly less dangerous politically. 
But suppose the immigrants also lowered the relative incomes of the poor native-
born with whom new immigrants competed? Inequality trends of this sort are far 
more interesting and have more dangerous political implications.
How, then, did the typical unskilled worker do relative to the average income 
recipient—that is, how did the ratio of the unskilled wage (w) to GDP per worker 
hour (y) trend over time? Changes in the ratio w/y measure changes in the eco-
nomic distance between the working poor near the bottom of the distribution and 
the average-income recipient in the middle of the distribution. When the index is 
normalized by setting w/y equal to 100 in 1870, we get the following: Powerful 
Danish and Swedish equality trends establish the upper bound (the index rises 
from 100 to as high as 154), and powerful Australian and U.S. inequality trends es-
tablish the lower bound (the index falls from 100 to as low as 58). An alternative 
way to standardize these distributional trends is to compute the annual percent-
age change in the index relative to its 1870 base. The per annum rates of change 
range from 0.98 for Sweden to –1.45 for the United States.
This measure of the annual rate of change in inequality is plotted against the 
1870 real wage in Figure 1, and it offers a stunning confirmation of the global-
ization–inequality hypothesis. Between 1870 and 1913, inequality rose dramati-
cally in rich, land-abundant, labor-scarce New World countries like the United 
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States; inequality fell dramatically in poor, land-scarce, labor-abundant, newly 
industrializing countries like Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy. Inequality was 
more stable in European industrial economies like Belgium, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. And inequality was also more stable 
in the poor European economies that failed to play the globalization game, like 
Portugal and Spain.
When Simon Kuznets gave his presidential address to the American Econom-
ic Association in 1955, he hypothesized that inequality should rise in early stages 
of modern development, reach a peak during what we have come to call the 
newly industrialized-country stage, and fall thereafter. Since then, the thesis has 
taken a beating, most recently by a newly constructed late twentieth century da-
tabase (Deininger and Squire 1996). What is surprising about this Kuznets curve 
literature, however, is that it treats a very complex problem so simply. A number 
of forces can drive inequality in the long run: mass migration, trade, demogra-
phy, schooling, and technology. The technological forces Kuznets thought were 
pushing his curve cannot by themselves explain the trends in Figure 1, because 
while inequality should have been on the rise in newly industrializing but poor 
European countries, it was not. And while it should have been on the decline in 
richer, more mature industrial economies, it was not.
It appears likely that globalization was producing those late nineteenth cen-
tury Atlantic economy distribution trends. Furthermore, I think that mass migra-
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SOURCE: Williamson (1997, Figure 6).
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tion was the most important part of that globalization-distribution connection. 
As I already noted, the mass migration significantly influenced labor supplies in 
sending and receiving countries. I also noted that migration’s impact on the labor 
force was highly correlated with initial labor scarcity, causing the biggest reduc-
tions in low-wage emigrating countries and the biggest increases in high-wage 
immigration countries. Figure 2 plots the migration–inequality connection. Where 
immigration had a large positive impact on the labor force, inequality underwent 
a steep rise. Where emigration had a large negative impact on the labor force, 
inequality underwent a steep fall.
Mass migration appears, therefore, to be the leading candidate in accounting 
for the distribution trends we observe in the Atlantic economy. I stress the word 
appears since it is impossible to decompose globalization effects into trade and 
migration, given that the correlation between migration’s impact, trade’s impact, 
and initial labor scarcity is so high. Yet, an effort has been made to finesse this 
problem by constructing a trade-globalization-impact variable as the interaction 
of initial labor scarcity and openness (Williamson 1997). The former is proxied 
by dummies for the labor-scarce New World (d
1
), the labor-abundant European 
periphery (d
2
), and the core European industrial leaders making up the remainder 
of countries. Openness is proxied by trade shares (trade). The per annum rate of 
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change in the equality index, here called e, is explained by (R2 = 0.72, t statistics 
in parentheses):
(1)        e = –52.07 − .31mig + .25trade + .55(d
1 
* trade) + 2.42(d
2 
* trade),
                           (2.56)     (1.00)       (0.36)              (3.38)
where mig stands for the impact of net migration on labor supplies. The impact of 
mass migration is powerful, significant, and of the right sign. When immigration rates 
were big, e was small and inegalitarian trends were strong. When immigration rates 
were small, e was bigger, and thus inegalitarian trends were weaker. And when emi-
gration rates were big, e was even bigger, and thus egalitarian trends were strong.
Around the European periphery, the more-open economies had more egali-
tarian trends (bigger trade implying bigger e, [.25 + 2.42] * trade). It appears that 
the open, industrializing “tigers” of that time enjoyed benign egalitarian trends, 
while those opting for autarky did not. Furthermore, the coefficient 2.42 on 
(d
2 
* trade) passes conventional significance tests. In the European industrial 
core, the effect was far less powerful since the smaller coefficient 0.25 on trade 
does not pass any significance test. It appears that open-economy effects on in-
come distribution were ambiguous among the European industrial leaders with 
moderate initial income levels. In the labor-scarce New World, however, the more 
open economies also had more egalitarian trends ([.25 + .55 ] * trade), which is 
certainly not what Heckscher and Ohlin would have predicted. The result is not 
statistically significant, however.
Overall, I read this evidence as strong support for the impact of mass mi-
gration on distribution trends. The effects were big everywhere in the Atlantic 
economy where the migrations were big. The evidence offers weak support, 
however, for the impact of trade on distribution trends, except around the Eu-
ropean periphery where trade lowered inequality. This econometric exercise ex-
plains about two-thirds of the variance in distributional trends across the late 
nineteenth century.
The globalization–inequality connection in high-wage countries was bro-
ken after 1913. Figure 3 shows the correlation between distributional trends as 
measured by changes in w/y and a 1921 real wage measure of labor scarcity. 
The late nineteenth century inverse correlation has completely disappeared, re-
placed by a positive correlation. In the interwar period of deglobalization, the 
poorer countries experienced sharply increasing inequality while the richer 
countries experienced more moderate increases or, in four cases, egalitarian 
trends. This finding is consistent with both the cessation of the mass migrations 
and with the Stolper–Samuelson theorem: Protection should raise demand for 
the scarce factor, thus improving the position of the unskilled in rich countries 
and contributing to egalitarian trends while eroding the position of the unskilled 
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in poor countries and contributing to inegalitarian trends. Whether it really was 
deglobalization that precipitated this dramatic switch in distribution trends has 
yet to be established with firmer evidence, but there seems to be no doubt about 
the switch itself. The pre-1913 egalitarian trends in Scandinavia and Italy disap-
peared and were replaced by post-1921 inequality trends. The pre-1913 inequal-
ity trends in the New World disappeared and were replaced by post-1921 egali-
tarian trends. This change, seen as a revolutionary leveling at the time, has been 
confirmed by better data since (Goldin and Margo 1992; Goldin and Katz 2001). And 
the relatively stable pre-1913 distribution trends in industrial France and Germany 
were replaced by dramatic post-1921 inequality trends (Piketty and Saez 2003).
A Closer Look at the Impact of Immigrants on High-Wage Labor Markets
The impact of immigrants on labor markets obsessed contemporary Ameri-
can observers. Here we confront two questions as relevant today as when they 
were posed almost a century ago, when the Immigration Commission published 
its 1911 report: Did immigrants crowd out natives and reduce their wages? It ap-
pears they did.
Claudia Goldin (1994) estimates the correlation between immigration and 
wage changes across cities between 1890 and 1915, finding that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the foreign-born share reduced unskilled wage rates by 1 to 1.5 
percent. Another study estimates the impact of immigration on the real (unskilled) 
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SOURCE: Williamson (1997, Figure 9).
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wage by looking at the wage adjustment mechanism from time-series data. By 
altering labor supply and unemployment in the short run, immigration should 
have driven down the wage along some long-run Phillips curve. The long-run 
solution to one such model estimated for 1890–1913 suggests that holding output 
constant, an increase in the labor force of 1 percent lowered the real wage in the 
long run by 0.4 or 0.5 percent (Hatton and Williamson 1998, Table 8.6). Based on 
the stock of foreign-born and their children enumerated in the 1910 census, im-
migration after 1890 accounted for about 12 percent of the 1910 labor force and 
immigration after 1870 accounted for about 27 percent of the 1910 labor force. 
These magnitudes suggest that the real (unskilled) wage would have been 5 to 
6 percent higher in the absence of immigration after 1890 and 11 to 14 percent 
higher in the absence of immigration after 1870.
Both the cross-section and time-series results are consistent with those based 
on computable general-equilibrium models. The first effort to apply a computable 
general-equilibrium model to the late nineteenth century United States estimates 
that immigration after 1870 lowered real wages in 1910 by 11 percent (Williamson 
1974, 387), almost identical to the time-series estimate. A more recent computable 
general-equilibrium experiment gets pretty much the same result: Immigration re-
duced urban real wages in 1910 by 9.2 percent (O’Rourke, Williamson, and Hatton 
1994, 209).
In short, it appears that there were powerful crowding-out forces at work in 
immigrant countries before World War I and that they contributed to the rising 
inequality observed there.
The Impact of Anti-Immigration Policy on the American Labor Force
The United States was the biggest immigrant labor market, so our focus is 
there. Whether due to a switch to restrictive immigration policy, war, the Great 
Depression, or all three in concert, did the labor force and population growth 
rate slow down in the three decades after 1913? If so, how much of the decline 
can be attributed to declining immigration? Only if we can show that a decline in 
immigration contributed to a labor force slowdown can we ask whether it had an 
impact on developments within the U.S. economy. 
Three studies have explored the impact of immigration on U.S. population 
and labor supply in the interwar years, but I believe that all three ask the wrong 
question. Kuznets and Ernest Rubin (1954) adopt a foreign-born measure and 
count net migrants of labor force age but also immigrant children born abroad as 
they reach employment age. Richard Easterlin’s (1968) measure is narrower and 
excludes the impact of immigrant children. More recently, Henry Gemery (1994) 
extends the analysis using the Easterlin measure, the narrow definition that I also 
use in what follows. However, all of these scholars only measure the share of 
the actual labor force or population increase accounted for by immigrants. While 
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such accounting decompositions are useful, they do not assess the impact of the 
demise of mass migration on labor force or population growth. What we want 
instead are estimates of a counterfactual world where the mass migrations con-
tinued. Only then can we identify the role of the demise of mass migration.
Consider first the extent of the labor force slowdown. Table 2 documents 
a dramatic fall in the U.S. labor force growth rate from 2.29 percent per annum 
over the three decades 1880–1910 to 1.14 percent per annum over the three de-
cades 1910–40. This slowing in the rate of labor supply growth amounted to 1.15 
percentage points—a massive regime switch in which the growth rate was cut 
in half. Whether we would find similar large numbers for other, less-adequately 
documented immigrant countries would depend on two factors.
First, which economies were most dependent on immigration prior to the Great 
War? The answer to that question has been reported elsewhere for both sending and 
receiving countries (Hatton and Williamson 2005, Table 6.2). Immigration between 
1870 and 1910 served to raise the 1910 labor force of Argentina by 86 percent, Can-
ada by 44 percent, Australia by 42 percent, and the U.S. by 24 percent. Emigration 
between 1870 and 1910 served to lower the 1910 labor force in Ireland by 45 percent, 
Italy by 39 percent, Norway by 24 percent, and Sweden by 20 percent.
Second, which economies experienced the biggest fall in mass migration? 
With that evidence in hand, we would then predict that the biggest labor force 
slowdown occurred in economies where net migration had the biggest impact 
 Labor force Percentage
 growth rate due to net
 (percent per annum)  immigration
Actuals 
1880–1910. .2.29.. 40.1
1910 –1940.. 1.14.. 11.6








SOURCE: Hatton and Williamson (2005, Table 9.3).
Table 2 
U.S. Labor Force Growth, 1910–40: Some Counterfactuals
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on prewar labor force totals and where across-border net migration underwent 
the biggest decline after 1913. Australia would be one such candidate; indeed, 
the rate of labor force growth in Australia fell by 1.41 percentage points between 
1870–1913 and 1913–38 (Maddison 1994, 266). The other immigrant countries are 
harder to document, but similar magnitudes seem likely.
Next, does the demise of mass migration explain the big slowdown? Table 
2 poses the following counterfactual: What would have been the labor force 
growth rate between 1910 and 1940 had the 1880–1910 immigration experience 
persisted? The counterfactuals are calculated to take account of two forces. First, 
immigration into the U.S. fell after 1910. So, what would have been the impact 
over the 1910–40 period if, on the one hand, the immigration rate had maintained 
the 1880–1910 average thereafter and if, on the other hand, the absolute level 
of immigration had maintained the 1880–1910 average thereafter? The pre-1910 
rate sets an upper bound, while the pre-1910 level sets a lower bound on the 
counterfactual impact. These counterfactuals are reported in the second panel 
of Table 2. Second, the age and sex distribution of the immigrants changed dra-
matically—partly induced by immigration policy—thereby serving to lower the 
labor participation rate of the interwar immigrants. So, what would have been the 
impact on pre-1910 labor force growth if, in addition, the immigrant labor partici-
pation rate had maintained its pre-1910 average thereafter? These counterfactuals 
are reported in the third panel of Table 2.
The bottom line is this. The observed decline in the rate of labor force growth 
between the pre- and post-1910 periods was 1.15 percentage points, but the no-
mass-migration-demise counterfactual decline would have been only 0.47 (2.29 
– 1.82, panel 3) or 0.63 (2.29 – 1.66, panel 2) percentage points. The demise of 
mass migration accounted for 45 to 59 percent of the massive slowdown in U.S. 
labor force growth around World War I, or about half. Since the immigrants were 
more unskilled than the native-born (Hatton and Williamson 2005, Chapters 5 and 
15), it seems likely that the demise of mass migration contributed even more than 
half to any unskilled labor force growth slowdown.
The demise of mass migration wasn’t the only force at work, of course, since 
the crude birthrate in the U.S. also fell, from about 37 per thousand in the 1880s 
to about 18 per thousand in the 1930s. But the demise of immigration accounted 
for about half the changing demographic and labor supply growth events during 
the interwar years when the world went antiglobal.
Rising Schooling Supplies, Falling Immigrant Supplies, 
and the Great Leveling in America
When Paul Samuelson published the sixth edition of his famous Economics 
textbook in 1964, he made the following statement: “After World War I, laws were 
passed severely limiting immigration. Only a trickle of immigrants has been ad-
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mitted since then. … By keeping labor supply down, immigration policy tends to 
keep wages high” (Samuelson 1964, cited in Borjas 2003, 2).
Writing in the same year, Stanley Lebergott, in Manpower in Economic Growth, 
joined Samuelson with this statement about the impact of the immigration quotas: 
“It [is] most unlikely that the rate of productivity advance or the nature of produc-
tivity advance changed so [much in the 1920s] as to explain [the spurt in real wage 
growth]. Instead we find that halting the flow of millions of migrants … offers a 
much more reasonable explanation” (Lebergott 1964, 27).
The economics underlying both statements is straightforward, and it goes 
back to the Dillingham Commission reports in 1911 and before. A glut in the 
labor supply lowers the wage relative to the returns to capital and rents on land. 
Since capital and land are held by those at the top of the distribution pyramid, 
immigration-induced labor supply growth should create more inequality and the 
demise of immigration should create less, ceteris paribus. Since immigrants were 
more unskilled than the native-born, immigration should also have raised the 
premium on skills as they got scarce relative to unskilled labor, and the demise 
of immigration should have reduced the premium on skills as they got relatively 
abundant, ceteris paribus.3
Not everyone has agreed with this traditional argument, mostly because of 
the ceteris paribus: Many other forces were driving the American economy, thus 
offering potential offsets to any measured immigrant glut or scarcity. Potential 
offsets invite debate. For example, Vernon Briggs (1984, 50) thought that the 
premise of the traditional argument was false, since he believed that immigration 
was still substantial in the 1920s and that productivity advance was very differ-
ent in rate and factor-saving bias. Others have argued that immigration generates 
accumulation responses, forces that would mute the immigration impact. I will 
not try to resolve this debate here but only pose the arguments and present an 
impressive and suggestive correlation in the historical time series.
We have already seen that during the mass migrations between 1870 and 
1913, rich labor-scarce countries with big immigration rates underwent rising 
inequality and poor labor-abundant countries with big emigration rates under-
went falling inequality. During the antiglobal and immigrant-restricted interwar 
years 1921–38, the correlation disappeared. Indeed, some previously emigrating 
countries like Italy underwent rising inequality, while some previously immigrat-
ing countries like Australia, Canada, and the United States underwent falling in-
equality. This is only a correlation, of course. Immigration policy may have been 
correlated with some omitted variables, and the omitted variables may have been 
driving this change. Still, the correlation keeps the immigration-breeds-inequality 
hypothesis on the table.
Now consider Figure 4, where I plot the correlation for the U.S. only, but over 
150 years. The figure is taken from a book that was published some time ago 
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(Williamson and Lindert 1980), and the underlying data have been revised many 
times since. Still, those revisions have not overturned the correlation—namely, 
rapid rates of labor force growth in the United States took place during episodes 
when earnings inequality was on the rise and the skill premium was increasing, 
while slow labor force growth rates took place during episodes when earnings 
inequality was decreasing and the skill premium was falling. And note the ob-
servations that are the focus of this section: 1909–29 and 1929–48 in the lower 
left quadrant, where the skill premium was falling and the growth rates of the 
labor force were slow; and 1899–1909 in the upper right quadrant, where the 
skill premium was rising and the labor force growth rates were fast. Correlation 
is not causation, but Figure 4 is certainly consistent with the immigration-breeds-
inequality hypothesis.
The twentieth century evidence on the evolution of U.S. inequality has im-
proved over the past decade or so, and it confirms a great egalitarian leveling in 
American incomes between the first and second thirds of the century (Figure 5). 
The ratio of wages in the top to the bottom 10 percent in manufacturing fell by 
almost a third between 1890 and 1940, a period of labor force slowdown, half 
of which can be attributed to the demise of mass migration. Pay ratios of skilled 
to unskilled labor fell by two-thirds between 1907 and 1952. The ratio of college 
professors’ incomes to those of unskilled workers was cut in half between 1908 
and 1960. Weekly-wage dispersion measures among white men fell by more 
Figure 4
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than a quarter between 1940 and 1965, as did the share of the top 10 percent of 
income earners.
Among the authors contributing to the evidence in Figure 5, Goldin and Law-
rence Katz have made the greatest effort to explain the great leveling (Goldin and 
Margo 1992; Goldin and Katz 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2001), and the relative demand 
and supply of skills is central to their story: “[The] long-run change in the distribu-
tion of earnings is shaped by a race between the demand for skill, driven largely 
by industrial shifts and technological advances, and the supply of skill, altered 
by changes in educational investments, demographics and immigration” (Goldin 
and Katz 2001, 68).
While they are cautious, Goldin and Katz appear to favor the view that an 
exogenous and revolutionary change in the supply of secondary and tertiary 
schooling must have overwhelmed the skill-using bias that characterized twen-
tieth century economic progress. Such schooling forces would, of course, help 
erase the skill premium, compress the wage structure, and level incomes. But 
what about exogenous and revolutionary changes in unskilled labor supplies as-
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earners = income share of the top 10% of earners (Piketty and Saez 2003, Table II). Hatton and Williamson 
(2005, Figure 9.4).
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sociated in large part with the demise of mass migration? These policy-induced 
immigration forces would reinforce the policy-induced schooling forces. As the 
growth of the unskilled labor force slowed down, unskilled labor would have 
become scarcer relative to skilled labor.
If mass migration before the Great War contributed to high and rising in-
equality and skill scarcity in New World host countries, while its absence there 
after the quotas contributed to less equality and the decline in skill scarcity, we 
should see opposite trends in the European sending countries. While both sides 
of the Atlantic may have shared the same technological events and perhaps even 
the same schooling events (see below), the boom and bust in mass migration 
must have left different inequality marks on labor markets on either side of the 
Atlantic. Much more work remains to be done on this issue, but what evidence 
we have at hand seems to be consistent with the hypothesis. Two recent papers 
have documented skilled versus unskilled wage-gap trends for Europe and North 
America between 1870 and 1960, and they show the following.
First, the U.K. skilled-wage premium started falling in 1880, thirty-five years 
before it did in the U.S. and Canada in 1915 (Anderson 2001, 96; Betrán and Pons 
2004, 39). Second, while the skilled-wage premium declined very dramatically 
after 1915 in the U.S. and Canada, it declined only very modestly in the U.K. 
(Anderson 2001, 96; Betrán and Pons 2004, 39). And third, what is true for the 
Anglo–American comparison was also true for those involving Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Anderson 2001, 94; Betrán and Pons 2004, 
39). The mass migration boom and bust appears to be a good candidate to help 
explain the asymmetric inequality trends between Europe and the New World.
A good illustration of how policy-induced immigration forces created greater 
unskilled labor scarcity and lower inequality in the United States is not hard to 
find, and it involves disadvantaged black Americans. Did European immigrants 
crowd out southern blacks from northern jobs that offered much better earnings 
and living standards than did sharecropping in the South? This is an old ques-
tion that until recently was illustrated only by compelling correlations. Thirty-five 
years ago, Brinley Thomas (1972, 130–34, Chapter 18) noted the striking inverse 
correlation between black migration out of the South and European migration 
into northern cities. The problem left unanswered by these correlations, however, 
was causation. William Collins (1997) recently unraveled the issues of causation 
and supplied the answers. While only about a half-million southern blacks left 
for the urban North in the four decades before 1910, seven times that—about 
3.5 million—left in the four decades after 1910. By 1950, about 20 percent of all 
the blacks born in the South lived in the North, while the figure was only a little 
more than 4 percent at the turn of the century (Collins 1997, 607), or only a fifth 
of the 1950 figure. Not only did those who moved improve their economic lives, 
but those who stayed behind gained, too, since the wage gap between North 
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and South declined sharply as the Great Black Migration served to better inte-
grate what had been regionally segmented labor markets (Wright 1986). Collins 
concludes that the mass migrations from Europe did indeed crowd out southern 
blacks from better jobs in the urban North, and, symmetrically, the demise of the 
mass migrations crowded them in. A very large share of the Great Black Migration 
can be explained by the disappearance of new European immigrants in northern 
U.S. cities after 1914. Since the Great Black Migration greatly improved the rela-
tive income position of blacks between 1910 and 1950, it helps account for the 
great leveling of incomes in the middle third of the twentieth century and offers 
one important channel through which exogenous changes in European mass 
migration contributed to the leveling.
Did the Presence of Immigrants Contribute to the Schooling Revolution  
in America?
Consistent with the evidence of the great leveling in the United States in the 
middle third of the twentieth century, Goldin and Katz (1999a, Tables 6 and 7) 
have documented a decline in the returns to schooling from World War I to the 
1960s. For young men, the return to a high school degree fell from 11–12 percent 
in 1914 to 7 percent in 1959, while the return to a college degree fell from about 
15 percent to 9 percent over the same period (Goldin and Katz 2001, Table 2.4). 
How much of this was due to a policy-induced scarcity of unskilled and poorly 
schooled immigrants who lowered the rate of return to schooling by raising the 
opportunity costs of staying in school and out of the labor market? How much of 
it was due, instead, to a schooling glut that lowered those rates? If it was a school-
ing glut, how much of that glut was triggered by exogenous policy changes and 
how much was an endogenous response to the observed skill scarcity created, at 
least in part, by the open immigration policy before 1914?
It is important to stress that the immigrant-scarcity and schooling-glut hypoth-
eses are not competing. Instead, they are mutually supporting. The exogenous 
and endogenous schooling hypotheses also need not be competing, since both 
forces might have been operating. Still, we would like to know which was most 
important.
Goldin and Katz clearly favor the exogenous-schooling hypothesis. There 
is no doubt that secondary school enrollment soared in the United States from 
1910 to 1940, rising from about 14 percent to 71 percent (Goldin 1998; Goldin 
and Katz 2001, 59–60, Figure 2.5), and an increasing number of the graduates 
took white-collar office and factory jobs. More and more high school students 
were using their diplomas in the marketplace, rather than solely as a way to gain 
entrance to college, and secondary schools increased the number of terminal de-
grees granted: “The increase in high school enrollments and graduation served to 
flood the market with literate and numerate workers whose skills enabled them 
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to move into white-collar office jobs. It also increased the supply of those capable 
of filling blue-collar positions that required the reading of manuals, deciphering 
of blue-prints, computing of formulae, and use of elementary science” (Goldin 
and Katz 2001, 61).
Moreover, “‘mass’ secondary school education was unique to the United 
States at that time. Most European countries did not have mass non-vocational, 
non-industrial secondary school education that was fully publicly funded until the 
post-World War II era” (Goldin and Katz 1999a, 15).
 But why did the U.S. high school movement begin around 1900 or 1910? 
Why not later, as was true of Europe? We may agree that the schooling supply re-
sponse helped erase schooling scarcity and inequality in America, but surely pre-
vious schooling scarcity played a role in triggering that supply response. Goldin 
and Katz think not and believe instead that it was the relative cultural and wealth 
homogeneity of the early twentieth century that explains the timing and location 
of the schooling boom. For them, the key was social and economic egalitarianism 
in America that supported the belief in externalities—especially in New England 
and the West, where the high school movement led the nation. Perhaps, but some 
part of the schooling boom must have been an endogenous response to the large 
skill premium, schooling scarcity, and a high return to education in the late nine-
teenth century, when mass migration reached its crescendo. 
The issue has not been resolved, but Rodney Ramcharan (2002) has offered 
some evidence supporting the schooling-endogeneity hypothesis, although his 
evidence also offers some support for the alternative offered by Goldin and Katz. 
Ramcharan’s results are reassuring for those, like me, who believe that schooling 
endogeneity and exogeneity forces were both at work.
Needless to say, the payoff to future research on the schooling-endogene-
ity hypothesis will be great, since it speaks to modern brain drain debates and 
whether and how human capital formation responds to mass migration in host 
and source country.
Brain Drain and Schooling Responses in Europe
Was There a European Brain Drain?
Fearing brain drain, there were legal restrictions in the eighteenth century on 
the emigration of artisans and engineers from Britain to the European continent. 
But public concerns about losing vital skills through emigration seem to have 
vanished by the late nineteenth century. There may have been good reasons for 
this. First, where positive selection was weak, it would not have made a major 
dent in the per capita skill base at home. Second, much of the human capital 
embodied in the emigrants who disappeared across the Atlantic had not been 
23 Inequality and Schooling Responses to Globalization Forces
financed by the public purse. Third, immigrant remittances from abroad may have 
offset the forgone income at home.
So was there a big brain drain from Europe during the age of mass migration? 
While there certainly was some within-country positive selection, it probably did 
not translate into big brain drains. Table 3 shows literacy rates (in any language) 
for five European countries among adult immigrants to the United States between 
1899 and 1909, as well as the literacy rates of the adult home populations in 
1901 (those who stayed behind). Literacy rates among immigrants were generally 
higher than they were among the source populations, implying positive selection. 
Perhaps this was inevitable: Immigrants were younger adults than the source 
adult populations, and, as I discuss below, there was a schooling revolution tak-
ing place in late nineteenth century Europe, raising literacy among the young 
movers compared with the old stayers (Easterlin 1981). Italy may appear to be an 
exception to this rule, but the observed lower literacy among immigrants relative 
to the Italian population simply reflects the dominance of poor southern Italians 
in the immigrant inflow.4 The third row of Table 3 reports the outflow of literate 
emigrants (over the decade) as a proportion of literate adults in the 1901 source 
population. For Britain and France, the decade’s loss to the United States was 
small in relation to the stock, less than 2 percent. It was larger for Italy because of 
its higher emigration rates. Spain’s and Portugal’s out-migration numbers would 
be higher if the flows to South America were included. But even then, the totals 
would be small.
Even if the human capital losses were small for Europe when measured in 
terms of education and literacy, they may have been larger in terms of unobserv-
able “best and brightest” characteristics. One piece of evidence supporting this 
view comes from Swedish clergymen’s evaluations of the intellectual abilities of 
their parishioners. Comparison of those who subsequently emigrated with those 
Table 3 
Literacy in Europe and the Brain Drain
 France Britain Italy Spain Portugal
.
Literacy.rate.of.adult.immigrants.to.the.
U.S..1899–1909.(percent). 94.6. 99.0. 47.0. 85.4. 31.8
Literacy.rate,.adult.stayers,.1901.(percent). 83. 97. 52. 44. 22
Literacy.loss.(outflow.of.literates.as.a.
percentage.of.literate.stayers). .4. 1.6. 8.6. .6. 2.0
School.enrollment.as.a.percentage.of.
literate.adult.stayers,.1901. 25.9. 23.4. 24.2. 31.3. 29.5
 
SOURCE: Hatton and Williamson (2005, Table 5.3, 93).
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who did not reveals that the former had a higher intellectual level, did better at 
school, and had a wider view of the world (Hvidt 1975, 109). On these grounds, 
one might have expected that immigrants to the New World were more likely than 
the native-born to become entrepreneurs and business leaders. Consistent with 
that prediction, it turns out that among those born between 1816 and 1850, im-
migrants were overrepresented among the top businessmen in the United States 
(Ferrie and Mokyr 1994). This evidence of positive selection and brain drain was 
much less apparent among those born between 1850 and 1890, reflecting the 
declining quality of U.S. immigrants as origin countries shifted. 
Were There Schooling Responses in Europe?
If a supply glut of poorly schooled and poorly skilled immigrants helped 
raise the relative scarcity of skills in the United States before the quotas and thus 
helped create a high school revolution in America, why wouldn’t the same skill 
scarcity encourage schooling at home in Europe, at least at the primary level?
The 1917 Literacy Act imposed a literacy test that was precisely the mode 
of restriction Congress had debated since 1895. The idea was that the literacy 
requirement would ensure a rise in the quality of immigrants, a change in their 
source (favoring more advanced Western Europe), and a reduction in their num-
bers (Hatton and Williamson 2005, Chapter 8). Congress was to be disappointed. 
The literacy test (in English or some other language) proved ineffective in stem-
ming the inflow at the end of the Great War, mainly because a revolution in the 
provision of free and public elementary education had spread east and south to 
backward and illiterate Europe from the 1880s onwards (Easterlin 1981; Lindert 
2003). 
As one of the biggest immigrant sources by 1910, Italy illustrates the Euro-
pean schooling revolution well. Between 1881 and 1931, Italian regional literacy 
rates soared, from less than 20 percent to more than 60 percent in southern Italy, 
Sicily, and Sardinia; from less than 35 percent to almost 80 percent in central Italy; 
from about 40 percent to about 85 percent in Venice and Emilia; and from almost 
60 percent to more than 95 percent in the northern industrial triangle (Kirk 1946, 
183–85). The literacy rate for Italy as a whole was about 80 percent by 1931. Of 
course, the rate for young adults is much more relevant for any prediction regard-
ing the effectiveness of the 1917 Literacy Act, because these were the individu-
als most responsive to labor market signals. The literacy rate in poor European 
source countries (including Italy) for those aged 15 to 29 ranged from 80 to 83 
percent in 1931 (Kirk 1946, Table 12, 189). No wonder the literacy criteria failed 
to effectively bar immigrants from poor European countries.
Just as it might be doubted that the U.S. high school revolution was exog-
enous to labor market skill scarcity, it might also be doubted that the European 
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literacy revolution was exogenous to labor market demands, both being driven 
in part by mass migration.
Comparative Economic History and the Present
The first global century before 1914 had profound effects on both low-wage, 
labor-abundant Europe and the high-wage, labor-scarce New World. Trade and 
especially mass migration contributed to a reduction in unskilled labor scarcity in 
the New World and to a rise in unskilled labor scarcity in Europe. Thus, global-
ization contributed to rising inequality in the United States and falling inequality 
in most of Europe. Falling unskilled labor scarcity in the U.S. meant rising skill 
scarcity, which contributed to the high school revolution there. Rising unskilled 
scarcity in Europe also contributed to the primary schooling and literacy revolu-
tion there.
Under what conditions would we expect the same responses to globalization 
in today’s world? The magnitude of the migrations matters. The skill-selectivity of 
the migrations matters. And the governmental response to market signals matters. 
It seems to me that we would gain considerable insight into the inequality and 
schooling responses to modern globalization forces by doing serious comparative 
analysis, and that analysis should include history.
Notes
This paper draws from a recent book with Timothy J. Hatton, Global Migration and the World Econ-
omy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance (MIT Press, 2005). It has also been influenced by 
participants’ comments at the Center for Global Development Workshop on Emigration’s Impact 
on the Third World (September 11, 2006).
1 Other surveys can be found in O’Rourke and Williamson (1999); Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson 
(2003); Williamson (2006); and Hatton and Williamson (2005).
2 The modern economist may find it odd to discuss changing distribution without referencing the 
wages of skilled workers, while stressing land rents. Yet land and labor were the dominant fac-
tors of production a century ago, not skills and capital, as is true today.
3 The premium on U.S. skills relative to the unskilled was 53 percent in 1890, greater than Great 
Britain (33 percent) and Germany (35 percent), and much greater than the poorer parts of 
Europe (Hatton and Williamson 2005, Table 5.2, 90).
4 Among the northern Italian immigrants to the U.S. in 1899–1909, 88 percent were literate, 
whereas only 46 percent of southern Italian immigrants were literate (Hatton and Williamson 
2005, 407).
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Trade, Migration, and 
Economic Development: 
The Risks and Rewards 
of Openness
James.F..Hollifield.
From the founding of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1944 through the conclusion of the last round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) talks in the 1990s, the postwar 
international order has been marked by multilateralism and the building of liberal 
regimes for trade and finance. These regimes have reduced the risks of openness 
for national economies and stimulated international exchange across the board. Like 
portfolio and foreign direct investment and trade, international migration increased 
dramatically in the postwar period. Yet, with the notable exception of refugees, 
no liberal regime for migration has emerged. Why has migration continued at such 
high levels in the absence of a regime and in the face of cyclical downturns, and 
why have states been willing to risk openness to migration?
Economists have long argued that exposure to trade leads to increased com-
petition and efficiency, resulting in greater specialization in production and a 
wider and cheaper range of goods available to consumers. Likewise, mobility of 
productive factors (labor and capital) and the reduction of transaction costs are 
seen as essential to the smooth functioning of markets. In the case of trade, the 
GATT/WTO regime was constructed through a multilateral process, with most 
favored nation status (MFN), nondiscrimination, and reciprocity as the organizing 
principles. In the case of international finance, exchange rate stability has been 
pursued unilaterally by the U.S. during the early Bretton Woods period and mul-
tilaterally through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Both 
institutions have worked to solve problems of liquidity and adjustment as they 
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arise. In each case, the international community seems to have accepted these 
goals/goods as indivisible, and herculean political efforts have been made to 
maintain openness and solve free-rider problems.
Even though similar economic efficiency arguments can be made in favor 
of international migration, no liberal regime for migration has emerged. States 
are reluctant to expose their economies and societies to exogenous, competitive 
pressures, more so in the area of migration than in the areas of trade and finance. 
It is only at certain points in time and under certain political-economic conditions 
that states have been willing to risk openness to migration. How can we explain 
the opening and closing over time, and does openness to migration covary with 
openness to trade and investment? Is international migration simply a function of 
the ongoing globalization of economies and societies, or is it linked to changes 
in international and domestic politics?
This paper argues that openness to migration is heavily dependent upon (1) 
ideational and institutional factors, especially the willingness of states to guar-
antee a minimum basket of rights for migrants; (2) domestic political coalitions 
and alignments that are driven in part by factor proportions and intensities; and 
(3) the structure of the international system, including the presence or absence 
of international regimes. In contrast to transnational or globalization arguments 
about the weakening of state sovereignty, this paper offers evidence in support of 
a neoliberal argument that stresses the role of institutions and rights, but without 
abandoning the central precepts of realist theory. Realist theory asserts that states 
are unitary rational actors and will pursue their interests within the confines of an 
international system structured by anarchy and distribution of power. Finally, the 
paper proposes a model of strategic interaction to specify the conditions under 
which (developed and developing) states will risk migration.
Regulating Trade and Migration
The first rule of political economy is that markets do not and cannot exist in 
the absence of regulation. This is true at the national as well as the international 
level. But intervention to establish and maintain markets for goods, services, capi-
tal, and labor is more complicated at the international level because no central 
authority exists to guarantee contracts, ensure exchange rate stability, maintain 
free trade, and protect the rights of migrants. Kindleberger (1973) was one of the 
first to point out the importance of having a leader in the international economy 
willing to shoulder responsibility for establishing and maintaining a free-trading 
system.1 
Another difficulty of sustaining international markets arises from the collective-
action problem of finding a basis for cooperation in a dynamic international system. 
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With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the decline of American hegemony 
in the 1970s, and the Cold War in the 1990s, multilateralism has replaced reliance on 
American political and economic power as the cornerstone of the international politi-
cal economy.2 As Rogowski (1989) and others (Milner 1997) have demonstrated, eco-
nomic openness can have a dramatic effect on domestic political alignments, making 
it difficult to maintain support for trade even in the most outward-looking states, 
including Great Britain in the nineteenth century (Pax Britannica) and the U.S. in the 
post–World War II period (Pax Americana). In some respects, migration carries even 
greater risks (of political and social instability), especially for receiving societies.
Powerful liberal states have found ways to overcome these hurdles, primarily 
through multilateralism and the building of international institutions that help to 
lock even the most protectionist states into a more open world economy. Con-
stant political battles are fought to prevent and defeat isolationist and protectionist 
coalitions. Why do states and their political leaders do this? Simply put, because 
they recognize the enormous advantages of trade and open investment regimes. 
In the 1990s, many recalcitrant Third World states jumped on the free trade band-
wagon (the so-called Washington consensus), despite the tremendous asymmetry 
in the world economy between developed and developing economies.
But if the logic of trade and finance is one of openness, the logic of migration 
tends to be one of closure, especially for the receiving societies. From a political 
standpoint, migration is the mirror image of trade and finance. The wealthier 
states push hard to keep the lines of trade and investment open, while the poorer 
states are more skeptical, fearing dependency. With migration, it is the opposite: 
By and large, the wealthier states push hard to keep foreigners out, usually for 
reasons of national security or identity, whereas many poorer states want to ex-
port people, to reap the benefit of remittances and return migration or simply 
maintain a social safety valve. 
Yet from a historical and economic standpoint, it is exceedingly difficult to 
separate trade and capital flows from migration. Historically, the movement of 
goods, services, and capital increasingly is highly correlated with the movement 
of labor, both skilled and unskilled. Conventional economic wisdom (Heckscher–
Ohlin and Stolper–Samuelson) has it that in the long run, trade can substitute for 
migration through a process of factor price equalization.3 But in the short run, 
empirical studies demonstrate that trade leads to increased migration, especially 
when disparities in wages and incomes are very high, as they are between the 
U.S. and Mexico (P. Martin 1995). Although paradoxical, the reasons for this are 
simple: When backward economies are exposed to strong exogenous competitive 
pressures, the agricultural sector can collapse, leading to a rural exodus, swelling 
the population of cities, and increasing pressures to emigrate. Likewise, increased 
trade in services leads to high-end migration because technical and professional 
staff are integral parts of the service. The relationship between trade and migra-
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tion is, in fact, very complex, and restrictions on one can lead to increased pres-
sure on the other.
Sorting out winners and losers is at least as complicated in the case of migra-
tion as in the case of trade. We can start from the basic premise that migration 
is heavily dependent on factor proportions and intensities and that groups will 
support or oppose migration depending upon whether they represent scarce or 
abundant factors. This is the political corollary of economic push–pull arguments, 
which hold that cross-border movements of people have a strong economic di-
mension and that such movements are basically a function of demand-pull and 
supply-push factors.4 There is little doubt that people move in search of better 
opportunities—however defined—and the existence of markets and information 
or kinship networks is a necessary condition for migration to occur. But the suf-
ficient conditions for migration are political. States must be willing to open their 
borders for exit and entry, and such openness is not simply a function of interest-
group politics or cost–benefit analyses. Ideas and institutions play a crucial role 
in determining openness or closure.
Since 1945, there has been a continuous increase in the world migrant pop-
ulation, both in developed and developing countries and across regions. This 
increase parallels similar increases in the volume of world trade and foreign 
investment, despite the absence of an international migration regime. 5 It would 
be tempting to conclude, as many sociologists and anthropologists have, that 
migration is simply a part of the inexorable process of the globalization of societ-
ies and cultures and states have little control over these movements of people.6 
The corollary of this globalization thesis is that migration will continue as long 
as there are imbalances in the international economy or until the process of 
factor price equalization is complete. But I argue that such a conclusion is not 
only simplistic and premature but wrong. We must look more closely at political 
factors that govern international migration, mindful that economic pressures for 
migration (demand-pull and supply-push) are strong and will remain so for the 
foreseeable future. To understand how politics affects the willingness of states 
to risk migration, I review several arguments for openness and closure, drawn 
from international relations theory, to develop a typology of international politi-
cal economy that will help us understand the conditions under which states can 
cooperate to manage migration.
Realism and National Security Arguments
The most venerable theory of international relations is political realism. Keo-
hane (1986, 7) succinctly summarizes the assumptions of this theory as follows: 
“(1) states… are the key units of action, (2) they seek power, either as an end in 
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itself or as a means to other ends, and (3) they behave in ways that are, by and 
large, rational and, therefore, comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms.” At 
first blush, political realism would seem to tell us little about international migra-
tion other than the fact that states are sovereign, power-seeking units that act in 
their own self-interest. As such, one would expect states to protect their sover-
eignty and maximize their power by opening or closing their borders when it is 
in the national interest to do so. But this argument is not only dangerously close 
to being a tautology, it begs the question of why states at certain points in time 
open or close their borders. 
As is often the case with such pure realist arguments, we are thrown back 
onto an ad hoc analysis of state rationality, seeking to determine, for example, 
when it is in a state’s national interest to open its borders and when it is not, or 
whether out- or in-migration will enhance the state’s power and contribute to its 
national security. Neorealist theory, which builds upon the basic assumptions of 
political realism, may offer us more insight into why states open and close their 
borders. Waltz (1979) places great emphasis on the systemic nature of interna-
tional politics and the fact that the system is structured by anarchy. State behavior 
is conditioned by the distribution of power within this anarchic system. States, 
according to Waltz, are caught in an inescapable security dilemma. Any policy 
that touches upon national security must be made in response to the structure of 
the international system if a state is to survive in a world characterized by anarchy 
and the “war of all against all.” Using this perspective as a starting point, we must 
ask ourselves (1) whether or not international migration has a national security 
dimension and (2) to what extent migration and migration policy are determined 
by the structure of the international system.
The second question may be easier to answer than the first because in the 
twentieth century, we have seen massive shifts in the structure of the international 
system that have included the end of World War II, which ushered in a new era 
(1945–) of globalization (increased international exchange), and the end of the 
Cold War (1989–90), which marked a return to a more multipolar world, albeit 
one characterized by U.S. dominance. If Waltz is correct, such dramatic shifts in 
the system’s structure should have an impact on the willingness of states to risk 
openness.
What hypotheses can we derive from this theory? The intense rivalry between 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. divided the world into two competing camps: communist 
and noncommunist. One result of this struggle was to create great incentives 
for cooperation among the Western democracies, institutionalizing openness to 
trade, finance, and migration. The abrupt end of the Cold War removed this 
geostrategic incentive for cooperation and has made it more difficult (in political 
terms) to sustain policies of openness.
Prior to the end of the Cold War, Western democracies, led by the U.S., con-
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structed a liberal regime for refugees built on the 1950 Geneva Convention and 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The principles of 
this regime are well known. They are (1) asylum (based on a well-founded fear 
of persecution), (2) nonrefoulement, (3) protection, (4) nondiscrimination, (5) 
international cooperation, and (6) a commitment to search for solutions to the 
problem of refugees. Arguably, this regime was created in response to the horrors 
of World War II, which left millions of refugees and displaced persons scattered 
throughout Europe. But it was also a construct of the Cold War, designed in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s to facilitate the flight of individuals from communist 
regimes. 7 From roughly 1950 to 1990, much of the openness of liberal democra-
cies to migration can be attributed to the bipolar structure of the international 
system. Liberal states in particular felt compelled to cooperate in the building and 
maintenance of the refugee regime. The creation of the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM) also was a by-product of this policy.
Following the realist logic, we would expect liberal states to back away from 
some of their more liberal commitments, especially in the area of human rights 
and asylum but also trade and migration. Certainly, there is evidence in the 1990s 
that the commitment of liberal states to the refugee regime, if not to international 
labor migration, weakened. The Schengen Agreement in Europe suspended non-
refoulement for asylum seekers who passed through a “safe” third country. The 
1993 amendment of Article 16 of the German Basic Law/Constitution eliminated 
the blanket right to asylum in that country. The 1996 immigration reforms in the 
United States restricted due process and equal protection for asylum seekers, and 
the special status of Cuban refugees under American law has been attenuated. 
All of these changes indicate that liberal states are adjusting to new geopolitical 
realities and attempting to restrict migration from formerly communist states. It is 
no longer in the strategic interest of liberal states to promote refugee migration, 
but levels of labor migration continued to rise throughout the 1990s and into the 
twenty-first century. 
If we return to the more difficult question of whether migration can be de-
fined as a national security issue, we quickly run into the limitations of realist and 
neorealist arguments. Perhaps the most eloquent argument in favor of treating 
migration as a national security issue has been made by Weiner (1995), who con-
tends that migration can destabilize societies and regimes, especially in weaker 
Third World states but also in the more advanced industrial democracies. Third 
World states are particularly vulnerable because their legitimacy may already be 
precarious and they do not have the political or economic capacity to absorb 
large numbers of immigrants in short periods of time. Of the 191 million interna-
tional migrants in 2005, 61 million, or 32 percent, were in the southern (or less 
developed) countries where state capacity for managing migration is weakest. 
The refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region of central Africa in the mid-1990s 
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resulted in the destabilization of the Mobutu regime in Zaire, demonstrating how 
threatening such massive refugee flows (in this case, Hutus fleeing Rwanda) can 
be for some states. 
Weiner extends his national security argument to the advanced industrial 
democracies by pointing out that the fear of immigration among native popula-
tions should not be dismissed as merely irrational or xenophobic. Immigration, 
he contends, threatens many groups and individuals in these countries, whether 
on economic grounds (foreigners take jobs from natives) or cultural grounds 
(foreigners threaten the political and cultural cohesion of society and the nation). 
It is accurate to say that more international migration is happening in the devel-
oped countries of the north; 62 million, or 32 percent, of migrants in 2005 moved 
from south to north, and 53 million, or 28 percent, moved within the Northern 
Hemisphere from one developed country to another. The numbers alone may 
contribute to xenophobia and nativism.
From Weiner’s national security perspective, immigration can lead to crises of 
absorption wherein societies can be further divided and destabilized. He cites the 
example of racist violence in the newly unified Germany as an example of the 
dangers of too much migration in too short a time. Looking at the U.S., Schlesinger 
(1992) and Huntington (1996, 2004) echo Weiner’s concern for the solidarity and 
stability of Western democracies when faced with large waves of immigration.8 
In addition to this “cultural threat,” migration raises concerns about terrorism and 
drug trafficking as well as environmental degradation that may result from over-
population. Each of these threats can and has been used by politicians in Western 
democracies as a justification for restricting international migration. 
Some human capital arguments reflect the same national security logic, 
namely a concern for the power, wealth, and sovereignty of the nation-state. A 
classic example is found in the work of Borjas (1990), who poses the question 
succinctly in the title of his best-known book, Friends or Strangers? His argument 
is that immigration policy should be driven by national economic interests, and 
these should determine whether migrants are friends or strangers. As an econo-
mist, Borjas uses a strict cost–benefit calculus to determine if migrants have the 
requisite skills (human capital) needed by the national economy. He goes on to 
argue that the American economy no longer needs a large pool of unskilled and 
uneducated (largely Mexican) immigrants, and every effort should be made to re-
strict the entry of this group. The argument suggests that waves of low-skilled im-
migration will contribute to inequalities in American society and further weaken 
the national economy. The realist element in this type of economic reasoning is 
not as clear as in Weiner’s political formulation. If we adopt a strictly cost–benefit 
rationale, the interests involved in making immigration policy begin to look more 
like they belong in the realm of low rather than high politics, and it becomes 
increasingly difficult to make a national security argument for restriction.
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For every economist like Borjas who argues against immigration, we can 
find another, like the late Julian Simon (1989), who argues in favor of increased 
immigration. Like any public policy in a democracy, immigration policy is to a 
large extent interest-driven. A political scientist, Freeman (1995), has constructed 
a rational-choice/pluralist framework for explaining the difficulties liberal democ-
racies encounter in their attempts to restrict immigration. He argues that even 
though it may be in the national interest to restrict low-skilled immigration, this 
has been difficult because powerful business interests, ethnic lobbies, intellectu-
als, and others have captured the state, making it virtually impossible for govern-
ments to carry out what is (in his view) clearly in the interest of the nation and 
society as a whole and what is demanded by the electorate and public opinion.
All of these interest-based arguments (Borjas, Simon, and Freeman) point 
to the difficulties of reducing migration to a national security issue. They also 
indicate the extent to which national security itself is a social construct. From 
the “constructivist” perspective, the interests and identities of states are heavily 
influenced by a range of sociological factors and are constructed by the actors 
involved.9 They are not—as realists would have us believe—purely a function 
of international systemic or structural factors such as the distribution of power 
within the system. This would be twice as true for international migration as it 
would be for trade and finance because migration involves the movement of 
animate rather than inanimate commodities. People are not shirts. Unlike goods 
and capital, people/foreigners have the potential to immediately and radically 
transform the culture and politics of societies in which they arrive.10
Hence, as Weiner has pointed out, migration can threaten the national secu-
rity (and identity) of the nation-state. It is, therefore, not surprising that political 
debates over defining the national interest with respect to migration can be in-
tense and emotional. But, no matter how hard we try in liberal democracies, it is 
impossible to remove cultural and social factors completely from these debates 
or reduce the terms of the debate to a cost–benefit calculation. As Weber (1947, 
158) and Lévi-Strauss (1966) remind us, all actions are not strictly economic or in-
strumental. Subjective and normative elements figure heavily in the construction 
of interests and national security.
Does this mean we can dispense with realist perspectives on international 
migration? I argue that we cannot, for two reasons. First, we must recognize the 
constraints structural factors impose upon states in their formulation of migration 
policies and their willingness to allow entry or exit. Migration policies are inex-
tricably linked with foreign policies and (from the perspective of weaker states in 
the south) with strategies for economic development. The end of the Cold War 
and its impact on the international refugee regime is a case in point. Formerly 
communist states of the East stopped restricting exit, which compelled liberal 
democratic states in the West to impose new restrictions on entry. Second, we 
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must recognize the primacy of sovereignty in international relations. With few ex-
ceptions, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereignty and noninterference 
in the internal affairs of other states have been the central organizing principles 
of international relations—principles that are codified in international law. States 
have a sovereign right to prohibit the entry or exit of non-nationals into or from 
their territories. Even asylum seekers, covered by the Geneva Convention, have 
no right to enter and reside in the territory of signatory states. Under the conven-
tion, states are obliged to give asylum seekers a fair hearing and to abide by the 
principle of nonrefoulement; they are not required to admit asylum seekers to 
their sovereign territory. Realism remains the rule, not the exception, in interna-
tional relations.
The Globalization Thesis
The globalization thesis stems largely from works in economic sociology 
and the sociology of international relations, although some economists subscribe 
to it.11 Globalization arguments stand at the other extreme from realism, which 
stresses the role of the nation-state as the primary decisionmaking unit in in-
ternational relations. The globalization thesis comes in a variety of shapes and 
sizes, but all versions share a common assumption: The regulatory power (and 
sovereignty) of the national state has been weakened by transnational, social, 
and economic forces ranging from the internationalization of capital to the rise 
of transnational communities to the increasing importance of human rights in 
international relations. The nation-state is no longer the sole, legitimate actor in 
international relations, if it ever was. Rather, the tables have been turned against 
the state, which is unable to control either transnational corporations—especially 
banks that move vast sums of capital around the globe—or migrants who move 
in search of employment opportunities. The internationalization of capital, we are 
told, has provoked a radical restructuring of production as national economies 
move up (or down) the international product cycle. Production itself has been 
decentralized with the rise of new centers of power and wealth, which Sassen 
(1991, 22; 1996) dubbed “the global city.”
According to Sassen and others, the rise of transnational economies has re-
sulted in the creation of transnational communities as workers are forced to move 
from one state to another in search of employment, often leaving family members 
behind. Such communities can be found at both the high and low end of the la-
bor market as individuals move with more or less ease from one national society 
to another. A great deal of research has been done to document this practice 
among Mexican immigrants to the United States. Massey was one of the first to 
point out the importance of transnational social networks in linking communi-
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ties in the country of origin to those in the country of destination. These kinship 
and informational networks helped instill confidence in potential migrants, thus 
raising their propensity to migrate and, in effect, lowering transaction costs for in-
ternational migration.12 Portes (1997; Portes and Bach 1985) argues that migrants 
have learned to use this “transnational space” as a way to get around national 
regulatory obstacles to their social mobility. He goes on to point out that changes 
in Mexican law to permit dual nationality may reinforce this type of behavior, 
leading to ever larger transnational communities.
The decline in transaction costs and the ease of communication and transpor-
tation have combined to render national migration policies obsolete. Indeed, the 
entire regulatory framework of the state with respect to labor and business has 
been shaken by the process of globalization.
To compete in the new international marketplace, business and governments 
in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
have been forced to deregulate and liberalize labor and capital markets, whereas 
less developed states have been thrown into debt crises, leading to painful poli-
cies of structural adjustment that, in turn, have caused more migration from poor 
to rich states.13 A case in point is the Mexican financial crisis in the mid-1990s 
that led to the devaluation of the peso and a surge in emigration to the United 
States in the latter part of the decade (U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 
1997). Likewise, developing states such as Mexico and the Philippines are forced 
to rely increasingly on migrants as a source of foreign exchange. The remittances 
that migrants send home are a source of hard cash for countries across the Third 
World, from Latin America to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. In the globaliza-
tion framework, migration, like trade, leads only to growing inequalities and 
dependence within and between countries of the south. 
Politics and the state have been factored out of international relations in 
these types of globalization arguments, most of which are inspired by world-sys-
tems theory (Wallerstein 1974). Following on this apolitical logic, both trade and 
migration—which are closely linked—are largely a function of changes in the 
international division of labor. States at best play only a marginal role in determin-
ing economic and social outcomes. The prime agents of globalization are trans-
national corporations and transnational communities, if not individual migrants 
themselves.14 If states have such a minor role, any discussion of national interests, 
national security, sovereignty, or even citizenship would seem to be beside the 
point. But at least one group of sociologists has tried to bring politics and law, if 
not the state, back into the picture. 
Works by Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1996) focus on the evolution of rights 
for immigrants and foreigners. Both authors posit the rise of a kind of postnation-
al regime for human rights wherein migrants are able to attain a legal status that 
is outside the bounds of national citizenship. Jacobson, more than Soysal, argues 
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that individual migrants have achieved an international legal personality by virtue 
of various human rights conventions, and both authors view these developments 
as presenting a distinctive challenge to traditional definitions of sovereignty and 
citizenship. But Soysal in particular is careful not to use the terms postnational 
citizenship or transnational citizenship, opting instead for the expression postna-
tional membership. Wrestling with the contradictory nature of her argument, Soysal 
writes: “Incongruously, inasmuch as the ascription and codification of rights move 
beyond national frames of reference, postnational rights remain organized at the 
national level ... the exercise of universalistic rights is tied to specific states and their 
institutions.” 
Another sociologist, Bauböck (1994) is less circumspect. He argues simply 
that, given the dynamics of economic globalization, a new transnational/political 
citizenship is necessary and inevitable. Bauböck draws on political and moral 
philosophy, especially Kant, in making his argument in favor of transnational 
citizenship. Like Soysal, he relies heavily on the recent history of international 
migration in Europe and the experience of the European Community/Union to 
demonstrate that migration has accompanied the process of economic growth 
and integration in Europe and that these migrants, many of whom were guest 
workers, have achieved a rather unique status as transnational citizens. What all 
three of these authors (Soysal, Jacobson, and Bauböck) attempt to do is give 
some type of political and legal content to world-systems and globalization ar-
guments. But like Sassen, they see the nation-state as essentially outmoded and 
incapable of keeping pace with changes in the world economy.
What do these theories tell us about migration policy (the opening and clos-
ing of societies) and the willingness of states to risk migration? At first blush, they 
would seem to account rather well for the rise in migration. Even though the glo-
balization arguments are neo-Marxist in orientation, they share many assumptions 
with conventional, neoclassical (push–pull) theories of migration. 
The first and most obvious assumption is that migration is caused primarily 
by dualities in the international economy. As long as these dualities persist, there 
will be pressures for individuals to move across national boundaries in search of 
better opportunities. But whereas many neoclassical economists (like Simon) see 
this as pareto optimal—creating a rising tide that will lift all boats—globalization 
theorists (like Sassen, Piore, and Portes) view migration as further exacerbating 
dualities both in the international economy and in national labor markets. This 
variant of the globalization thesis is very close to the old Marxist argument that 
capitalism needs an industrial reserve army to surmount periodic crises in the 
process of accumulation.15 As migration networks become more sophisticated 
and transnational communities grow in scope and complexity, migration should 
continue to increase, barring some unforeseen and dramatic fall in the demand 
for immigrant labor. Even then, some globalization theorists like Cornelius (1998) 
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would argue that the demand for foreign labor is “structurally embedded” in the 
more advanced industrial societies, which cannot function without access to a 
cheap and pliable foreign workforce.
The second (crucial) assumption that globalization theorists share with neo-
classical economists is the relatively marginal role of the state in governing and 
structuring international migration. States can act to distort or delay the develop-
ment of international markets (for goods, services, capital, and labor), but they 
cannot stop it. With respect to migration, national regulatory regimes and munici-
pal law in general simply must accommodate the development of international 
markets for skilled and unskilled workers. To talk about the opening and closing 
of societies is simply a nonstarter in a “global village” where the world is flat 
(Friedman 2006). Likewise, citizenship and rights can no longer be understood 
in their traditional national contexts. If we take the example of postwar West 
Germany, nationality and citizenship laws date from 1913, and until the reforms 
of 1999/2000, these laws retained kinship, or blood (jus sanguinis), as the prin-
cipal criterion for naturalization.16 But this very restrictionist citizenship regime 
did not prevent Germany from becoming the largest immigration country in Eu-
rope. Globalization theorists like Sassen, Portes, and Soysal explain this anomaly 
by pointing to the structural demand for foreign labor in advanced industrial 
societies, the growth of networks and transnational communities, and the rise 
of postnational membership. Postnational membership is closely tied to human 
rights regimes—what Soysal calls universal personhood. National citizenship and 
regulatory regimes would seem to explain little about the variation in migration 
flows or the openness (or closure) of German society.
A more fully developed critique of these arguments is provided in the con-
clusion. But what can we retain at this point from globalization, as opposed to 
realist, arguments? The biggest shortcoming of the globalization thesis—in con-
trast to realism—is the weakness or, in some cases, the absence of any political 
explanation for migration. The locus of power and change is in society and the 
economy. There is no place for the state in this theoretical framework. Almost 
everything is socially and economically determined. The next section reviews 
neoliberal arguments, which combine economic and political theories to explain 
why states are willing to risk free trade.
Neoliberalism and International Regimes
Neoliberal arguments, often referred to among international relations theo-
rists as liberal institutionalism, are heavily rationalist and have some things in 
common with neorealism. Both schools of thought stress the primacy of interests, 
the major difference being that neoliberals want to disaggregate “national inter-
Trade, Migration, and Economic Development 21
est” and look at the multiplicity of social and economic groups that compete to 
influence the state. For neoliberals, both national and international politics can be 
reduced to an economic game and ultimately to a problem of collective action. 
To understand this (means–ends) game, all that is needed is to correctly iden-
tify the interests and preferences of social, economic, and political actors.17 Not 
surprisingly, neoliberal theorists focus heavily on politics and policy in developed 
democracies, where the competition among groups is relatively open and unfet-
tered by authoritarianism and corruption. Studying competition among groups 
at the domestic level, as well as the allocational and distributional consequences 
of policy, presents a clearer picture of why (liberal) states behave the way they 
do in the international arena, whether in the areas of trade, finance, or migra-
tion.
Since this approach incorporates both economic and political analysis, it has 
come to be called international political economy (IPE). IPE theorists are inter-
ested in the connections between domestic and international politics. In addition 
to focusing on domestic interests, they also stress the importance of institutions 
in determining policy outcomes. For one of the original IPE theorists, Keohane, 
institutions hold the key to explaining the puzzle of conflict and cooperation in 
international relations, especially with the weakening of American hegemony in 
the last decades of the twentieth century. Keohane and Nye (1977) argue that in-
creases in economic interdependence in the postwar period have had a profound 
impact on international relations, altering the way states behave and the way in 
which they think about and use power. In the nuclear age and with growing 
interdependence, it became increasingly difficult for states to rely on traditional 
military power to guarantee their security because security was tied increasingly 
to economic power and nuclear weapons fundamentally altered the nature of 
warfare. The challenge for liberal states post-1945 was how to construct a new 
world order to promote national interests that were tied ever more closely to in-
ternational trade and investment, if not to migration.
In the first two decades after World War II, this problem was solved essentially 
by the United States, which took it upon itself to reflate the world economy and 
provide liquidity for problems of structural adjustment. This approach to interna-
tional political economy was dubbed “hegemonic stability.”18 But with the gradual 
decline of American economic dominance in the 1970s, the problem arose of 
how to organize world markets in the absence of a hegemon. The answer would 
be found, according to Keohane, Ruggie, and others, in multilateralism and the 
building of international institutions and regimes (like GATT and IMF) to solve 
the problems of international cooperation and collective action.19 As the Cold War 
waned in the 1980s, the entire field of international relations shifted dramatically 
away from the study of national security toward the study of international eco-
nomics, especially issues of trade and finance. In the last decades of the twentieth 
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century, even domestic politics, according to IPE theorists, was thoroughly inter-
nationalized (Keohane and Milner 1996).
Despite the fact that international migration would seem to lend itself to 
neoliberal arguments (migration has a strong political-economic dimension and 
clearly contributes to the internationalization of domestic politics), very little has 
been written about it from this perspective.20 The reasons are fairly simple. Until 
recently, there was little demand for international policy in the area of migration, 
with the major exception of refugees. Even for the refugee regime, the numbers 
were relatively modest until the 1980s, and incentives for cooperation among 
liberal states were closely linked to the Cold War and the bipolar structure of 
the international system. From the late 1940s through the 1970s, liberal states 
had little incentive to cooperate or build regimes for managing labor migration 
because an unlimited supply of (unskilled) labor could be recruited through bi-
lateral agreements with the sending countries. The German Gastarbeiter (1960s) 
and the American Bracero (1940s to 1960s) programs are classic examples of 
these types of bilateral accords. We did, however, see more innovation in the area 
of refugee policy, especially in Europe, where states came together to find ways 
to slow the influx of asylum seekers. The Dublin Convention and the Schengen 
Accords have helped to harmonize asylum policy in Western Europe, creating a 
border-free Europe but one in which every member state is responsible for polic-
ing a common external border. 
But the situation with international labor migration did not change that much 
in the 1980s and 1990s, despite the end of the Cold War. Today, there is still an 
unlimited and rapidly growing supply of cheap labor available in developing 
countries. What has changed, however, are the goals of immigration and refugee 
policies of the OECD states. The demand now is for policies to control, manage, 
or stop migration and refugee flows. The Cold War refugee regime, specifically 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has come under enormous 
pressure to manage various refugee crises, including the Cambodians in Thailand, 
Kurds in Iraq, Hutus in Zaire (now the Republic of Congo), and Albanians fleeing 
Kosovo. Existing international organizations for dealing with economic migra-
tion, such as the IOM and the International Labour Office (ILO) in Geneva, have 
not been besieged by demands for action. With the major exception of Western 
Europe, which has developed a regional regime for migration, there has been 
little effort to regulate international labor migration on a multilateral basis. Even 
a clause in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) dealing with 
international labor migration (Mode 4) has done little to promote cooperation in 
the area of migration. Most OECD countries, especially the United States, are un-
interested in the creation of an international guest-worker program, and attempts 
to link trade regimes with migration have been resisted tooth and nail by both the 
Americans and Europeans.21 
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What can neoliberal theory tell us about the development of international 
migration and the willingness of states to risk migration? The first hypothesis we 
can derive from neoliberal theory is that states are more willing to risk opening 
their economies to trade (and by extension, migration) if there is some type of 
international regime (or hegemonic power) that can regulate these flows and 
solve collective-action and free-rider problems. However, as I have pointed out, 
there is no regime for regulating migration that comes close to the type of regime 
that exists for trade (GATT/WTO) or for international finance (IMF/World Bank). 
Yet we know that migration has increased steadily throughout the postwar period 
in the absence of a regime or any type of effective multilateral process. The EU 
and Schengen group are partial exceptions. If we accept the realist assumption 
that states are unitary, rational actors capable of closing as well as opening their 
economies, other (political) factors must be driving the increases in migration 
and maintaining a degree of openness to migration, at least among advanced 
industrial democracies.
The second hypothesis that can be derived from neoliberal theory focuses 
on domestic coalitions. The maintenance of a relatively open (nonmercantilist) 
world economy is heavily dependent on coalitions of powerful interests in the 
most dominant, liberal states. In Resisting Protectionism, prominent neoliberal 
theorist Helen Milner (1988, 18–44) demonstrates how advanced industrial states 
in the 1970s were able to resist the kind of beggar-thy-neighbor policies that were 
adopted in the 1920s and 1930s. She argues that growing interdependence (multi-
nationality and export dependence) helped to solidify free trade coalitions among 
the OECD states in the postwar period, thus preventing a retreat into protection-
ism following the economic downturns of the 1970s and 1980s. Government 
leaders in a range of industrial nations were willing (and able) to resist strong 
political pressures for protectionism in the 1970s in large part because a powerful 
constellation of business interests contributed to a substantial realignment within 
these societies. In some cases, polities themselves were (creatively) redesigned 
by political entrepreneurs to facilitate the maintenance and strengthening of these 
new (free trade) coalitions.22 Of course, free trade interests were bolstered by the 
existence of an international trade regime (GATT) in the 1970s. 
Therefore, from a neoliberal perspective, the central questions with respect 
to migration are: How did pro-immigration coalitions in the key OECD states 
form? And will they be able to maintain legal immigration regimes with the end 
of the Cold War and in the absence of a strong international migration regime? We 
should not discount the importance of international systemic constraints such as 
the end of the Cold War, which clearly has had an impact on political coalitions 
and alignments in all of the liberal democracies. The end of the Cold War had a 
profound impact on coalitions supporting open migration policies, even more so 
than on trade. The major difference between trade and migration is in the nature 
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and types of the coalitions that form to support or oppose them. Although relat-
ed, in the sense that strong economic liberals tend to support both free trade and 
more open migration policies, there is a much stronger ideational and cultural 
dimension to pro-migration coalitions than free trade coalitions.23  
Free trade policies clearly have important political and social effects, but the 
arguments about comparative advantage and tariff policies tend to be heavily 
economic, and interest groups are organized along sectoral or class lines. With 
respect to trade, individuals and groups tend to follow their market interests, 
but in the making of migration policies, this is not always the case. If a state can 
be sure of reciprocity—that other states will abide by nondiscrimination and 
the MFN principle—it is easier to convince a skeptical public to support free 
trade. With migration, on the other hand, economic arguments (about the costs 
and benefits of migration) tend to be overshadowed by political, cultural, and 
ideological arguments that cut across class lines. National identities and founding 
myths—what I have called national models—come into play in the making and 
unmaking of coalitions for admissionist or restrictionist migration policies (Hol-
lifield 1997a, 1997b). Debates about migration in the liberal-democratic (OECD) 
states revolve as much, if not more, around issues of rights (see next section) and 
national identity than around issues of markets or social class. The coalitions that 
form to support more-open migration policies are often rights-markets (left–right) 
oriented, and debates about sovereignty and control of borders are reduced to 
debates about national identity—a fungible concept that reflects values, morality, 
and culture rather than a strictly instrumental, economic calculus.
If we take a neoliberal approach to understanding the rise of migration in the 
postwar era, we are thrown back into an analysis of three factors that together 
drive national migration policy. 
The first of these factors is ideational, historical, and cultural. Migration pol-
icy, especially in the biggest liberal republics (the United States, France, and 
Germany), is heavily influenced by national (or founding) myths, which are codi-
fied in citizenship and nationality laws (Brubaker 1992, 165). These myths and 
national identity are subject to manipulation and involve strong elements of sym-
bolic politics. They are reflected in constitutional law and can be analyzed from 
a historical, sociological, legal, and political standpoint. 
Citizenship, like society or the economy, is subject to exogenous shocks. 
Immigration—as Weiner (1995) and Koslowski (1996) have pointed out—can 
change the composition of societies, alter political coalitions, and transform citi-
zenship and national identity. The argument, therefore, can be made that migra-
tion contributes to the internationalization of domestic politics and economics. 
Multiculturalism is the functional equivalent of multinationalism. If the rise of 
multinational corporations has contributed to the creation of new free trade co-
alitions, as Milner and others have argued, then the rise of immigration and 
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multiculturalism has contributed to new pro-immigration coalitions. As foreigners 
gain a legal foothold in liberal societies, rights accrue to them and they become 
political actors capable of shaping both policy and polity.24 
But there is clearly a second factor involved in building pro-migration co-
alitions. As Freeman argues, businesses that are dependent on foreign labor—
whether skilled, as in the case of the software industry, or unskilled, as in the case 
of construction trades or agriculture—can form powerful lobbies and, under the 
right conditions, capture parts of the state to maintain access to a vital input.25 The 
political and economic history of Western states since the late nineteenth century, 
when the transaction costs of migration were lower, is replete with examples of 
businesses working with, around, through, or against the state to import labor.26 
Economic interests are always at play in the making of migration policy because 
the profits to be had from importing labor are great (demand-pull forces are 
strong) and an abundant supply of cheap labor is available. Cutting off access to 
foreign labor for businesses that are heavily dependent upon it is the same thing 
as imposing high tariffs on imported raw materials. The industries affected will 
howl. Both policies are protectionist and have profound allocational effects, often 
leading to increases in irregular migration.
In the postwar period, the third and most important factor in building pro-
migration (as opposed to free trade) coalitions is institutional. Perhaps the most 
famous and oft-quoted statement about European guest-worker programs was 
made by Swiss novelist Max Frisch, who said, “We asked for workers, and hu-
man beings came.” Unlike capital or goods, migrants—as individuals and some-
times as groups (Cubans in the U.S., ethnic Germans and Jewish immigrants in 
Germany)—can acquire legal rights and protections under the aegis of liberal 
constitutions and statutory law. Even when they are not admitted immediately to 
full citizenship, migrants acquire the rights of membership, which can, depending 
upon the state, include basic civil rights, a package of social, or welfare, rights, 
and even political, or voting, rights. What is important to keep in mind, however, 
is that these rights are anchored in national legal systems, and although they may 
flow from constitutional law, they also depend upon increasingly fragile political 
coalitions involving left- and right-wing liberals. With the end of the Cold War, 
these “strange bedfellow” coalitions have become more difficult to sustain, even 
in the area of political asylum, a principle that is supported in international law.27 
As the coalitions weaken, we would expect to see a concomitant decline in sup-
port for admissionist immigration and refugee policies.
But rights have a very long half-life in liberal democracies. Once they are 
extended and institutionalized, it is extremely difficult to roll them back. Most 
democracies—especially those, like the U.S., France, and Germany, with repub-
lican traditions and strong elements of separation of powers—have a variety of 
judicial checks that limit the ability of executive and legislative authorities to alter 
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civil, social, and political rights. To understand the “limits of immigration control” 
in liberal democracies, as well as the mix of internal and external strategies for 
control, we must have a clear understanding of the evolution of rights-based poli-
tics and of the way in which rights are institutionalized.28 Even if rights-markets 
coalitions supporting immigration weaken, this does not mean that migration and 
refugee policies will change overnight or that liberal states can quickly and ef-
fectively seal their borders. 
To conclude, the neoliberal approach requires us to look first at international 
institutions and regimes and second at the types of coalitions that form to sup-
port more-open migration regimes. I have identified three factors that influence 
coalition building: (1) ideational and cultural, which are closely linked to formal, 
legal definitions of citizenship, (2) economic interests, which are linked to factor 
proportions and intensities such as land, labor, and capital ratios, and (3) rights, 
which often flow from liberal-republican constitutions. The following sections 
develop this neoliberal framework, offering a critique of realist and globalization 
arguments.
Risking Migration and the Centrality of Rights
Of the three analytical perspectives on migration and international relations 
we have reviewed so far—realism, globalization, and neoliberalism—neoliberal-
ism comes closest to explaining why states risk migration. But, as I have indi-
cated, we cannot ignore structural or systemic factors, such as the end of the Cold 
War, that can influence the propensity of states to support liberal international 
regimes. In the absence of a threat or hegemon to unite liberal states and help 
them overcome collective-action problems, multilateralism is one way for states 
to cooperate and build a migration/refugee regime. 
Following the work of Ruggie (1993a, 3–47), we can identify three tenets 
of multilateralism. The first is indivisibility, which is another way of saying that 
multilateral regulation should take the form of a public good. Unless it is a 
hegemon, a single state or even a small group of states cannot provide this good 
for the international community. The costs and benefits of its provision must 
be shared relatively equally among states. The second tenet is principles, or norms 
of conduct, which can alter the behavior of states. The fewer principles or norms 
there are, the greater the likelihood that states will respect them and change 
their behavior. The most difficult problem in any multilateral regime is to find 
a single compelling principle (or at least a very small number of interrelated 
norms or principles) “around which actor expectations can converge.”29 Third, 
Ruggie points to diffuse reciprocity, meaning that states must be convinced ev-
eryone will respect the rules of the game, making it possible for governments to 
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persuade a skeptical or even hostile public to accept the short-term political and 
economic costs of establishing the regime in order to reap the long-term gains.
Using this neoliberal framework, we can ask: What are the possibilities of 
building an effective international migration regime? What would be the incen-
tives to participate in such a regime? Can states overcome their misgivings, which 
may include loss of sovereignty, threats to national security and identity, and 
changes in the composition of the citizenry? 
On the first point, indivisibility, we must ask if migration can be defined as 
an international public good. As noted earlier, this is problematic, especially if we 
compare migration and trade. During the postwar period, a consensus emerged—
based on American leadership and the doctrine of comparative advantage—that 
an open trading regime would promote global welfare and advance the cause of 
peace. The motto of the immediate postwar period was “Peace through trade.” 
The GATT system was created to ensure that the costs and benefits of free trade 
would be shared equally, and this allowed the leading liberal states (especially 
the U.S.) gradually to overcome the hostility and skepticism of weaker developing 
states. Free trade would lead not only to specialization in production, increased 
output, and pareto-optimal economic outcomes, it also would promote interde-
pendence and a more peaceful world. 
This type of economic reasoning, however, does not work well in the area of 
migration because the asymmetry between developed and developing countries 
is too great. It is only at certain points in time (such as the turn of the twentieth 
century in America, the period of reconstruction in Europe after World War II, 
and  the period of very high growth in Asia in the 1970s and 1980s) that the in-
terests of developing and developed states converge. Developing states almost 
always have an incentive to export surplus populations, whereas developed states 
only periodically have an interest in admitting large numbers of foreign workers. 
The history of south-to-north migration has tended to be one of fits and starts, 
of peaks and valleys that tended to follow the business cycle. But there is strong 
evidence this dynamic may have been broken in the postwar period, at least for 
certain “core” liberal states in America and Europe (Hollifield and Zuk 1998). We 
can see this in the rates of world migration, which have been rising continuously 
since 1945. 
So, if migration does not mirror the business cycle, what is driving it? The 
answer, in a word, is rights. As the world becomes more open, more democratic, 
and more liberal, people are freer to move than ever before. This has placed great 
strains on liberal states, especially on the institution of citizenship. Liberal states 
are caught on the horns of a dilemma or, what I have called a liberal paradox 
(Hollifield 1992a, 222; Weiner 1995, 112). In liberal political and economic sys-
tems, there is constant tension between markets and rights, or liberty and equal-
ity. Rules of the market require openness and factor mobility, whereas rules of 
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the liberal polity, especially citizenship, require some degree of closure, mainly 
to have a clear definition of citizenry and to protect the sanctity of the social 
contract —the legal cornerstone of every liberal polity. Equal protection and due 
process cannot be extended to everyone without undermining the legitimacy 
of the liberal state itself. How can states solve this dilemma and escape from 
the paradox? Constructing an international migration regime, as European Union 
members have done, is one way.
But if migration is to be defined as an international public good, it cannot 
be defined purely in economic terms, even though mobility of productive fac-
tors (like free trade) is recognized in economic theory to be pareto optimal. To 
regulate migration on a unilateral basis, liberal states must adopt draconian (il-
liberal) policies that may threaten the foundations of the liberal state itself. It is 
not efficient or desirable in a liberal state to close or seal borders. This would 
be the ultimate strategy for external control. Likewise, strategies for internal con-
trol—including heavy regulation of labor markets, limiting civil rights and liber-
ties for foreigners and citizens, and tampering with founding myths (for example, 
weakening birthright citizenship in the U.S.)—also threaten the liberal state. Such 
measures can fan the flames of racism and xenophobia by further stigmatizing 
foreigners. Establishing a multilateral process for regulating and controlling im-
migration offers one way out of this dilemma, but to accomplish this, control must 
be redefined on a multilateral basis as the “orderly movement of people” (Ghosh 
1998, chap. 5). Orderly movements imply respect for the rule of law and state 
sovereignty, which are fundamental principles in every liberal state. 
The problem remains of how to set up generalized principles of conduct in 
the area of migration. Various conventions exist, many put forward by the UN and 
its agencies (the UNHCR, IOM, and ILO) to safeguard the rights of migrant work-
ers and establish standards for the treatment of these workers and their families.30 
Likewise, Mode 4 of GATS includes provisions for migration (Bhagwati 2004). But 
none of these agreements has achieved the status of a full-blown international 
migration regime capable of altering the behavior of states. It is only with asylum 
that a quasi-effective international regime has emerged in the postwar period, 
with a single guiding principle—a well-founded fear of persecution. The free-
dom-of-movement clauses of the various European Union treaties have resulted 
in the construction of a regional migration regime for EU member states, and the 
Schengen group has developed rules for dealing with the migration of third-coun-
try nationals, specifically asylum seekers. 
In such a regional context, where the asymmetry is less pronounced than in 
the international system, it is easier to solve the problems of reciprocity and col-
lective action. Rules can be adopted and formalized through already established 
institutional procedures. At the international level, what we have seen instead is 
a proliferation of very weak rules, norms, and procedures, resulting in a kind of 
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Figure 1
A Typology of International Regimes
fragmented and ineffective regime (Ghosh 1998, chaps. 4 and 5). Moreover, the 
primary concern of the most powerful liberal states is not to facilitate the orderly 
movement of people (even paying tourists) or promote international factor mobil-
ity. Rather, the concern is for control, which has as many different meanings as 
there are states.
The challenge for any state or organization attempting to construct an in-
ternational migration regime will be to define control in such a way that it is 
indivisible, can serve as a generalized norm or principle of conduct, and can lead 
to diffuse reciprocity. This is no mean feat because, heretofore, international mi-
gration has been regulated almost exclusively on a bilateral basis, if not through 
some type of imperial hierarchy. In fact, we still see both regulatory systems at 
work today. It is only among the OECD states that freedom of movement (but 
not settlement) has been more or less achieved, especially for the highly skilled. 
Between the core liberal states in the international system and the less developed 
countries, movement of populations is still governed by a system of imperial 
hierarchy, which is in many ways more one-sided today than it was during the 
colonial era.31
To better understand the difficulties of international cooperation to regulate 
migration, I have constructed a typology of international regimes. This typol-
ogy, depicted in Figure 1, points to a clear distinction between the regulation of 
capital, goods, and services on one hand and migrant labor or refugees (people) 
on the other. When it comes to regulating trade and capital flows—an essential 
function of the international political economy—multilateralism is strongest and 
most heavily institutionalized in the area of finance. Even though the institutions 
dealing with international finance are far from perfect, the IMF and World Bank 
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trade and investment would be difficult and extremely risky. The GATT/WTO 
regime for trade also is heavily institutionalized, but the multilateral basis of this 
regime is, I would argue, weaker than that for finance. The need for strong cur-
rencies and stable exchange rates is felt much more acutely by states than the 
need for free trade. Nonetheless, both of these institutions have evolved together 
in the postwar period. Powerful market incentives, as well as formal enforcement 
mechanisms in the case of the WTO, compel states to “play by the rules” (Gold-
stein 1993, 201–32).
Of the two “regimes” dealing with migration, one for labor migrants and the 
other for refugees, clearly the refugee regime, which is institutionalized through 
the UNHCR, is the more effective, for reasons I have spelled out. I put the term 
regimes in quotes because the labor regime is quite ineffective. The rules for 
entry and exit of economic migrants are controlled by nation-states, not by in-
ternational organizations like the UN, IOM, or ILO. Again, the major exception 
is the EU, but the EU regime for international labor migration functions only for 
nationals of the member states, not (or at least not yet) for third-country nationals 
(Guiraudon 1998, 657–74).
Even for the Schengen states—referred to in the British press derisively as 
Schengenland—third-country nationals do not have freedom of movement. Only 
Schengen nationals have this right. Schengen does, however, function as a multi-
lateral regime for asylum and is designed to help member states restrict refugee 
migration and prevent “asylum shopping.” Refugees have the right to request 
asylum in the first Schengen state in which they arrive—consistent with the Ge-
neva Convention—but if they transit through a “safe” third country, they can be 
refoulés (sent back to that third country). The result has been to forge a more or 
less common asylum policy in Schengen and turn all adjoining states into buffer 
states. The important point is that these Western European states, together with 
the U.S. and other liberal democracies, are respecting the letter, if not the spirit, 
of international refugee law.
Although the principles of the refugee regime are widely recognized, the 
UNHCR as an institution remains weak and heavily dependent on a few “cli-
ent states,” especially Sweden, the Netherlands, and other small European social 
democracies. The Japanese contribute a lot of money to the UNHCR, and the 
Americans support it and use it as a tool for managing refugee crises around the 
world, especially when American national interests are involved.
The regime for international labor migration is weakly institutionalized with 
no central norm (Figure 1), and its principal organs, the ILO and IOM, based in 
Geneva, have little regulatory or institutional capacity. For developed states in 
particular, the costs of participating in a regime for international migration would 
seem to outweigh the benefits, and a short-term strategy of unilateral or bilateral 
regulation of migration is preferred to a long-term, multilateral strategy. This is 
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less true for the refugee regime because the more powerful liberal states need 
this regime for situational exigencies—to manage massive refugee flows that can 
destabilize governments and, in some cases, entire regions. When such crises 
strike close to home, as in the 1999 Balkan war, the utility of the refugee regime 
goes up exponentially. But when the crisis is past, it drops again.
To date, unwanted labor migrations might be considered more of a nuisance, 
especially from a political standpoint, but they are not fundamentally threaten-
ing and, therefore, can be handled unilaterally and on an ad hoc basis. The 
payoff from international cooperation in the area of unwanted labor migration 
is negative, and opportunities for defection are numerous. The possibilities for 
developing, monitoring, or enforcing some principle of nondiscrimination are 
minimal at this point. That brings us back to the domestic level in our search for 
an explanation of why states risk migration. The three factors driving migration 
policies—cultural and ideational, economic interests, and rights—must be stud-
ied on a case-by-case basis. 
Yet an international market for labor exists and is growing. If the first rule 
of political economy is that markets beget regulation, some type of international 
regime is likely to develop. What will the parameters of such a regime be and 
how will it evolve? International relations theory, especially neoliberal/rationalist 
arguments, offers some clues.
Migration, Trade, and Development: The Coordination Problem
One of the principal effects of economic interdependence is to compel states 
to cooperate (Keohane and Nye 1977; Milner 1988). Increasing international mi-
gration (see Figure 2) is one indicator of interdependence, and it shows no signs 
of abating. As the international market for skilled and unskilled labor grows in 
the coming decades, pressures to create an international regime will increase. 
Following the work of L. Martin (1993, 91–121) and drawing on the preceding 
review of international relations theory, we can identify two ways in which states 
can overcome coordination problems in the absence of trust and reciprocity (de-
veloped states do not trust less developed states to help control borders and 
deter irregular migration): (1) through the centralization of regulatory power and 
pooling of sovereignty, and (2) suasion or, as Martin (1993, 104) puts it, “tactical 
issue linkage.”
We already have seen an example of the first strategy at the regional level in 
Europe. The EU and, to a lesser extent, the Schengen regimes were built through 
processes of centralization and pooling of sovereignty. But, as I have pointed 
out, this was fairly easy to do in the European context because of the symmetry 
(of interests and power) within this region and the existence of an institutional 
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framework (the European Community or EU). It would be much more difficult 
to centralize control of migration in the Americas or Asia, where the asymmetry 
(of interests and power) is much greater and levels of political and economic 
development vary tremendously from one state to another. It is unlikely that 
regional trade regimes like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) will lead quickly to cooperation 
in the area of migration. But the beginnings of collaborative arrangements are 
there, just as they were with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
in the early 1950s. The regional option—multilateralism for a relevant group of 
states—is one way to overcome collective-action problems and begin a process 
of centralization.
Most international regimes have had a long gestation period, beginning as 
bilateral or regional agreements. It is unlikely, however, that an international mi-
gration regime could be built following the example of the International Trade 
Organization/GATT/WTO. It is too difficult to fulfill the prerequisites of multilat-
eralism: indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity. 
The norm of nondiscrimination (equivalent of MFN) does not exist, and there 
are no mechanisms for punishing free riders and no way of resolving disputes. 
In short, as depicted in Figure 1, the basis for multilateralism is weak, and the 
institutional framework is very weak. 
With the asymmetry of interests and power between developed (migration 
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only viable strategy for overcoming collective-action problems, whether at the re-
gional or international level. L. Martin (1993, 104–06) points to a number of ways 
in which suasion can help solve coordination problems.
Step one is to develop a dominant strategy, which can be accomplished only 
by the most powerful states, using international organizations to persuade or 
coerce smaller and weaker states. From the standpoint of receiving countries, the 
orderly movement of people, defined in terms of rule of law and respect for state 
sovereignty, would be the principal objective of hegemonic, liberal states. From 
the standpoint of the sending countries, migration for development, taking ad-
vantage of remittances and return (brain gain) migration, would be the principle 
upon which an international regime could be based.
Step two is to persuade other states to accept the dominant strategy. This will 
necessitate tactical issue linkage, which involves identifying issues and interests 
not necessarily related to migration (such as MFN, for example) and using these 
as leverage to compel or coerce states to accept the dominant strategy. This is, 
in effect, an “international logroll.” Such tactics will have only the appearance of 
multilateralism, at least initially. Tactical issue linkage was considered in negotia-
tions between the U.S. and Mexico on NAFTA, and migration issues have figured 
prominently in negotiations between the EU and prospective EU members in 
East Central Europe. At the EU summit in Seville in 2002, the British and Span-
ish attempted to link official development aid and trade concessions for African 
states to migration control, but this initiative was blocked by the French and the 
Swedes. 
In such instances, reciprocity is specific rather than diffuse. Individual states 
may be rewarded for their cooperation in controlling emigration. Again, we 
have seen many bilateral examples of this type of strategic interaction between 
the states of Western and Eastern Europe. The post-unification German govern-
ments have cut a number of deals with East Central European states to gain 
their cooperation in the fight against irregular migration. In the case of Poland, 
this has involved investments and debt relief as well as greater freedom of move-
ment for Polish nationals in Germany. But liberal-democratic states may face a 
problem of credibility in pursuing these types of strategies. They need interna-
tional organizations to give them greater credibility (cover) and facilitate these 
logrolls. 
The third step for hegemonic states is to move from what is an essentially 
one-sided, manipulative game to a multilateral process and eventually to insti-
tutionalize this process. The long-term benefits of such a strategy for receiving 
states are obvious. It will be less costly to build an international regime than to 
fight every step of the way with every sending state, relying only on unilateral 
or bilateral agreements. This may entail some short-term loss of control (such as 
a  larger number of visas or higher quotas for the sending states) in exchange 
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for long-term stability and more orderly migration. The ultimate payoff for liberal 
states is the establishment of a liberal world order based upon rule of law, respect 
for state sovereignty, ease of travel, and the smoother functioning of international 
labor markets. The payoff for sending states is greater freedom of movement for 
their nationals, greater foreign reserves and a more favorable balance of payments 
(thanks to remittances), increased prospects for return (brain gain) migration, and 
increases in cultural and economic exchange, including technology transfers. 
However, changes in the international system with the end of the Cold War 
have altered this game in several ways. First, it has made defection easier. Since 
1990, states have been more likely to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies by clos-
ing their borders and not cooperating with neighboring states in the making of 
migration and refugee policies. The Schengen process itself is a kind of beggar-thy-
neighbor policy on a regional scale. Second, the new post-Cold War configurations 
of interests and power, both at the international and domestic levels, make it more 
difficult to pursue a multilateral strategy for controlling international migration. 
Rights-markets coalitions have been breaking apart in the dominant liberal states, 
increasing polarization and politicization over immigration and refugee issues. Yet 
liberalization and democratization in formerly authoritarian states to the east and 
south have dramatically reduced the transaction costs for emigration (Hollifield and 
Jillson 1999). Initially, this caused panic in Western Europe, where there was a fear 
of mass migrations from east to west. Headlines screamed, “The Russians are Com-
ing!”32 Even though these massive flows did not materialize, Western states began to 
hunker down and search for ways to reduce or stop immigration. The time horizons 
of almost all Western democracies suddenly were much shorter because of these 
changes in domestic and international politics. Migration came to be perceived as 
a greater threat to national security (Huntington 2004).
If the U.S. were to defect from the liberal refugee and migration “regimes,” 
such as they are, it could mean the collapse of these regimes. In game theoretic 
terms, such a defection would fundamentally alter the equilibrium outcome, and 
it would be potentially costly to all states and the international community. At 
least as far as migration is concerned, the process of globalization of exchange 
could be quickly and dramatically reversed.
To prevent the collapse of liberal migration and refugee regimes, the U.S. 
and other liberal states must pursue an aggressive strategy of multilateralism, 
taking the short-term political heat for long-term political stability and economic 
gain. This happened in the areas of international finance, with the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, and trade, with the Latin debt crisis of 
the 1980s and Asian crisis of the 1990s. Without the kind of leadership exhibited 
in international trade and finance, irregular migrations will increase and become 
ever more threatening, leading more states to close their borders.
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Conclusion
The two central questions this paper poses are (1) how can we explain in-
creasing migration in the face of strong political opposition and (2) why are states 
willing to risk migration? Several hypotheses, derived from international relations 
theory, are advanced. The first is the realist, or national security, argument that 
states open and close their borders in response to changes in the structure of 
the international system. The problem with this argument is that such structural 
changes (for example, shifts in the distribution of power) are relatively rare. But 
this type of change did occur in 1990 with the end of the Cold War, and there is 
considerable evidence that the willingness of (liberal) states to risk migration de-
clined dramatically in the 1990s. Coalitions of left- and right-wing liberals—what 
I term rights-markets coalitions—that had flourished during much of the Cold 
War period suddenly came under pressure and fell apart in many liberal societies. 
But we have not seen a concomitant decline in the rate of international migra-
tion.
An alternative hypothesis is offered by what I call globalization theory, de-
rived largely from world-systems arguments. According to this thesis, migration 
is largely a function of changes in the international division of labor and restruc-
turing of the global economy, which entails rapid and massive movements of 
productive factors, including capital and labor. Globalization is a social and eco-
nomic imperative, and even the most powerful states are incapable of regulating 
flows of capital, goods, services, information, and people. The result has been 
the rise of new global centers of production, what Sassen calls the “global city,” 
which is outside the regulatory reach of the state. The demand for (skilled and 
unskilled) foreign labor is embedded in the economies of the advanced industrial 
societies.
In such pure globalization arguments, it makes little sense to study either 
domestic or international politics as a way of understanding increases in inter-
national exchange, whether in finance, trade, or migration. Sovereignty is an 
antiquated concept, and we must think about the global economy in terms of 
postnationalism. Soysal, Jacobson, and Bauböck have argued that, with respect to 
migration, globalization of the economy has created a new kind of postnational 
membership, or in Bauböck’s terms, a transnational citizenship. Rights, according 
to Jacobson, now extend across borders. Such political developments are the logi-
cal counterpart of globalization. 
The globalization thesis, in which outcomes are socially and economically 
determined, stands at the opposite extreme of realism, in which outcomes are 
politically determined. A third perspective, neoliberalism, accepts the continuing 
importance of the nation-state in international relations. But neoliberals argue 
that economic interdependence has altered the way in which states think about 
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and use power. Rather than relying on traditional military means to pursue na-
tional interests, liberal states are increasingly drawn into “collaboration games” 
to regulate the international economy and reduce the risks associated with trade 
in particular. This desire to reduce risks and lower transaction costs has led the 
most powerful states to construct international regimes for trade and finance. Un-
like neorealists, neoliberal theorists do not consider the unitary-actor assumption 
to be sacrosanct, and they are willing to look at domestic politics, especially at 
coalitions and institutions that may facilitate openness and increase demand for 
international cooperation.
Following neoliberal and neorealist thought, I have argued that the rise in 
migration in the postwar period is closely linked to three factors: (1) the structure 
of the international system, including the distribution of power and the presence 
or absence of international regimes; (2) domestic political coalitions, based on 
economic interests (factor proportions and intensities) and rights (which flow 
from liberal constitutions and laws); and (3) ideational, cultural, and legal factors, 
or what Brubaker calls “traditions of citizenship and nationhood.”
During the Cold War, liberal states were more willing to risk migration because 
of the bipolar nature of the international system, which prevented large-scale 
emigration from communist states and helped solidify rights-markets coalitions in 
liberal states. The end of the Cold War has radically altered the configuration of 
power and interests, at both the national and international levels, and changed 
the dynamic of collaboration games, especially with migration. States are still will-
ing to risk trade, and coalitions of liberal states led by the United States support 
the institutions for maintaining stable exchange rates, especially the IMF. There is 
evidence, however, that multilateralism in these areas is under increasing political 
pressure, especially in the U.S. Isolationism and protectionism are stirring anew.
The logic of cooperation is different for trade than for migration. Liberal 
states work hard to keep trade and investment flowing in the world economy 
and increasingly work hard to keep migration, including refugees, bottled up 
in less developed (sending) countries. The international trade regime (WTO) is 
based squarely on the doctrine of comparative advantage and the principle of 
nondiscrimination (MFN). Free trade has come to be accepted by a wide range of 
states as an international public good. Ironically, following the Stolper–Samuelson 
theorem of factor price equalization, trade and foreign direct investment are often 
touted as the solution to the problem of unwanted migration. According to this 
theorem, trade can substitute for migration in the long term. Nevertheless, migra-
tion continues in the short term and may actually increase when less developed 
economies are exposed to strong exogenous shocks of trade and foreign invest-
ment.
No organizing principle has emerged as a basis for international cooperation 
to regulate migration. The exceptions are the international refugee regime, based 
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on a well-founded fear of persecution, and the EU regime, based on freedom 
of movement for nationals of member states. The primary reason for the lack 
of cooperation and the absence of an international regime for migration is the 
tremendous asymmetry between interests and power in the international system. 
The challenge for proponents of an international migration regime is to find (1) 
an organizing principle and (2) a strategy for overcoming collaboration problems. 
In the penultimate section of this paper, I suggest a principle—namely rule of 
law and the orderly movement of people—and several strategies for overcoming 
the asymmetry of interests and regime building. These strategies include the cen-
tralization of authority to promote trust and provide information and enforcement 
mechanisms. The problem with this strategy is that it requires continuous and 
strong intervention by a hegemon or group of hegemonic states. A more likely 
strategy is suasion, which involves tactical issue linkage and international logrolls 
that link unrelated issues to cooperation in controlling emigration.
The central argument in this paper is that states will not continue to risk 
migration in the post-Cold War era without some type of international regula-
tory framework. If migration is closely linked to trade and investment both eco-
nomically and politically, as I and many others have argued, any weakening on 
the part of liberal states in their commitment to support orderly movements of 
people could threaten the new liberal world order. This argument is at odds with 
the globalization thesis, inasmuch as I see politics and the nation-state as crucial 
to the stability of the global economy, especially with the end of the Cold War. 
To paraphrase Polanyi (1944, 140), without the “continuous, centrally organized, 
and controlled intervention” of the most powerful liberal states, the “simple and 
natural liberty” of the global economy will not survive. Globalization is a myth, 
insofar as it ignores the imperatives of politics and power, which are still vested 
in the nation-state.
Notes
1	 Kindleberger’s	argument	evolved	into	what	 is	now	called	“hegemonic	stability	 theory,”	where,	
in	the	words	of	Keohane,	“hegemonic	structures	of	power,	dominated	by	a	single	country,	are	


















from	 non-Western	 societies,	 as	 every	 major	 European	 country	 has	 done	 and	 as	 the	 United	
States	is	beginning	to	do,	and	ensuring	the	assimilation	into	Western	culture	of	the	immigrants	
who	are	admitted.”		
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Katzenstein	(1996),	especially	the	introduction,	1–32.	
10	As	 Shain	 (1989)	 and	 Koslowski	 (1996)	 have	 pointed	 out,	 international	 migration	 can	 create	
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The postwar era is not the first experience the world has had with globalization in all its dimensions. The current episode can, however, be distinguished from its nineteenth century predecessor by its scale—a 
world of six billion inhabitants, massive movements of goods, services, and 
capital—as well as by continuously falling communication and transport costs 
and the instantaneous nature of information flows and stakeholder reaction 
possibilities. When war and interwar autarky ended in 1945, international 
trade was first to pick up, followed by a renewal of public capital movements, 
initially to Europe and subsequently to developing countries. Next came private 
portfolio capital and foreign direct investment (FDI), quickly dwarfing public 
capital flows, known as Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
The economic migration of people, excluding refugees and asylum seek-
ers, has lagged substantially behind. That’s largely because barriers to the move-
ment of people remain high—despite calls and considerable action for increased 
freedom of trade, capital, and associated technology mobility. This dimension 
of globalization tends to cause the strongest political resistance; when domestic 
workers are seen to be threatened by some combination of technology change, 
imports, and immigrants, it is invariably the last of these that generates the largest 
rhetorical and policy response. 
Nevertheless, pressures for enhanced migration are rising, certainly in the 
less-developed origin (O) countries but also in some quarters of the more de-
veloped destination (D) countries. The very fact that migration has lagged sub-
stantially behind the other dimensions of globalization also makes it the largest 
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opportunity for additional global welfare gains—especially today, when further 
multilateral trade liberalization is in considerable doubt. We will, therefore, focus 
on migration and its interactions with the other elements of globalization as they 
impact development. In this context, we will find it useful to distinguish between 
the costs and benefits to the O and D countries while differentiating between the 
movement of skilled and unskilled migrants. The first section concentrates on the 
movement of the unskilled and its relation to the other dimensions of globaliza-
tion, while the second attempts the same with respect to the skilled. The final 
section suggests some conclusions for policy within the same broad globalization 
framework.
Migration of the Unskilled
The unskilled migrant represents the largest potential benefit to global wel-
fare even as the distribution of gains between O and D countries remains con-
troversial. The desire to migrate by the unemployed, underemployed, and those 
employed at very low incomes in developing countries is a function of the avail-
ability of information, geographic distance, gaps in prospective lifetime incomes, 
and the perceived probability of gaining employment in the D country. The abil-
ity to migrate, on the other hand, depends on some combination of family in-
come levels, access to credit markets, government support, the extent of diaspora 
corridors abroad, and the level of entry barriers erected by the D countries. As in-
dicated in Figure 1, picturing Mexico as a typical case, we can expect the desire to 
migrate to dominate both the private ability to do so and the D countries’ barrier 
levels. In some O countries, such as the Philippines, the government may step in 
by providing both information and financial support in return for the promise of 
enhanced remittances, which tends to shift up both the desire and ability curves. 
However, to the extent that immigration barriers remain the dominant constraint 
(X marks the actual level of migration), there will be increasing pressure to at-
tempt illegal entry. 
The benefits of unskilled migration are clear to the O country. Given that the 
O country is likely to find itself in a labor surplus condition, the withdrawal of 
even substantial numbers of unskilled workers from meager-paying rural or, more 
likely, urban informal business sectors is not likely to affect output significantly. 
Indeed, given the probability of family subsidization of underemployed relatives, 
plus positive adjustments in technology as a consequence of such departures, 
productivity is likely to rise and poverty to decline. 
The O country accrues other substantial benefits. Chief among these is the 
receipt of remittances, which not only substantially enhance family incomes but 
also have important dynamic spillover effects. Such receipts are likely to encour-
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age additional entrepreneurial and investment activities by those left behind and, 
probably as important, innovative activities by returning migrants who have had 
new windows and contacts opened to them while abroad. This is especially true 
since the D country is likely to be a more advanced market economy. But even 
in relatively advanced, developing O countries such as Pakistan, which has sent 
temporary migrants to the Middle East, evidence from its North-West Frontier 
Province has shown that returned migrants make important entrepreneurial, hu-
man capital as well as financial capital contributions. 
Mexico, for example, receives $20 billion to $25 billion in remittances an-
nually, exceeding FDI flows ($18 billion in 2004) and providing an estimated 
20 to 30 percent of its microenterprise capital (Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). In 
2000, unskilled workers in the U.S. earned roughly six times more than unskilled 
workers in Mexico (Freeman 2006). An individual’s average annual gain by mov-
ing to the U.S. is thus estimated at $10,000, which, over a working life, amounts 
to a roughly $250,000 differential—clearly undergirding the desire to migrate, 










the U.S. The Philippine case is not too different, except that the government has 
been more directly involved in supporting emigration via the provision of infor-
mation and credit advances. Between 1975 and 1986, the number of Philippine 
contract workers moving to other parts of Asia increased from 4,200 to 76,650, 
and those moving to the Middle East rose from 1,552 to 262,758.1 In 2003, remit-
tances amounted to 10.2 percent of GDP, up from 2.7 percent in 1990.2 Globally, 
remittances reached $150 billion in 2004, almost three times ODA, with an esti-
mated additional $50 billion underreported (Maimbo and Ratha 2005). In some 
O countries, remittance flows have risen to 40 percent of export earnings and 20 
percent of GDP. These flows have clearly helped reduce poverty rates and had an 
equalizing effect on the distribution of income.
Remittances, as well as capital inflows such as ODA and private capital, sub-
stitute for unskilled labor migration. To the extent such inflows generate equitable 
growth, the income gaps between the O and D countries will decline and the 
desire to migrate will fall even as the ability rises. If after some time the country is 
successful in reaching East Asian newly industrialized country status, or Kuznets’ 
(1973) epoch of “modern economic growth,” the D country’s import barriers will 
at some point, beyond X, no longer be binding (Figure 2). 
Remittances have additional advantages in comparison with other types of 
capital inflows. For one, they are likely to be more dependable, fluctuating less. 
For another, they are likely to be countercyclical, increasing in times of eco-
nomic decline or natural disasters, while other types of private capital often act 
cyclically. Moreover, remittances are less likely to cause Dutch disease problems, 
either of the narrow or the extended variety, 3 because they typically are broadly 
dispersed and frequently end up in the hands of rural and urban-informal sector 
families. With respect to the traditional, narrow variety, that means remittances 
are less likely to cause a strengthening of the currency and a shift from exportable 
to nontraded goods—especially if they are used for entrepreneurial investment 
rather than purely consumption activities. Turning to the extended variety, which 
we define as the political economy consequence of capital inflows that tend to 
take the pressure off and permit governments to avoid reforms, remittances again 
are much less likely than foreign aid to be a source of reform obstruction and the 
object of rent-seeking and corruption.
The most important substitute for unskilled labor migration is trade, which 
incorporates such labor in the form of labor-intensive commodities that are sent 
to the D country under the radar. Unfortunately, while trade has virtually ex-
ploded in the postwar era, early liberalization efforts have recently tended to run 
out of steam, and neoprotectionist measures such as antidumping provisions and 
exemptions from preferences, targeted especially at textiles, shoes, and other la-
bor-intensive commodities, have been on the rise.
In addition to capital and trade movements, a substitute for unskilled mi-
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gration is the inflow of technology, especially if it is adaptable to the more la-
bor-abundant environment of the O country and thus enhances the potential of 
keeping unskilled labor productively employed at home or embodied in exports. 
Indeed, I would place much more weight, whether discussing the impact of 
migration, trade, or capital, on such dynamic dimensions rather than on static 
comparative-advantage and efficiency criteria.
In summary, various other dimensions of globalization can act as substitutes 
for unskilled labor migration. Moreover, the economic benefits of such migration 
for the O country are overwhelmingly clear. On the negative side of the ledger, 
we can record the not-inconsiderable social costs incurred as a result of pro-
longed family separations as well as the risks of exploitation and ill treatment of 
migrants, temporary or permanent, in the D country. 
Turning to the benefits and costs of unskilled migration with respect to the 
D country, the situation is somewhat less clear. The arrival of “cheap labor” from 
abroad is usually greeted by much more political flak than the arrival of “cheap 
goods” incorporating “cheap labor.” Yet both serve the interests of dispersed D 
Figure 2









country consumers because the former may encourage the survival, at least for a 
time, of relatively sick or defensive industries, while the latter directly enhances 
consumer welfare. The other benefit, increasingly recognized, especially in rich 
D countries suffering from low birthrates, is that large-scale migration by over-
whelmingly young workers is necessary to help support the welfare and safety-
net packages of the indigenous elderly population. We can safely assume that 
such pressures in the future will be even greater because of continuously falling 
birthrates and rising life expectancies. It is, moreover, a fact that there are jobs at 
the lower end of the occupational totem pole, mostly in agriculture and personal 
services, which D country workers are reluctant to take and which have been 
increasingly filled by unskilled immigrants. In this important sense, unskilled im-
migrants are substitutes for capital, increase labor force participation rates, and 
thus enhance the D country’s productive capacity.
Nevertheless, resistance to the admission of unskilled migrants continues to 
be formidable in almost all D countries. The key objection, emanating mainly 
from unions and their political allies, focuses on the cost in terms of lowering 
indigenous unskilled worker wages, as we would expect from economic theory. 
Nevertheless, what empirical evidence we have casts doubt on the robustness of 
this effect. David Card (2001), for example, examining such national experiments 
as the Mariel boatlift and Algerian inflows into France, finds only relatively minor 
negative wage impacts on earlier migrants and virtually none on indigenous un-
skilled workers. All in all, from a global welfare point of view, unskilled migration 
from poor to rich countries seems to have large benefits for both sides; yet, it is 
clearly the most controversial and most restricted of all globalization flows. Here, 
politics and both intentional and unintentional misperceptions decidedly trump 
economics.
Migration of the Skilled
When we attempt to examine the costs and benefits for both the O and D 
countries of high-talent labor migration, the story is quite different. The benefit to 
the O country is still the contribution such migrants make to the volume of remit-
tances, although the spending pattern of these somewhat more well-to-do left-be-
hind families is likely to be somewhat different—more oriented toward additional 
consumption than investment. Still, on the benefit side, skilled migrants are likely 
to stimulate others in the O country to seek additional education in preparation 
for future migration, thus increasing the average level of education. Moreover, 
there is a good chance that such migrants will ultimately return once the home 
country has reached a certain level of income and opportunity. This has certainly 
proven to hold in the cases of Korea, Taiwan, and India, with engineers, informa-
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tion technology specialists, and others leaving Silicon Valley and its equivalents, 
returning home—sometimes after many years—and contributing in a major way 
to the growth of high-tech industries in the O countries.
But there are also costs to be considered, especially in the short run, when a 
poor O country loses valuable human capital in which it has invested substantial 
educational expenditures. This perverse movement of human capital—from poor 
to rich countries—has occasioned much discussion and policy debate in the past, 
including Bhagwati’s (1976) suggestion of an exit tax and equally unimplemented 
efforts to restrict long-term stays abroad by legal/contractual means.
While high-talent manpower is clearly needed to support the O country’s 
development efforts, all too frequently the educational structure’s yield is not 
suited to the needs of the contemporary economy, creating a mismatch with po-
tentially explosive political consequences. A well-known case is the highly skilled 
unemployed in Sri Lanka. In such circumstances, unless the domestic educational 
production function can be reformed so that the output is better suited to the de-
veloping country’s needs, emigration may provide the only possible escape valve. 
On the other hand, there are cases, including the Philippines, where it is official 
policy to generate skilled labor—in this instance, doctors and nurses—specifically 
for purposes of export and remittances. This is seen not as a cost but as a benefit 
to society.
In the D country, where unskilled immigrants can generally be viewed as 
substitutes for capital, skilled labor is likely to constitute a complement to the rich 
country’s capital, both physical and human. While D country immigration barriers 
are therefore usually friendlier to skilled immigrants than to the unskilled, empiri-
cal evidence indicates that the negative impact of such arrivals on the incomes 
of their indigenous counterparts is likely to be larger than what we find for the 
unskilled. 
Unless the skilled arrivals fill a particular, relatively poorly serviced, non-
competitive niche or, in a dynamic context, are in a position to help generate 
new economic activities, they ultimately represent a greater threat to the income 
levels of their domestic counterparts than the unskilled do. Nevertheless, given 
their modest numbers and a relative absence of union opposition to their arrival, 
skilled immigrants are likely to meet much lower political resistance. Moreover, 
the recognition that they help overcome specific shortages and/or provide en-
trepreneurial energy and generate precious technology change, especially in the 
knowledge industries, is more likely to carry the day, certainly in the more dy-
namic D countries. In the case of the U.S., for example, it has been estimated that 
a 10 percent increase in the number of foreign graduate students raises patent 
applications by 4.7 percent, and we all know of the contribution of Chinese and 
Indian migrants to the science and technology explosions in Silicon Valley.
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Conclusions for Policy
It should be abundantly clear that the enhanced south–north migration of 
both unskilled and skilled individuals would not only increase global welfare 
but would almost certainly benefit both the O and D countries. At present, since 
migration is clearly the most constrained of the various dimensions of globaliza-
tion, it also offers the greatest potential for future gains. This potential emanates 
not only from the fact that it is a static substitute for or complement to the other 
elements of globalization but also because, as we have noted, it has a potentially 
important, dynamic catalytic impact.
International trade has exploded since 1950, rising twenty-five fold, much 
faster than per capita income. Even if the Doha Round cannot be resuscitated, 
we can expect trade to continue to grow—if at somewhat lower rates—since it is 
generally recognized to represent a positive sum game even if the gains are not 
equitably distributed, as between north and south. The arrival of foreign capital, 
shifting from ODA in the immediate postwar era to private flows, can also be ex-
pected to continue to expand. The same can be said of the transfer of technology, 
even though trade-related property rights issues do still need to be sorted out.
The most obvious policy conclusion, but also the most difficult to implement, 
would be for the D countries to lower their barriers to migration, especially those 
curbing the unskilled labor variety. When domestic producers and labor unions 
in the so-called sunset industries feel threatened by a combination of technology 
change, competitive imports, and the arrival of migrant workers, it is usually the 
last—more visible and threatening—that is likely to bear the brunt of restrictive 
actions. While politics here is usually in a good position to trump rationality—just 
as it is with the traditional emphasis on reciprocity in trade liberalization nego-
tiations—nowhere else is the problem as pronounced as in the realm of inter-
national migration. The resistance is usually more modest to the flow of skilled 
immigrants because they can be defended as net helpful to the local economy. 
Even as pressures mount to accept more immigrants, whether for demograph-
ics, business interests, entrepreneurial renewal, or job characteristics, most rich 
D countries, including Japan and the U.S., prefer to close one eye to illegal im-
migration rather than lower official barriers. This holds generally in spite of the 
serious humanitarian and rule-of-law-related side effects. The recently passed U.S. 
immigration legislation, focused on penalties and border fences, can be seen as a 
response to this general attitude. 
Multilateral negotiations to reduce migration barriers have never been tried. 
Given the convergence of issues relating to trade and immigration, such a func-
tion might sensibly be lodged in the World Trade Organization. With services 
now included in WTO negotiations, this would represent a rational extension—
especially when migration is increasingly perceived as a potential benefit to both 
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rich and poor countries. Though there are legitimate worries about further over-
loading that body, this would appear to be a better option than working with the 
toothless International Organization for Migration—or creating yet another new 
look-alike institution.
A second policy option, emphasized in the 2005 report of the United Nations 
Global Commission on National Immigration, would be to generalize member 
countries’ “best practice” related to guest worker arrangements. For example, 
it recommended multilateral consideration of a South Korean program forcing 
temporary migrants to deposit a proportion of their earnings in a special savings 
account that is forfeited if “temporary” threatens to become “permanent.” 
A third policy option would be the installation of a much more effective trade 
adjustment-assistance program in D countries so that, given the simultaneous ar-
rival of immigrants and imports, affected domestic workers could be retrained 
and moved into “sunrise industries.” Discussion during the WTO Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference in December 2005 suggested focusing ODA more on the 
facilitation of trade. Such an initiative could include moving toward a global trade 
and migration adjustment-assistance program that is administered by the World 
Bank or the WTO, financed mainly by D countries’ ODA contributions, and fol-
lows multilaterally negotiated rules of the game. Foreign aid spent at home in this 
fashion is likely to yield a higher return to D country taxpayers. Inevitably, when 
all is said and done, elements of globalization can lead to some job losses in the 
D countries. The reaction has varied from minimal state intervention in the form 
of a rather ineffective adjustment-assistance program, plus a rather flexible labor 
market, in the U.S. to substantial public purse support combined with strict gov-
ernment controls over the labor market in France. Perhaps the best model may be 
found in Denmark, which combines a generous public safety net with a relatively 
flexible labor market. But since all, especially emerging, countries will not have 
the same budgetary capacity, assistance from outside may be warranted. Even in 
the absence of major changes in the international rules of the game, O countries 
can provide systematic information and even financial support to potential mi-
grants, both temporary and permanent, as in the case of the Philippines. Improv-
ing credit access may serve to reduce the demand and simultaneously enhance 
the ability of unskilled would-be migrants to move—thus reducing the potentially 
explosive gap previously referred to.
One way to be helpful in this regard is by facilitating the flow of remittances, 
which can make important financial as well as entrepreneurial contributions to 
the O countries’ development while incurring much smaller risks than other capi-
tal flows with respect to either the narrow or broad definition of Dutch disease. 
Given the rapidly increasing realization of remittances’ importance to both par-
ties, special efforts should be made to reduce exorbitantly high remittance trans-
fer fees in the D countries. 
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But, ultimately, the only reliable way to reduce expected lifetime income 
gaps between individuals in the O and D countries is to enhance participatory, 
or labor-absorbing, development in the former. With Mexican immigrants to the 
U.S. benefiting to the extent of approximately $250,000, a reduction of such huge 
expected income gaps for an individual Mexican and, as important, for his or her 
children, undoubtedly is required. And that, in turn, requires successful develop-
ment in the O country—mainly a domestic affair but one that can be assisted from 
the outside. How to do this effectively extends beyond the scope of this paper.4
Notes
1 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, www.poea.gov.ph/default.htm.
2 International Organization for Migration, www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp.
3 In general, the term Dutch disease refers to the case where a sudden appreciation of a country’s 
currency renders the (tradable) manufacturing sector less competitive and leads to a decline 
in manufacturing output and employment (de-industrialization). This phenomenon was first 
observed in the Netherlands in the 1970s, where the discovery of a major natural gas field 
caused a sudden and strong appreciation of the Dutch exchange rate and subsequent decline 
in manufacturing activity.
4 See, however, Ranis (forthcoming).
References
Bhagwati, J., and M. Partington, ed. (1976), Taxing the Brain Drain: A Proposal (Amsterdam: 
North Holland Publishing).
Card, David (2001), “Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows and the Local Labor Market Impacts of 
Higher Immigration,” Journal of Labor Economics 19 (January): 22–64.
Freeman, Richard B. (2006), “People Flows in Globalization,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
20 (Spring, pt. 2). 
Kuznets, S. (1973), “Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections,” American Economic 
Review 63 (June).
Maimbo, Samuel Munzele, and Dilip Ratha, ed. (2005), Remittances: Development Impact and 
Future Prospects” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank).
Ranis, Gustav (forthcoming), “Toward the Enhanced Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” World Insti-
tute for Development Economics Research.
Woodruff, Christopher M., and Rene Zenteno (2007), “Migration Networks and Microenterprises 
in Mexico,” Journal of Development Economics 82 (March): 509–28.
29
Commentary on Session IV 
The Historical Relationship 
Between Migration, Trade,  
and Development
Barry.R..Chiswick
T he three papers in this session, by Jeffrey Williamson, Gustav Ranis, and James Hollifield, focus on the interconnections between migration, trade, and economic development, but they are quite distinct in terms of 
period covered, conceptual framework, and methodological approach. They are 
individually well argued and well written, but each also complements the others 




Williamson, an economic historian, brings his skills in economic theory, data 
analysis, and historical insights to his study of the “Inequality and Schooling Re-
sponses to Globalization Forces: Lessons from History.” Using a model with two 
countries (the New World and Europe) and three factors (unskilled labor, skilled 
labor, and land/capital), Williamson analyzes the effects of immigration during 
two periods, the period of mass migration pre-1914 and the period of minimal 
migration and immigration restrictions that followed.
While the two world wars and the Great Depression were exogenous to the 
trans-Oceanic migration flows, Williamson recognizes that the immigration re-
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strictions in the countries of overseas settlement were endogenous to the supply 
of immigrants.
The period of mass migration was dominated by positively selected but large-
ly unskilled flows from Europe’s low-skilled labor surplus to the low-skilled, 
labor-scarce countries in the New World, in particular the U.S., Canada, and 
Australia. These flows raised low-skilled workers’ wages in Europe and lowered 
them in the destinations, compared with what otherwise would have occurred. 
This tended to reduce the real wage gap between Europe and the New World but 
also reduced income inequality in Europe and raised it in the New World. The 
absence of significant migration after 1914 resulted in a change in labor supplies 
that increased relative wage differentials, and hence inequality, in Europe but re-
duced relative wage differentials in the U.S., since low-skilled labor became more 
scarce as native-born workers increased their levels of skill.
Williamson also argues that these changes in labor supply due to interna-
tional migration were responsible for changes in rates of return from schooling 
that led to changes in the educational attainment of the labor force. This was one 
factor; other influences on the growth of schooling were the impacts of chang-
es in technology and school policies. The late nineteenth century technological 
revolution in manufacturing played an important role in increasing the rate of re-
turn from schooling, particularly in the United States, and thereby increasing the 
demand for secondary and tertiary schooling. Enrollments were increased by the 
lobbying success of school teachers and others in propagating the idea of free (no 
charges for attending) public secondary schooling and its eventual spread across 
the country. In the United Kingdom, binding minimum-school-leaving-age laws 
raised schooling levels. 
In reading Williamson’s account of events in the age of mass migration, if 
you replace the New World with the advanced, high-technology OECD countries 
of today and replace Europe with the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, and perhaps the transition countries of Russia and Eastern Europe, 
it strikes me that Williamson’s text could be describing the current period. While 
there is much migration of high-skilled workers today, migration to the U.S. and 
Western Europe is now dominated by low-skilled workers from the less-devel-
oped countries. One consequence is increased inequality in the advanced econo-
mies as their native-born, lower-skilled workers pay the price of the large-scale 
influx of the low-skilled.
Gustav Ranis
In his paper, “Migration, Trade, Capital, and Development: Substitutes, Com-
plements, and Policies,” development economist Gustav Ranis brings the analysis 
explicitly into the contemporary period and models the incentives for migrating 
and the effects of legal barriers. As the potential supply of migrants exceeds the 
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legal limits, incentives exist for illegal migration. These incentives are realized if 
the enforcement mechanisms are insufficient. 
Liberal democracies have enacted provisions to enforce immigration law, in-
cluding border enforcement and interior enforcement, typically in the form of 
penalties against employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens (“employer sanc-
tions”). Yet, liberal democracies have difficulty enforcing these laws in the pres-
ence of employer groups, immigrant/ethnic constituencies, and civil libertarians 
who fundamentally endorse open borders. 
The argument that free trade advocates should favor open borders misses 
an important point. Migrants are different from shirts. When migrants cross bor-
ders, they acquire, de facto even if not de jure, political and economic rights 
that neither shirts nor the shirtmakers in less-developed countries acquire from 
the destinations. My shirt was made by Bangladeshi workers. If they made it in 
the U.S., their children would be entitled to schooling here, and given their low 
skills, their low wages would entitle them to subsidized medical care, perhaps 
subsidized housing, the Food Stamp Program, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
so on. If they make the shirt in Bangladesh, they receive no such benefits from 
the U.S. taxpayer.  
Ranis also correctly reminds us that the simple two-country, three-factor mod-
el does not tell the full story regarding the economic development of the country 
of origin. The developing countries benefit directly and indirectly from emigra-
tion. There are emigrant remittances—funds that go to families back home rather 
than to bureaucrats in the capital. Return migrants bring back skills (including en-
trepreneurial skills), technology, and connections acquired in the West. Because 
of the reduced supply of low-skilled workers, higher wages and employment 
for low-skilled workers reduce inequality and poverty. However, Ranis does not 
mention that if the emigration is positively selected, it may be the most able, the 
“best and the brightest,” who leave and do not return.
This raises a question seldom asked. If we are concerned about the economic 
well-being of a developing country, how should we measure economic welfare? 
Conventional measures focus on those living in the country. But if we are con-
cerned with people rather than countries, the emigrants should be considered 
as well. The positive effect of international migration on the economic welfare 
of Mexicans or Algerians, as distinct from Mexico and Algeria, must include the 
welfare of those who emigrated. If they move voluntarily, their welfare must have 
increased. 
I am reminded of Harberger’s triangles in reading Ranis’ paper. Barriers to 
voluntary exchange reduce economic exchange and thereby reduce economic 
welfare. Ranis reminds us that the barriers to international capital flows have 
been virtually eliminated and the barriers to trade in goods and services have 
been sharply reduced. The social welfare gains from further reductions in these 
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barriers, while positive, are likely to be relatively small. Yet, in contrast to the 
preceding century of largely open migration, the recent century of restrictions on 
international migration has, in principle, created opportunities for welfare gains 
by removing these barriers. The greatest contributions to economic development, 
though, have come from advances in technology. These productivity-enhancing 
changes may originate in one country, but in the modern world the knowledge is 
quickly available worldwide. Which international migration regimes foster tech-
nological advancement? The free flow of high-technology workers to technology 
centers (for example, Silicon Valley and its equivalents elsewhere) may be the 
answer.
James Hollifield
So, the next questions are, why were these barriers enacted? and, could an 
international regime be created to better manage international migration? Politi-
cal scientist James Hollifield focuses on the latter question in his paper, “Trade, 
Migration, and Economic Development: The Risks and Rewards of Openness.” 
Part of the answer as to why barriers were enacted is that people are not 
like shirts. As mentioned above, migrants acquire political and economic rights in 
the destination that the shirtmakers in the country of origin do not obtain from 
the destination. These include economic benefits such as medical care, schooling 
for their children, and income transfers for the poor. They also include political 
rights, both explicit (voting) and implicit (people do matter even if they do not 
vote), which can be used to change the distribution of power, wealth, and prop-
erty rights. Impacts on the culture also matter, and while some may view these as 
positive, others may not.
There are interconnections between immigration policy and domestic policy. 
As landless, lower-skilled workers in the New World grew in number and espe-
cially as they acquired political rights in the nineteenth century, the balance of 
power changed between owners of land and capital on the one hand and low-
skilled workers on the other. The latter, fearing competition from low-skilled im-
migrants, favored restrictions and enacted them when they could in coalition with 
nativist elements and others.
Perhaps the most recent example was the 1996 welfare reform, which, among 
other provisions, barred recent immigrants from receiving certain federal income 
transfers. I believe that this welfare reform was legislated in part because of the 
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which established a process by which 
nearly 3 million low-skilled illegal aliens were the direct beneficiaries of an am-
nesty and perhaps several million more were indirect beneficiaries.
It might be argued that the gain in income to natives who benefit from im-
migration exceeds the loss in income to the low-skilled natives from low-skilled 
immigration and that natives as a whole are better off. Moreover, in principle, the 
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gainers could compensate the losers so that everyone gains (Pareto optimality). In 
practice, however, the transfers might never take place. And if the income transfer 
system requires that low-skilled immigrants and natives be treated equally, the 
immigrants get these transfers as well. Then, it is easy to show that natives as a 
whole would lose as a result of equal treatment for low-skilled immigrants.
An interesting distinction arises between the direction of international trade 
and international migration. International trade is necessarily, over the long run, 
a two-way street. Imports must be paid for in some way. When comparing coun-
tries or regions with similar wage levels across skill groups, migration also tends 
to be a two-way street (for example, compare Canada and the U.S., the Nordic 
countries, or Illinois and Indiana). When this is the case, it is easier for countries 
to form international agreements on the free mobility of workers. Political con-
cern arises most intensely when migration is a one-way street, especially when 
those using the street are low-skilled workers. It is under these circumstances that 
nation states have divergent interests regarding the number, characteristics, and 
expected length of stay of the migrants. Under these circumstances international 
agreements are more difficult to establish. As an example, consider the agreement 
on the free mobility of labor in the initial European Union, where the differences 
in incomes across countries were small, compared with the current anxiety over 
the admission of the much-lower-income Turkey and the transition economies of 
Eastern Europe.
There is perhaps an irony that liberal democracies, having learned the hard 
way that there is no such thing as a group of temporary workers from less-devel-
oped areas, have become much more reluctant to enter into international agree-
ments regarding the acceptance of low-skilled guest workers. Autocratic regimes 
that can confine them in foreign worker enclaves, impose severe penalties on 
those who do not depart when their contract expires, and have severe visa restric-
tions would have less reluctance.
Hollifield would like to see a more ordered world in which international 
agreements help regulate the international flow of workers. A wide consensus 
can be reached on some issues, such as against the sex trade and forced (slavery) 
migration. On some matters, there can be bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
for example, across countries with similar income levels and income distribution. 
Yet, for much international migration from low-income to high-income countries, 
there is a wide divergence in interests. While issue-specific bilateral agreements 
might be negotiated, the prospects seem remote for nation states to turn over 
sovereignty to some international organization for regulating migration between 
low-income and high-income countries or even among countries at the same 
level of economic development. Moreover, if the international organization were 
to be captured by autocratic regimes, repression against potential emigrants and 
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